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PHYSICIANS COUNTERATTACK: LIABILITY
OF LAWYERS FOR INSTITUTING
UrNhJUSTIFIED MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS*
SHEILA L. BIRNBAUM**
I asked him whether, as a moralist, he did not think that the practice of the
law, in some degree, hurt the nice feeling of honesty. JOHNSON. "Why no,
Sir, if you act properly. You are not to deceive your clients with false
representations of your opinion: you are not to tell lies to a judge." BOS-
WELL. "But what do you think of supporting a cause which you know to be
bad?" JOHNSON. "Sir, you do not know it to be good or bad till the Judge
determines it. I have said that you are to state facts fairly; so that your
thinking, or what you call knowing, a cause to be bad, must be from
reasoning, must be from your supposing your arguments to be weak and
inconclusive. But, Sir, that is not enough. An argument which does not
convince yourself, may convince the Judge to whom you urge it: and if it does
convince him, why, then, Sir, you are wrong, and he is right. It is his
business to judge; and you are not to be confident in your own opinion that a
cause is bad, but to say all you can for your client, and then hear the Judge's
opinion."
-James Boswell'
I. INTRODUCTION
The dramatic increase in the frequency of medical malpractice
actions as well as the size of individual awards has created a crisis
situation in several states, 2 causing the cost of medical malpractice
* Although this Article primarily focuses on physicians' remedies against attorneys who
institute unjustified medical malpractice suits, the conclusions reached here are applicable to
other professionals who have been unjustifiably sued for professional malpractice.
** Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Professor Birnbaum received her
B.A. and M.A. from Hunter College and her LL.B. from New York University.
1. J. Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. 366-67 (Oxford ed. 1934).
2. See generally HEW, Medical Malpractice Report of the Secretary's Commission on
Medical Malpractice (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW Report]; Special Advisory Panel, State of
New York, Report of the Special Advisory Panel on Medical Malpractice-State of New York
234-55 (1976) [hereinafter cited as New York Report]; Adler, Malicious Prosecution Suits as
Counterbalance to Medical Malpractice Suits, 21 Cleveland St. L.R. 51 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Adler]; Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 Am. B. Foundation
Research J. 87-89; Symposium-Medical Malpractice, 1975 Duke L.J. 1177; Symposium-The
1975 Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, 51 Ind. L.J. 91, 93-94 (1975); Note, Rx for New York's
Medical Malpractice Crisis, 11 Colum. J.L. & Social Problems 467 (1975).
The Idaho Supreme Court in passing upon the constitutionality of the Idaho Hospital Medical
Liability Act passed in 1975, rejected an argument that the Act was a relevant response to a
medical malpractice "crisis". The court, after reviewing some of the available data noted that
there was no evidence of a crisis either from the record or outside of it. The court, however,
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insurance to skyrocket 3 and physicians to feel threatened and out-
raged. Many physicians believe that the medical malpractice insurance
crisis has, in large part, been caused by overzealous and unethical
attorneys who institute groundless malpractice suits. 4 Recently several
physicians who were sued for medical malpractice have mounted a
legal counterattack against those lawyers whom the physicians claim
instituted such actions without justification.5 These physicians and
their attorneys hope that these legal tactics will discourage other
patients and their attorneys from prosecuting medical malpractice suits
of dubious merit. 6
While most of the actions instituted by these physicians have been
based upon the traditional tort theories of malicious prosecution, 7
abuse of process8 and defamation, 9 several cases have advanced such
novel causes of action as prima facie tort10 and professional negli-
remanded the case for further findings. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399 (Idaho
1976).
3. New York Report, supra note 2, at 242-43; Adler, supra note 2, at 206-07; Aitken, Medical
Malpractice: The Alleged "Crisis" in Perspective, 3 W. St. U.L. Rev. 27 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Aitken]; Ashier, Medical Malpractice Insurance-The Regulator's View, 49 Fla. B.J. 506
(1975); Gouldin & Gouldin, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis, 3 Ohio N.UL. Rev. 510
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Gouldin & Gouldin]; Gray, The Insurer's Dilemma, 51 Ind. L.J. 120
(1975); Linster, Insurance View of Malpractice, 38 Ins. Counsel J. 528 (1971); Segar, Is
Malpractice Insurable?, 51 Ind. L.J. 128 (1975); Note, Medical Malpractice-A Question of
Insurability, 80 Dick. L. Rev. 594 (1976); Note, Professional Liability Insurance: The Doctor's
Dilemma, 7 Loyola U.L.J. 459 (1976).
4. Adler, supra note 2, at 207; Aitken, supra note 3, at 28-29, 36-37; Daughtry, The View of
the Medical Profession, 38 Ins. Counsel J. 534, 535 (1971); Mallor, A Cure for the Plaintiff's
Ills?, 51 Ind. L.J. 103 (1975); Stewart, The Malpractice Problem-Its Cause and Cure: The
Physician's Perspective, 51 Ind. L.J. 134 (1975); Time Magazine, Apr. 19, 1976, at 89, col. 1.
However, the HEW Report, supra note 2, at 10, and AMA, Doctor's Countersuit: Hard to Win,
Medical World News, May 19, 1975, at 37 indicate that very few frivolous suits are filed against
doctors.
5. For an account of current attempts by physicians to countersue plaintiffs' malpractice
attorneys, see Berlin, The Need for Countersuits to Balance the Malpractice Scales, Am. Medical
News, Aug. 16, 1976, at 6; Gorney, Countersue That Malpractice Accuser? Better Think Twice,
Medical Econ., Sept. 3, 1973, at 242; Levine, I Beat a Malpractice Blackmailer, Medical Econ.,
Feb. 23, 1976, at 65; Reynolds, Doctor vs. Doctor, Medical Econ., Mar. 4, 1974, at 205;
Rosenberg, He Sued His Malpractice Accusers Right Back-for $3,000,000, Medical Econ., Dec.
8, 1975, at 69.
6. Rosenberg, He Sued His Malpractice Accusers Right Back-for $3,000,000, Medical
Econ., Dec. 8, 1975, at 69, 75; Time Magazine, Apr. 19, 1976, at 89, col. 1.
7. Adler, supra note 2, at 208-11. See pt. V A infra.
8. E.g., Doctor Strikes Back-Wins in Nuisance Suit, Medical World News, May 19, 1975,
at 38. See pt. V B infra.
9. Libel has proved an almost impossible cause of action to sustain. The only successful case
was marked by peculiar circumstances. Reynolds, Doctor vs. Doctor, Medical Econ., Mar. 4,
1974, at 205, 206, 211. See pt. V C infra.
10. See pt. VI A infra.
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gence in the absence of privity. 1' In addition to seeking relief in the
courts, physicians have also sought legislative redress. 12 Regulatory
legislation has recently been proposed or enacted in several states in an
attempt to curtail the institution of groundless malpractice actions. 13
Before analyzing the theories of recovery, both traditional and
innovative, now being asserted by physicians against lawyers who
institute unjustified medical malpractice actions, this Article will ana-
lyze the available statistical data to determine whether such data
substantiates the physicians' allegations that far too many malpractice
actions are wrongfully instituted. The Article will then examine the
theories of liability being advanced by physicians who believe they
have been unjustifiably sued, in view of the recognized public policy in
this country of encouraging open access to the courts for the settlement
of disputes. 14 Finally, an exploration of the reforms which have been
proposed to alleviate the problem of frivolous medical malpractice
suits will be undertaken.
II. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Many physicians contend that the majority of medical malpractice
claims are of doubtful merit and initiated by plaintiffs' attorneys
primarily to secure a fee under the contingent fee system.' 5 Certainly,
11. See pt. VI B infra.
12. ABA Commission on Medical Professional Liability, Informational Report, Appendix B
(1976) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report], notes that 25 states took some legislative action with
regard to medical malpractice liability insurance in 1975 and provides relevant data thereon. See
also Charbonneau, Medical Malpractice Crisis: Fact or Fiction?, 3 Orange County B.J. 139,
142-46 (1976) (summary of California's new legislation on malpractice); Gouldin & Gouldin, supra
note 3, at 530-33 (statistics and facts on legislative reforms in 1975); Steinberg, Medical
Malpractice Reform Act-A Legislator's View, 49 Fla. B.J. 510, 512-13 (1975) (discussing
Florida's new legislation); Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical
Malpractice Crisis, 1975 Duke L.J. 1417 (surveying all states); Comment, Recent Medical
Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 655 (1976) (Louisiana law em-
phasized); Note, Medical Malpractice-A Question of Insurability, 80 Dick. L. Rev. 594
(1976) (Pennsylvania law discussed).
13. The new legislation includes the setting of ceilings on recoveries, the regulation of
contingency fees, the institution of review panels and shorter statutes of limitations. See ABA
Report, supra note 12, at 2-6; New York Report, supra note 2, at 256-58; Epstein, Medical
Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 Am. B. Foundation Research J. 87, 12841; Gibbs, The
Montana Plan for Screening Medical Malpractice Claims, 36 Mont. L. Rev. 321, 323-25 (1975);
Gouldin & Gouldin, supra note 3, at 530-33; Mallor, A Cure for the Plaintiff's Ills?, 51 Ind. L.J.
103, 106-18 (1975); Note, Professional Liability Insurance: The Doctor's Dilemma, 7 Loyola
U.L.J. 459, 480-82 (1976).
14. Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Mendez v. Heller, 380 F. Supp. 985,
989 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (three-judge court) (per curiam), vacated and remanded, 420 U.S. 916
(1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374, 377,
380-81 (1971)); Young v. Redman, 55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 838, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86, 93 (1976).
15. See HEW Report, supra note 2, at 10, 32; N.Y. Times, June 6, 1975, at 18, col. 2.
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if the statistical evidence supports the physicians' claims that a sub-
stantial number of malpractice actions are unjustifiably instituted
merely for their settlement value, physicians should receive relief from
such suits.
The available statistical data is unfortunately incomplete and incon-
clusive since none of the studies undertaken have expressly focused on
the problem of unjustified medical malpractice claims. However, three
major studies,16 completed within the last four years, shed some light
on the extent of the problem. Each study deals with a vastly different
sampling group: the HEW Report of the Malpractice Commission, 17
established by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare in
1973, broadly outlined nationwide trends in the malpractice field; the
New York State Advisory Panel Report examined the medical mal-
practice crisis in the State of New York;18 and the Michigan Physicians
Crisis Committee Survey concentrated on statistical data in three
Michigan counties. 19
Although many of the conclusions reached in these surveys are
contradictory, they all agree that the number of medical malpractice
claims has increased substantially in recent years. 20 The studios have
16. It must be noted at the outset that the three studies discussed are by no means the only
attempts to analyze the medical malpractice crisis. Rather they have been chosen because of their
currency, statistical orientation and their representative sampling mix. However, the studies use
different units of measurement which makes any real comparison difficult. See, in addition, the
first major study on medical malpractice, Ribicoff, Medical Malpractice: the Patient vs. the
Physician, Trial, Feb.fMar. 1970, at 10.
17. HEW Report, supra note 2. The Commission studied the medical malpractice files closed
in 1970 by 26 major malpractice insurers. Id. at 5 n.l.
18. New York Report, supra note 2. The major source of data for this report was the
Actuarial Survey of Professional Medical Liability Insurance and Defense Program of the Medical
Society of New York as of June 30, 1975 which was based on physician data collected by
Employers Mutual of Wausau, Wisconsin, the official carrier of malpractice insurance for the
New York State Medical Society from 1959 to 1974. Id. at 237-38. For a review of the Florida
malpractice problem, see generally Symposium-Shedding Light on the Medical Malpractice
Problem, 49 Fla. B.J. 499-517 (1975).
19. Physicians Crisis Committee, Court Docket Survey (1975) [hereinafter cited as Physicians
Survey]. The Committee surveyed malpractice cases filed in Wayne, Oakland and Macomb
Circuit Courts in Michigan from 1970 to 1974. Id. at 3.
20. In New York from 1969 to 1974, the number of new cases rose 56% (from 1283 to 2003).
New York Report, supra note 2, at 17. This figure includes: an "event" (notification by the
physician to the insurance company that an incident has occurred); a "claim" (a patient or his
attorney indicates to the physician that they are contemplating bringing action against a
physician); a "suit" (the instituting of an action for malpractice). Id. at 248. The Physicians
Survey noted a 193% increase in medical malpractice suits filed in the three counties from 1970 to
1974. Physicians Survey, supra note 19, at 6-7. The HEW Report documented a 10.6% increase
in malpractice files opened in 1970 by the insurance carriers surveyed over those closed in that
year. HEW Report, supra note 2, at 5-6. Despite the publicity given to a few large malpractice
settlements and verdicts, the HEW Report concluded that "a medical malpractice incident is a
relatively rare event; claims are even rarer . . . ." Id. at 12.
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attributed this significant increase to several factors.2 1 They recognized
that there have been "[s]teady and marked increases in the utilization
of health services" in this country as a result of "expanded private
health insurance and the enactment of major Federal health programs,
particularly Medicare and Medicaid ..... 22 With increased medical
services, the frequency of adverse consequences to a patient is corre-
spondingly increased. Another factor contributing to the rise in litiga-
tion has been the utilization of "more sophisticated and advanced
medical procedures and technology" 2 3 by physicians who fail to ex-
plain to their patients the risks and experimental nature of these
treatments. When the treatment does not result in a complete "cure,"
the patient, who is often confused and unsatisfied, initiates a malprac-
tice action. 24 Another factor almost universally cited for the increase in
malpractice claims has been the breakdown of the traditional doctor-
patient relationship.25 As the Committee on Medicine and Law of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York has noted:
The decline of the general practitioner and the increase in specialization, which by
itself frequently requires but does not always result in a referral, have combined to
create a less personal patient-physician relationship and a greater willingness on the
part of the patient to sue the physician.
2 6
Other factors have also been cited by various studies as being
responsible for the dramatic increase in medical malpractice litiga-
tion.2 7 The HEW Report noted that there has been a substantial
growth in all forms of personal injury litigation2 8 since World War II,
attributing this increase in part to a growing interest in consumer
rights and "a concomitant trend toward the socialization of compensa-
21. See Mechanic, Some Social Aspects of the Medical Malpractice Dilemma, 1975 Duke L.J.
1179, 1181-86 [hereinafter cited as Mechanic].
22. New York Report, supra note 2, at 9-10.
23. Id. at I0; see Assoc. of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Committee on Medicine and Law,
The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis, 30 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 336 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as City Bar Report].
24. City Bar Report, supra note 23, at 336.
25. See id.; HEW Report, supra note 2, at 3; New York Report, supra note 2, at 10.
26. City Bar Report, supra note 23, at 336.
27. The Physicians Survey attempted to correlate the increase in malpractice suits with the
introduction of no-fault insurance in Michigan and the resultant decline of personal injury
litigation in that state. Physicians Survey, supra note 19, at 8-9. The New York statistics,
however, apparently refute this contention. Not only has the rate of increase in New York
medical malpractice claims remained fairly constant over the years, but the institution of no-fault
has not as yet resulted in a documented decrease in automobile litigation. New York Report,
supra note 2, at 248.
28. HEW Report, supra note 2, at 3. The statistical data in the products liability field also
reflects a marked increase in claims filed in recent years. The insurance industry has seen a 26%
increase in the number of products claims from 1969 to 1973. See Product Liability, A Tale
Written in Red Ink, 52 J. Am. Ins. 16 (1976).
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tion for all types of injuries."2 9 It would appear that many Americans
have come to look upon the courts as arbiters of their legal, social, and
economic problems, including purported errors in medical treat-
ment. 3
0
Compounding the problem in the medical field has been the devel-
opment of what the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
Report has termed the " 'Marcus Welby Syndrome'-an unrealistic
expectation [on the part of the general public] that medical treatment
will provide a cure in every instance." 31 Fueled by media reports of
medical "miracles," a greater public interest in medicine has emerged,
"leading the public to develop many unrealistic expectations about
medicine's capabilities. '32 As a result "[m]any Americans regard good
health as though it were a commodity, something that the doctor can
dispense at will."' 33 The failure to achieve this state of ideal health has
led more and more Americans to seek relief in the courts in an attempt
to assuage their disappointment.
Although all of the studies document an increase in the frequency of
malpractice claims, only the HEW Report directly focused upon the
physicians' chief contention-that most malpractice claims are ground-
less. To test the validity of the physicians' assertions, the HEW Report
asked malpractice insurers to indicate whether or not each closed
malpractice claim filed during 1970 was "legally meritorious in terms
of liability." According to the Commission:
The results indicated that the insurance carriers judged 46 percent of the claims to be
meritorious. This percentage is slightly higher than the percentage of all claims paid
(45%); however, cross tabulations are not yet available to establish any possible
correlation between claims paid and claims judged to be meritorious. Viewed together,
the number of claims judged to be meritorious by malpractice insurers and the number
in which payment was made to the claimant would seem to indicate that the vast
majority of malpractice claims are not "entirely baseless," as often alleged.34
Contrary to the HEW Report, the Physicians Survey concluded that
settlement or other disposition of malpractice claims has little to do
with merit.35 Rather, the Survey contended that many baseless claims
are settled rather than litigated because defense counsel fears a "sym-
pathetic" or "emotional" judgment by a jury. 36 The Survey asserted
29. HEW Report, supra note 2, at 3.
30. See Newsweek, Jan. 10, 1977, at 42.
31. City Bar Report, supra note 23, at 336.
32. HEW Report, supra note 2, at 3.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 10.
35. Physicians Survey, supra note 19, at 10.
36. Id. at 13. The Physicians Survey indicates that "emotional" is merely a code word for
1008 [Vol. 45
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that insurance companies can afford the predictable losses from settle-
ments, but cannot bear the risk of judgments resulting from unpredict-
able factors. 37 A decision to settle a baseless claim may be made by
defense counsel who in reality represents not the physician but the
insurance company which would often rather settle out of court to
avoid the expenses of litigation than defend against a baseless suit. The
Survey concluded that the physician, despite his protestations of
innocence, will usually acquiesce in the decision because he is
literally at the mercy of the insurance company. If he incurs their displeasure, they can
"rate" his premium or arbitrarily refuse to review his insurance. Since the market is
not competitive, he is without recourse and can thereby be deprived of his livelihood.38
While the New York Report did not address itself directly to the
number of groundless claims or suits filed, it did present some
statistics that are helpful in analyzing the problem. The Report indi-
cated that the number of suits "marked off" (that is, suits where there
has been no activity by the plaintiff's lawyer on the case for a
substantial period of time and which may therefore be considered
frivolous) has been increasing steadily since 1970. 3 9 Dismissed or
discontinued causes of action (that is, suits where no payments have
been made), which for the most part reflect unsubstantiated claims,
remained relatively stable between January 1958 and June 1974,
averaging 28 percent of the total number of suits brought.
40
The HEW Report revealed that 50 percent of the 16,000 insurance
files dosed in 1970 were concluded without the claims resulting in
suits, with some payment made in approximately 25 percent of these
closed files. 41 The remainder of the claims not litigated were aban-
doned or settled without any payment. 42 The other 50 percent of the
claims filed resulted in lawsuits and 80 percent of these actions were
settled prior to trial, with the claimant receiving some payment 60
percent of the time. 43 The remaining 20 percent of the suits filed were
tried by jury and resulted in plaintiffs' verdicts 20 percent of the time.44 In
factors which would lead the jury to award a plaintiff a large judgment, regardless of the merit of
the claim. These factors include race, religion, stature, national origin, the nature of the injury
and a desire to redistribute income. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 14.
39. New York Report, supra note 2, at 240. The figures for the first six months of 1974
indicate that 15% of the suits closed were marked off. Id.
40. Id. at 242. The Report noted that from 1964-74 over 70% of the closed claims resulted in
no payment. Id. at 245-46.
41. HEW Report, supra note 2, at 10.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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sum, there was payment in approximately 45 percent of all claims,
whether or not a lawsuit was filed.
4
-
The Physicians Survey reached far different conclusions from the
New York and HEW Reports. The Michigan tri-county study indi-
cated that 91 percent of the medical malpractice suits resulted in some
payment to the plaintiff.4
6
Another trend which has disturbed physicians is the steady increase
in the size of malpractice awards. 4 7 The HEW Report recognized that
the number of large awards or settlements increased dramatically. In
1970, however, over 50 percent of the claimants received less than
$3,000.48 Awards in excess of $40,000 constituted 6.1 percent of the
total funds allocated to claimants4 9 and less than one out of every
1,000 claimants was paid $1,000,000 or more, with no more than
seven such payments being made in each year prior to 1973. 5o The
New York Report noted that in 1974 the average payment per claim
rose to $35,151.70.51 This figure is somewhat misleading as it incorpo-
rates several disproportionally high awards.The median payment per
claim in which payment was made fell between $10,000 and $19,999.52
The Physicians Survey reports a vastly greater increase in the size of
awards. Although it indicated that the average recovery for 77 cases
(settlement or verdict) filed from 1970 to 1974 was $66,000, it sug-
gested that a more accurate estimate is the known result of 35 cases
filed in 1970 in which the average payment was in excess of $78,000. 3
The studies agree that only a very small percentage of the cases
instituted ever reach the courtroom. An even smaller number of cases
are actually tried before a jury to a verdict.5 4 The New York Report,
45. Id. In a survey of the medical malpractice legal system prepared for the HEW Commis-
sion on Medical Malpractice it was reported that in 68% of the cases in the national survey and
79% of the cases in the selective survey some dollar amount was recovered by plaintiff. HEW
Report, supra note 2, Appendix 104. This national survey was conducted by mailing question-
naires to a random sample of about 800 lawyers in private practice. Four hundred additional
lawyers known to be engaged in medical malpractice were surveyed in the selective survey by
mall questionnaires or personal interviews. Id. at 87. See note 57 infra.
46. Physicians Survey, supra note 19, at 25.
47. In California, an average of one $1,000,000 judgment is awarded each month. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 19, 1975, at 36, col. 1. The large judgments awarded have resulted in a sharp
increase in the cost of malpractice insurance. Id., cols. 1-2.
48. HEW Report, supra note 2, at 10.
49. Id. Since the Report's years of study, inflation will have increased the percentage of
awards totalling more than $40,000.
50. Id. In New York, there were eight awards over $100,000 in 1970, but 44 in 1974. See
New York Report, supra note 2, at 186.
51. New York Report, supra note 2, at 245-48.
52. Id.
53. Physicians Survey, supra note 19, at 28.
54. According to the Physicians Survey, 9% of the cases in the four-year survey period were
tried and only 5.4% were tried before a jury. The Survey acknowledges, however, that a
1010 [Vol. 45
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in fact, reported a decline in the number of cases tried by a jury from
1970 to 1974." s No consensus emerged from the studies as to plaintiffs'
success rate at trial. 5 6 The reports all confirmed, however, that the
vast majority of cases are settled favorably to plaintiff prior to trial. 57
No accord has been reached with respect to the reasons prompting
these settlements. The Physicians Survey views the high settlement
rate largely as a maneuver to cut litigation costs from the defendant's
point of view and increase recovery and contingent fees from the point
of view of plaintiffs lawyers.58 In contrast, the HEW Report implies
that lawyers have no such self-serving motives in settling claims. In
most cases they have already incurred much of the expense and
undergone preparation for trial prior to the trial itself-even if the trial
is never conducted. 59
Physicians have asserted that the contingent fee arrangement 60
encourages attorneys to institute malpractice claims of doubtful merit
in order to secure substantial fees. 6 1 Lawyers, on the other hand, have
percentage of the cases filed have not yet reached trial and the figure will therefore increase. In
rural counties with shorter calendars 17% of all cases were tried. Id. at 10-11. The New York
Report found that the percentage of suits ultimately decided by a jury verdict remained fairly
constant from 1958 to 1969 averaging about 9%. New York Report, supra note 2, at 240. The
survey prepared for the HEW Commission indicated that 17% or 29% of the cases are ever tried
depending upon whether the national or selective survey figures are chosen. HEW Report, supra
note 2, Appendix 103. The national survey consisted of a random sampling of the nation's private
practitioners. The selective survey was composed of lawyers specializing in medical malpractice
litigation. Id. at 89.
55. While the percentage of suits tried by jury between 1958 and 1969 remained stable and
averaged 9%, this figure decreased to an annual rate of 4% of all suits brought between the years
1970 and 1974. New York Report, supra note 2, at 240.
56. The Physicians Survey suggested that plaintiff received a jury award in about 50% (30 of
58) of the cases. Physicians Survey, supra note 19, at 26. In contrast, the New York Report
indicated that from 1958 to 1974, 13% of the cases decided by jury verdict were decided in favor
of plaintiff and 87% in favor of defendant. New York Report, supra note 2, at 240. The HEW
Report indicated that plaintiffs' win-rate at trial was 63% according to the selective survey but
only 44% according to the national survey. HEW Report, supra note 2, Appendix 104.
57. The success rate of plaintiffs is found to be highest in the Physicians Survey which
concluded that 91% of all cases result in some money settlement. Physicians Survey, supra note
19, at 25, Table 12. The New York Report indicated that the percentage of suits settled by the
patient averaged 57% for the years 1958 to 1974. New York Report, supra note 2, at 240. The
HEW national survey showed that in 68% of all cases, whether terminated by trial or settlement,
some dollar amount was recovered by plaintiff, while the selective survey indicated that 79% of
all cases resulted in some dollar recovery. HEW Report, supra note 2, Appendix 104.
58. Physicians Survey, supra note 19, at 12-14; see notes 35-38 supra and accompanying text
for a discussion of the additional factors promoting settlement.
59. HEW Report, supra note 2, at 33.
60. "A contingent fee is a fee set as a percentage of recovery for a successful law suit." New
York Report, supra note 2, at 42. If the client receives no recovery, the lawyer is usually not
compensated for the work he performed. Id.; HEW Report, supra note 2, at 32-33.
61. HEW Report, supra note 2, at 32; New York Report, supra note 2, at 42; N.Y. Times,
June 6, 1975, at 18, col. 2.
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vigorously supported the contingent fee arrangement on the ground
that it enables claimants with legitimate claims who could not pay
legal fees in advance of trial to pursue their claims. 62 In fact, it has
been asserted that the contingent fee system actually protects physi-
cians from groundless suits, since an attorney will reject a frivolous
claim if it appears that he will not receive any remuneration for his
services. 63 The HEW Report concluded that "most physicians gener-
ally placed undue emphasis on the influence of the contingent fee
system upon malpractice litigation .... "64 The New York Report
suggested that the contingent fee while useful should be limited,
especially in those cases where exceptionally high verdicts or settle-
ments are awarded. 65
There is substantial evidence to infer, contrary to the physicians'
claims, that there are many more acts of medical malpractice than are
actually reported or litigated. The data indicates that the number of
claims brought by patients against physicians has not been excessive
and that serious acts of malpractice frequently occur, especially in the
course of hospital treatment. 66 It has been estimated that as many as
five percent of the medical profession are unfit to practice medicine. 67
If this figure is accurate, these 16,000 incompetent physicians are
treating an estimated 7.5 million patients a year. 68 Moreover, in a
recent study by the American College of Surgeons and the American
Surgical Association, it was found that 78 percent of preventable
surgical complications were due to surgeons' errors, with one-half
resulting from faulty surgical techniques. 69 These figures alone suggest
62. HEW Report, supra note 2, at 33; New York Report, supra note 2, at 42. "[Tlhe
contingent fee system tends to discourage the acceptance of . . .meritorious malpractice cases
involving minor injury and relatively small potential recovery. . . ." HEW Report, supra note 2,
at 33.
63. A recent New York survey indicated that "80 percent of all prospective clients are turned
down by plaintiffs' malpractice lawyers ...." Harley & Rheingold, New Survey of Malpractice
Litigation, 175 N.Y.L.J., April 28, 1976, at 1, col. 2. The HEW Report confirmed these
estimates and noted that about 12% of all malpractice claims were accepted by the lawyers to
whom they were brought. HEW Report, supra note 2, Appendix 153. The lawyers surveyed In
the HEW Report reported that about half of the claims were rejected because of a lack of
apparent liability. Id. at 97.
64. HEW Report, supra note 2, at 32; see also City Bar Report, supra note 23, at 352.
65. New York Report, supra note 2, at 42. In New York, legislation was passed limiting the
attorneys' contingent fee as follows: 50% of the first $1,000 recovered; 40% of the next $2,000
recovered; 35% of the next $22,000; and 25% of any amount in excess of $25,000. A larger fee
may be authorized by court order if there is a showing of extraordinary circumstances. N.Y.
Judiciary Law § 474-a (McKinney Supp. 1976). See also Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, § 1301.604
(Supp. 1976).
66. Mechanic, supra note 21, at 1188-89.
67. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
68. Id.
69. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1976, at 24, col. 1. American surgeons are performing an estimated
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that many patients may have legitimate claims of malpractice. Al-
though this evidence does not establish that all of the malpractice
claims that are litigated are meritorious, it does demonstrate that there
are at least many more cases of malpractice than most physicians care
to publicly admit. In fact, some physicians have recently acknowl-
edged that the quality of medical care given by the average physician
falls below accepted standards. 70
A study of consumer attitudes also reflects that the great majority of
cases involving potential medical malpractice never result in legal
action of any kind.7 ' In a study conducted by the Temple University
Institute of Survey Research, approximately two-fifths of the 1,017
respondents reported that either they, their spouses, or their depen-
dents had suffered a negative medical care experience 72 within the past
ten years. 73 It is significant to note that only eight percent of those
with negative medical care experience considered seeking the advice of
a lawyer, and of these, less than half actually consulted with a
lawyer. 74 Based on this survey, it can be inferred that very few acts of
malpractice actually culminate in a law suit.
It is clear that the statistical studies do not lend themselves to
comparison and vary widely in their conclusions. The varied conclu-
sions reached appear to reflect, to some extent, the biased viewpoint
of those conducting the surveys. While no clear-cut assessment of the
problem of unjustified malpractice claims emerges from the available
contradictory surveys, the fragmentary data does not suggest that a
significant portion of malpractice claims are unfounded. In the final
analysis, any meaningful appraisal of the statistical information must
await a refinement of sampling techniques and the creation of a
total of 2.4 million unnecessary operations each year in which 11,900 patients die as a result of
complications. Id.
70. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1976, at 1, col. 1; id. at 20, col. 4. A former director of the Federal
Commission on Medical Malpractice noted that: "The time has come ...to recognize that the
root cause of the current malpractice problem is the substantial number of injuries and other
adverse results sustained by patients during the course of hospital and medical treatment." Id. at
20, col. 3.
71. See Peterson, Consumers' Knowledge of and Attitudes Toward Medical Malpractice, in
HEW Report, supra note 2, Appendix 659.
72. HEW Report, supra note 2, Appendix 668; Mechanic, supra note 21, at 1188-89 ("Such
reports . .. reflect only the perceptions of the respondents, and provide no indication of the
degree of malpractice involved.").
73. HEW Report, supra note 2, Appendix 658-59.
74. Id. at Appendix 659. The report specifically found that of the thirty-seven respondents
who considered legal action, fourteen actually consulted with a lawyer. Of those fourteen who
took their case to- a lawyer, twelve reported having their cases accepted by counsel. Of these
twelve claimants, six eventually decided not to bring a claim, two brought a claim but later
withdrew it without settlement, two claims were settled before trial, and two claims were still not
settled at the time of the survey. Id. at Appendix 675.
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mechanism to specifically secure reliable and consistent data on the
various aspects of the medical malpractice problem generally and
"meritorious" claims in particular.7 5 Many physicians, however, re-
main convinced of the legitimacy of their grievances7 6 and have
initiated a counterattack against the lawyers they view as adversaries.
The battle lines have been drawn and it remains to be seen whether
the legal strategy advanced by these physicians will overcome the
traditional resistance of the courts against providing a recovery for
unjustified litigation.
III. CONFLICTING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A balance must be struck between competing policy considerations
when a physician seeks legal redress against a lawyer who has al-
legedly instituted an unjustified medical malpractice suit. 7 7 It is
axiomatic to our system of jurisprudence that potential litigants should
have free and open access to courts in order to settle their grievances .7
Theoretically, the courts are available to every citizen, subject only to
the penalty of lawful costs 79 if the action is unsuccessful. 80 To ensure
open access to the courts, substantial financial penalties have not been
levied against litigants for instituting actions which ultimately prove
unsuccessful.
The same general principles and policy considerations must apply to
attorneys representing claimants. An attorney must have the same
freedom in initiating the client's action as the client, or else the client's
freedom of access to the courts would indeed become a sham. Accord-
ing to the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, an attorney has a
75. In an attempt to establish improved reporting of malpractice claims many states have
enacted legislation requiring insurers writing professional liability coverage to keep detailed
records of malpractice claims. See, e.g., N.Y. Ins. Law § 335 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
76. See N.Y. Times, June 6, 1975, at 18, col. 2.
77. See Soffos v. Eaton, 152 F.2d 682, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
78. Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Mendez v. Heller, 380 F. Supp. 985,
989 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (three-judge court) (per curiam), vacated and remanded, 420 U.S. 916
(1975) (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374, 377, 380-81 (1971)); Young v. Redman,
55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 838, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86, 93 (1976).
79. " 'Costs' are statutory allowances to a party to an action for his expenses incurred in the
action" and are recoverable from the losing party. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs § 1 (1965). Attorneys' fees,
in the absence of a special statute, are generally not recoverable. 1 S. Speiser, Attorneys' Fees §
12:3 (1973).
80. Many statutes award court costs to the prevailing party at the expense of the loser. Even
where such awards are discretionary, this prevailing party rule usually controls. D. Dobbs,
Remedies § 3.8, at 193 (1973). There have been recent proposals in the New York legislature for
additional cost allowances for attorneys' fees to defendants who prevail in malpractice cases.
Note, Rx for New York's Medical Malpractice Crisis, 11 Colum. J.L. & Social Problems 467,
481-82 (1975).
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duty to zealously represent his client, seek any lawful objective
through legally permissible means and present for adjudication any
lawful claim.81 The Code also provides that an attorney may, in good
faith and within the framework of the law, proceed to test the
correctness of a rule or attempt to extend, modify or reverse traditional
outmoded theories of law.8 2 If attorneys were unduly restricted in
commencing lawsuits by the threat of a countersuit should they be
unsuccessful, not only would worthy litigants be denied their day in
court, but the common law would lose much of its flexibility and
would be unresponsive to changing social needs.
The physicians' interest in discouraging patients and their attorneys
from prosecuting what the physicians consider to be unjustified claims
may conflict with the public policy of open access to the courts if the
prosecution of meritorious claims is discouraged as well. However,
physicians, as well as other professionals who are sued for malpractice,
can suffer substantial damage to their professional reputations as a
result of such claims. Especially in smaller communities, the com-
mencement of a malpractice action may cause the physician considera-
ble adverse publicity, resulting in the loss of patients and income.
Furthermore, a physician who is wrongfully sued for malpractice may
suffer severe mental distress.8 3 The physician so sued has to commit a
substantial amount of time and energy helping to prepare his defense
at the expense of his practice and personal life. Even if the physician is
ultimately successful in defending the malpractice action, he may
still sustain a substantial economic loss, since his insurance premiums
may be increased or his insurance may be cancelled altogether. 84
The disruptive impact that malpractice suits, especially unjustified
ones, have on medical services is substantial. Physicians who are
sued for malpractice may become more suspicious of their patients. As
a result of their fear of malpractice actions, doctors have begun to
practice a kind of defensive medicine85 that is expensive and often
counterproductive, a reaction which adversely affects the overall qual-
ity of medical services.86
81. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-1.
82. Id. at EC 7-4.
83. See Daughtry, The View of the Medical Profession, 38 Ins. Counsel J. 534, 535-36 (1971).
84. E.g., Rosenberg, He Sued His Malpractice Accusers Right Back-for $3,000,000,
Medical Econ., Dec. 8, 1975, at 69, 71.
85. HEW Report, supra note 2, at 14. Defensive medicine has been defined as the conducting
of a test or performance of a diagnostic or therapeutic procedure which is not medically justified
but is carried out primarily-if not solely---to prevent or defend against the threat of medical-
legal liability. Id.
86. Id. at 14-15; New York Report, supra note 2, at 110; Adler, supra note 3, at 207;
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The impact of unjustified malpractice claims on the court system
and society is also considerable. Increased numbers of malpractice
claims add to court congestion and adversely affect already overbur-
dened court personnel and facilities. Wrongfully instituted malpractice
actions which would be vigorously defended, of course, exacerbate this
condition.
The increase in malpractice suits and the size of awards87 has
furthermore had an enormous impact on the insurance industry and in
many states has precipitated a medical malpractice insurance crisis
with serious ramifications. 88 In some states, insurance companies have
refused to write professional liability insurance.8 9 In other states there
has been a significant increase in insurance premiums, 90 a cost which
is ultimately passed on by physicians to their patients. 9'
The courts must ultimately balance the competing interests of physi-
cians who wish to be secure from defending unjustified malpractice
suits and of patients and their attorneys who have a right to pursue
meritorious malpractice claims. In reaching this goal the courts must
confront the threshold issue of defining those malpractice claims which
are, in fact, "unjustifiably" instituted. 92
IV. DEFINING UNJUSTIFIABLY INSTITUTED
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
Although there is little agreement as to the proportion of medical
malpractice claims that are unjustifiably instituted, there is substantial
Hershey, Defensive Medicine, Trial, May/June 1973, at 61; Mechanic, supra note 21, at 1189-92;
Project-The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 Duke L.J. 939.
87. See notes 20, 47, 49-53 supra and accompanying text.
88. See notes 2-3 supra.
89. In 1975, two insurance companies dropped their malpractice insurance coverage for
nearly 2,000 physicians in the Los Angeles area. Newsweek, Feb. 10, 1975, at 41. First
Employers of Wausau, the primary insurer of physicians in New York, withdrew its coverage in
that state on July 1, 1974. New York Report, supra note 2, at 10. The Argonaut Insurance
Company of Menlo Park, California, who replaced First Employers as the primary malpractice
insurer for New York physicians, announced in 1975 that it would withdraw its coverage from
New York State. Id. at 10; N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1975, at 23, col. I.
90. The average medical malpractice insurance premium in 1973 was $1,905 a year, By 1975
it had risen to an average of $7,787. N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1976, at 22, col. 2. Other statistics
indicate that in 1970 physicians generally paid 541% more for their malpractice insurance than
they did ten years previously. Surgeons, a higher risk group, paid more than 949% more for their
malpractice insurance during the same period. HEW Report, supra note 2, at 13.
91. In the past, physicians have passed on to their patients 80-90% of the cost of malpractice
insurance. New York Report, supra note 2, at 108. A recent American Medical Association study
indicated that over a two-year period doctors raised their fees 96 cents per patient because of
malpractice insurance costs. N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1976, at 22, col. 2.
92. See Rheingold, Remedies of the Wrongfully Sued Professional, 1975 Nat'l Medicolegal
Symposium 52.
PHYSICIANS COUNTERATTACK
agreement that some portion of the malpractice actions brought are
groundless. 93 Some actions clearly are unjustifiably instituted and must
be vigorously discouraged by both the bench and the bar. Such an
action is one brought solely to harass a physician as a result of a
patient's spite, malice or ill will. Although it is relatively easy to state
that the action has been unjustifiably commenced, it is difficult in
many cases to prove that a patient has been primarily motivated by
hostility or ill will. Similarly, an attorney who knows or obviously
should know that a malpractice action would serve merely to harass or
maliciously injure another should be liable for initiating an unjustified
malpractice action. Moreover, if an attorney has failed to use rea-
sonable skill and diligence to ascertain the pertinent facts or examine
the applicable law prior to instituting a malpractice action, and the
facts or the law would not support such a claim, the action may be
considered unjustifiably and wrongfully instituted. 94 If an attorney
continues to prosecute an action after discovering that the relevant
facts or the law do not support a claim against the physician, the
action should also be considered unjustifiably and wrongfully main-
tained.
Another category of unjustified actions are those instituted in an
attempt to extort a settlement from a physician's insurance carrier for
the "nuisance value" of a claim. 95 An attorney who institutes such a
claim may know, or should know, that the allegations of malpractice are
extremely tenuous, if not completely groundless. The attorney never-
theless hopes that the insurance carrier, who is indemnifying and
defending the physician, will find it economically beneficial to settle
the action rather than pay the substantial defense costs that could
result from a protracted complex jury trial and appeal. Such claims,
even though not motivated by hostility or ill will, have the same effect:
economic and professional harassment and injury to the defendant
physician. A claim or action instituted merely to force a nuisance
settlement from a physician or his insurer should be considered unjus-
tifiably instituted and should be strenuously discouraged. However,
the difficulty will again be in identifying those claims which lack any
merit and are instituted merely for their "settlement value."
There are also those malpractice claims that are asserted by a
93. See N.Y. Times, June 6, 1975, at 18, col. 2 (physicians' charges).
94. Such acts by an attorney would amount to an absence of probable cause-one of the
essential elements of a suit for malicious prosecution. See notes 131-43 infra and accompanying
text.
95. Rosenberg, He Sued His Malpractice Accusers Right Back-for $3,000,000. Medical
Econ., Dec. 8, 1975, at 69, 74; Note, Rx for New York's Medical Malpractice Crisis, 11 Colum.
J.L. & Social Problems 467, 480 (1975).
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patient in response to a physician's claim or suit for an unpaid bill for
services rendered. 9 6 In an attempt to reduce the physician's claim for
services, the patient, on advice of counsel, may assert a baseless
counterclaim for medical malpractice. The patient and his attorney, in
this instance, hope that the physician will reduce his bill rather than
report the claim to his insurance carrier and be forced to defend a
malpractice action. If such a counterclaim is introduced merely to
"blackmail" the physician, it is obvious that the action is unjustifiably
and wrongfully brought and the physician should have some legal
redress against the claimant and his attorney.
Many other malpractice actions prove to be unsuccessful, but they
may not and should not be classified as unjustifiably instituted. Prior
to complete discovery in a malpractice case it is difficult, if not
impossible, to determine which of several physicians involved in
treating a patient was actually responsible for the medical malpractice
which caused the patient's injuries. The attorney's problem, if this
occurs, is magnified in those states that have adopted extremely short
statutes of limitation for medical malpractice actions. 9 7 If the attorney
failed to join a physician who he later discovered was responsible for
the alleged malpractice, the attorney could be held liable to his own
client for professional malpractice if the statute of limitations subse-
quently barred the action. The attorney's dilemma may be exacerbated
at the time of trial when those physicians who are sued attempt to shift
the blame to a physician who is not a party to the action. In these
instances, however, the attorney may not be justified in continuing the
action if it becomes apparent after pretrial discovery that the physician
is not a proper party defendant. This is true even though initially an
attorney may have been justified in bringing an action against all of
the treating physicians. If the attorney wrongfully continues an action,
the physician should have an action against the attorney for the
continuance of an unjustified claim.
There are also those malpractice actions in which an attorney joins a
physician as a party defendant in order to secure his testimony
although the attorney does not ultimately intend to pursue the action
against that defendant. 98 Even though the attorney discontinues the
96. Levine, I Beat a Malpractice Blackmailer, Medical Econ., Feb. 23, 1976, at 65.
97. In 1975, many states changed their statutes of limitations relating to medical malpractice.
The general thrust of these reforms was to shorten the period and set absolute maximums for
bringing an action. ABA Report, supra note 12, Appendix B Attachment 1, at 6-7. Comment, An
Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 Duke L.J. 1417,
1429-36; Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 Tul. L. Rev.
655, 672-74 (1976).
98. Courts have disapproved of the practice of joining a doctor as a party defendant solely for
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action immediately after taking the doctor's deposition, the doctor may
still have sustained substantial mental and pecuniary damage as a
result of being named as a defendant. However, an attorney may have
what he believes to be a justifiable reason for pursuing such a practice,
especially where a hospital or a physician has refused to permit the
attorney to examine records prior to suit99 or where it is impossible to
secure qualified expert testimony because of a physician's standing in
the local medical community.100 The attorney, however, must not only
seriously consider the ethical ramifications of such conduct but the
legal implications of prosecuting an action that may, at a later date, be
considered unjustifiably prosecuted.
Expanding tort law in many jurisdictions also tends to encourage
attorneys to sue any physician who was involved in treating the
patient. In some jurisdictions, the rule of res ipsa loquitur has been
expanded to such an extent that all those involved in an operative
procedure may be found liable for a patient's injury. This is true even
though they are innocent of malpractice since the burden of proof is
shifted from the unconscious plaintiff to each of the physicians in the
operating room to establish that he was not negligent.' 01 Where the
courts have expanded the physicians' liability to this extent, an attor-
ney would certainly be justified in proceeding against all the physicians
who may have been involved in an operative procedure, even if one or
more of the physicians were actually innocent of malpractice. The
attorney under these circumstances is merely utilizing the applicable
case law, and the physicians' remedy, if any, would be to seek
legislative or judicial modification of this expansive interpretation of
the res ipsa loquitur rule.
the purpose of obtaining his testimony as an expert McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat
Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 30 n.5, 203 N.E.2d 469, 475 n.5, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65, 73 n.5 (1964) C"It is, of
course, assumed that a plaintiff, in naming a doctor as a defendant, has done so in good faith, on
the basis of his relationship with the case and not as a device or subterfuge in order to afford the
plaintiff an opportunity to call him as an expert witness."); Pipers v. Rosenow, 39 App. Div. 2d
240, 245-46, 333 N.Y.S.2d 480, 485-86 (2d Dep't 1972).
99. Disclosure is generally permitted prior to the commencement of an action, by court order,
to aid in bringing an action and determining the identity of the party to be sued. E.g., N.Y.
CPLR § 3102(c) (McKinney 1970).
100. Although it has long been the case that the plaintiff could call the defendant doctor to
testify concerning facts within his knowledge, a significant number of states now hold that a
doctor can be called as an expert witness in the case in which he is a defendant. J. Waltz & F.
Inbau, Medical Jurisprudence 80-82 (1971). See Gouldin & Gouldin, supra note 2, at 525 & n.71.
101. Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. App. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); Anderson v. Somberg,
67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1 (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975), noted in 7 Seton
Hall L. Rev. 208 (1975); HEW Report, supra note 2, at 28-29; Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The
Case for Contract, 1976 Am. B. Foundation Research J. 87, 138-49; Comment, An Analysis of
State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 Duke L.J. 1417, 1426-29.
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There are some cases which do not fall into the above categories, but
which are brought by a patient for a minor or superficial injury. Such
claims are legitimate, but the courts' facilities are taxed and the
defendant physician is forced to expend substantial money and effort
to contest an action which he considers insignificant or frivolous.
These actions may be unjustifiably instituted in terms of the amount of
money that the plaintiff may recover compared with the amount of
money and energy that the defendant expends to defend against such
an action; but the courts must remain open to all legitimate claimants
no matter how miniscule the amount of their recovery.
Finally, it should be remembered that the mere fact that a jury
returns a verdict for the defendant physician does not establish that the
action was unjustified, any more than the fact that a jury returns a
verdict for the plaintiff would establish that a physician has been
guilty of malpractice. There are many factors, both objective and
subjective, which may have caused such a result. The patient and his
attorney may not have been able to obtain qualified expert witnesses
who would testify against a fellow physician, even where an act of
malpractice was performed. The attorney who represented the patient
may have been inadequate as compared to defense counsel, or, even
worse, he may have been incompetent to try such a technical and
complicated case. The subjective bias or feelings of the jury and not
the merits of the patient's case may also have determined the outcome
of the action. However, a small portion of these actions may have been
instituted without probable cause. These actions may be considered
unjustifiably prosecuted, but only if a mechanism can be devised for
distinguishing the unjustified action from the meritorious one.
If a physician believes that an unjustified malpractice action has
been instituted against him, he must consider what remedies are
available as a legal counterattack against the patient's lawyer who
initiated the groundless action. Before exploring the possible innova-
tive concepts, both judicial and legislative, that have been proposed to
remedy the problem of unjustifiably instituted malpractice actions, it is
essential to examine the traditional tort remedies that have been
utilized in the past when a civil action was unjustifiably instituted.
V. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF RECOVERY
A. Malicious Prosecution
The action for malicious prosecution or malicious use of process10 2
has its roots in the early common law of England as a tort action to
102. An action for malicious use of process and one for malicious prosecution are essentially
the same. See Golden Commissary Corp. v. Shipley, 157 A.2d 810, 814 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App.
1020 [Vol. 45
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recover damages for the institution, maliciously and without probable
cause, of a criminal judicial proceeding that terminated in favor of the
accused. 10 3  However, since the passage of the Statute of
Marlbridge, 10 4 which provided that attorneys' fees could be awarded
as costs'0 5 to a successful defendant in a civil action, English courts
have refused to extend the tort of malicious prosecution to wrongfully
instituted civil actions unless there has been an arrest of the person or
seizure of property.10 6
In the United States, two views have developed as to whether a
malicious prosecution action is available when a civil action is wrong-
fully initiated. A sizeable minority of jurisdictions'0 7 adhere to the
English rule and refuse to recognize a claim for malicious prosecution
in a civil action, even though the suit was instituted for an improper
purpose and without probable cause, in the absence of an arrest, an
interference with the defendant's property, 10 or some special injury' 0 9
which is ordinarily not an incident of defending similar civil actions. " 0
A few jurisdictions, in an attempt to modify the harshness of this
requirement, have broadened the accepted definition of special injury
to include the loss of a legally protected right,"' and the burden of
1960). Some cases, however, use the term malicious prosecution when referring to criminal
process and the term malicious use of process when referring to civil process. See Woodley v.
Coker, 119 Ga. 226, 46 S.E. 89 (1903); Publix Drug Co. v. Breyer Ice Cream Co., 347 Pa. 346,
32 A.2d 413 (1943).
103. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 119, at 834-35 (4th ed. 1971) (hereinafter
cited as Prosser].
104. 52 Hen. 3, c. 6 (1267).
105. The statute afforded a summary remedy for costs and damages in the original action in
lieu of an independent action for damages for malicious prosecution. Shute v. Shute, 180 N.C.
386, 104 S.E. 764 (1920); Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897).
106. 52 Am. Jur. 2d Malicious Prosecution § 9 (1970).
107. Shute v. Shute, 180 N.C. 386, 388-89, 104 S.E. 764, 766 (1920); Prosser, supra note 103,
at 851.
108. See, e.g., North Point Constr. Co. v. Sagner, 185 Md. 200, 44 A.2d 441 (1945);
Pittsburg, J.E. & E.R.R. v. Wakefield Hardware Co., 138 N.C. 174, 50 S.E. 571 (1905);
Cincinnati Daily Tribune Co. v. Bruck, 61 Ohio SL 489, 56 N.E. 198 (1900) (per curiam).
109. The special injury which traditionally supported a malicious prosecution action occurred
where there was an arrest, an attachment, an appointment of a receiver, a writ of replevin or an
injunction. Manufacturers & jobbers Fin. Corp. v. Lane, 221 N.C. 189, 196, 19 S.E.Zd 849, 853
(1942).
110. See, e.g., Wetmore v. Mellinger, 64 Iowa 741, 18 N.W. 870 (1884); Chappelle v. Gross,
26 App. Div. 2d 340, 274 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1st Dep't 1966); Petrich v. McDonald, 44 Wash. 2d 211,
266 P.2d 1047 (1954).
111. Rivers v. Dixie Broadcasting Corp., 88 Ga. App. 131, 76 S.E.2d 229 (1953) (business
losses resulting from suspension of radio station construction during pendency of proceeding
considered a special injury); Carver v. Dykes, 262 N.C. 345, 137 S.E.2d 139 (1964) (loss of right
to practice profession as a broker considered a special injury).
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defending against the successive institution of the same action" 2 or a
wholly frivolous appeal. 113 However, the usual expenses of litigation,
annoyance, and inconvenience are regarded as the normal incidents of
defending a civil suit and are generally insufficient to form the basis of
a claim of special injury."14 The courts adopting this restrictive rule
reason that the assessment of lawful costs compensates the successful
litigant and that the honest litigant must be encouraged to seek justice
in a court of law unhampered by fear of a countersuit for malicious
prosecution. These courts also rationalize that such restrictions are
necessary to prevent successful defendants from instituting counter-
suits which could result in interminable and vexatious litigation." s
A majority of jurisdictions, however, have eliminated this restric-
tion, and recognize an action for malicious prosecution for any civil
suit instituted maliciously and without probable cause. 116 These courts
acknowledge that the traditional American concept of legal costs
differs significantly from the costs available to a successful litigant in
England, 117 and that costs in the United States are totally inadequate
compensation for the time, effort, and expense of defending a baseless
suit. 18 In addition, these courts reason that the heavy burden of proof
resting upon the plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution will
usually operate as a sufficient restraint upon the indiscriminate institu-
tion of such claims as well as a sufficient safeguard against intermina-
ble litigation. 119
In those jurisdictions where an action for malicious prosecution is
permitted without proof of special injury, 120 a physician may institute
112. Soffos v. Eaton, 152 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Shedd v. Patterson, 302 Ill. 355, 134
N.E. 705 (1922).
113. Holt v. Boyle Bros., 217 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
114. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 366 Il. 247, 8 N.E.2d 668 (1937); Alswang v. Claybon, 40 Il.
App. 3d 147, 351 N.E.2d 285 (1976).
115. Peerson v. Ashcraft Cotton Mills, 201 Ala. 348, 78 So. 204 (1917).
116. See, e.g., Peerson v. Ashcraft Cotton Mills, 201 Ala. 348, 78 So. 204 (1917); Ackerman
v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 15 P.2d 966 (1932); Eastin v. Bank of Stockton, 66 Cal. 123, 4 P. 1106
(1884) (en banc); Slee v. Simpson, 91 Colo. 461, 15 P.2d 1084 (1932) (en banc); Levy v. Adams,
140 Fla. 515, 192 So. 177 (1939); Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897); Teesdale v.
Liebschwager, 42 S.D. 323, 174 N.W. 620 (1919); Prosser, supra note 103, at 853. This position
has been approved by Restatement of Torts § 674 (1938).
117. See McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of
Damages, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 619 (1931).
118. Id. at 620-21. See Peerson v. Ashcraft Cotton Mills, 201 Ala. 348, 78 So. 204 (1917);
Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897).
119. Eastin v. Bank of Stockton, 66 Cal. 123, 4 P. 1106 (1884) (en banc).
120. In jurisdictions that continue to apply the strict requirement of proof of special injury,
the physician's ability to assert a cause of action for malicious prosecution is illusory, in most
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such an action arising from an unjustifiably initiated medical malprac-
tice claim12 1 provided the necessary elements of the action can be
established.1 2 2 These elements include: the commencement or continu-
ation of a malpractice proceeding by the patient against the physician;
the termination of such proceeding in the physician's favor, the ab-
sence of probable cause for instituting the proceeding; malice on the
part of the patient in instituting such proceeding; and damage to the
physician as a result of the proceeding. 123 A malicious prosecution
action is not favored by the law 124 and therefore the elements of the
action are strictly construed. 125 Hence, the physician who fails to
prove any one of the prescribed elements will be unable to recover for
malicious prosecution.
An action for malicious prosecution of a medical malpractice suit
may be maintained against the patient 126 who initiated the action as
well as his attorney. 12 7 Although the attorney owes a duty12 8 to his
client to present his case vigorously, the attorney cannot completely
disregard the rights of the defendant physician in the discharge of this
duty. 12 9 The cause of action for malicious prosecution against an
attorney is dependent upon the existence of elements comparable to
cases, because the patient's suit against a physician for malpractice does not usually involve a
civil arrest of the physician, seizure of the physician's property, or any recognized special injury
to the physician which would not ordinarily result in all suits prosecuted for like causes of action.
See notes 108-10 supra and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Carroll v. Kalar, 112 Ariz. 595, 545 P.2d 411 (1976); Babb v. Superior Court,
3 Cal. 3d 841, 479 P.2d 379, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1971) (en banc); Spencer v. Burglass, 337
So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1976).
122. See Note, Malicious Prosecution: An Effective Attack on Spurious Medical Malpractice
Claims?, 26 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 653, 657 (1976).
123. Carroll v. Kaar, 112 Ariz. 595, 545 P.2d 411 (1976).
124. Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 479 P.2d 379, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1971) (en baned,
Gore v. Condon, 87 Md. 368, 39 A. 1042 (1898); Mayflower Indus. v. Thor, 15 N.J. Super. 139,
83 A.2d 246 (1951).
125. Higgins v. Knickmeyer-Fleer Realty & Inv. Co., 335 Mo. 1010, 1029, 74 S.W.2d 805,
814 (1934) (per curiam).
126. The patient could establish probable cause for instituting the malpractice action by
proving that he instituted the action on the advice of counsel, after full and truthful disclosure of
the facts. This good faith reliance defense is available even though the lawyer's advice proves
erroneous. Restatement of Torts § 675, comment g (1938). See also Allen v. Moyle, 84 Idaho 18,
367 P.2d 579 (1961); Patapoff v. Vollstedt's, Inc., 230 Ore. 266, 369 P.2d 691 (1962); Consumers
Filling Station Co. v. Durante, 79 Wyo. 237, 333 P.2d 691 (1958).
127. See, e.g., Carroll v. Kalar, 112 Ariz. 595, 545 P.2d 411 (1976); Ferraris v. Levy, 223
Cal. App. 2d 408, 36 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1963); AnnoL, 27 A.L.R.3d 1113 (1969).
128. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-1, DR 7-101(A)(1).
129. Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975); Tool Research & Eng'r
Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1975).
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those necessary to sustain an action for malicious prosecution against
his client, the patient. 130
A physician has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the patient's attorney lacked probable cause for institut-
ing the prior malpractice suit. 13' If probable cause is established it
operates as an absolute defense to a malicious prosecution action, even
if actual malice is proved.' 32
It is difficult to define precisely the term probable cause, 133 espe-
cially when applying it to an attorney who is pursuing a litigant's
rights in a lawsuit. In a recent California case 134 the court correctly
defined probable cause in the context of a malicious prosecution suit
brought against attorneys who had instituted a civil action on behalf of
their clients. The test enunciated by the court to determine whether the
attorneys acted with probable cause was twofold, comprising both
subjective and objective elements. The attorney must entertain a
subjective belief that his client has a tenable claim; and that belief
must satisfy an objective standard of what a reasonable or ordinarily
prudent attorney would have believed after an industrious investiga-
tion of both the facts and the law. 135 Before instituting an action an
attorney need not be convinced that his client will prevail provided he
has a reasonable and honest belief that his client's claim merits
litigation. 136
The attorney, in representing his client, must be permitted to pursue
litigation vigorously although unsure of whether his client or his
client's adversary is truthful, as long as the issue is genuinely in
doubt. 137 Hence an attorney generally may rely in good faith upon the
facts his client relates to him without seeking verification of these facts
130. Tool Research & Eng'r Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291
(1975); Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1947). See text accompanying note
123 supra.
131. Hunter v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 129 W. Va. 302, 310, 40 SoE.2d 332, 337 (1946).
132. Burt v. Smith, 181 N.Y. 1, 6, 73 N.E. 495, 496 (1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 129
(1906).
133. Probable cause for a criminal prosecution has been defined as "the knowledge of facts,
actual or apparent, strong enough to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he has lawful
grounds for prosecuting the defendant in the manner complained of." Id. at 5, 73 N.E. at 496.
134. Tool Research & Eng'r Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291
(1975).
135. Id. at 683, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 297; accord, Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123
Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975).
136. Tool Research & Eng'r Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291
(1975).
137. Id. at 684, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
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through independent inquiry. 138 Unless lack of probable cause for a
claim is obvious from the facts disclosed by the patient or oth-
erwise brought to the attorney's attention, the attorney may assume
that his client is honest and that the facts disclosed by him are
substantially correct. 139
Finally, the existence of some evidence contrary to the position
advanced by the attorney, although probative of the reasonableness of
his belief, does not, in and of itself, support an inference that the
attorney did not honestly believe that the patient's claim merited
litigation. 140 However, if the attorney prosecutes a malpractice claim
which a reasonable attorney would not regard as tenable, or proceeds
with a malpractice action after unreasonably neglecting to investigate
the facts and the law, the absence of probable cause may be estab-
lished. 141 When an attorney initiates an action, he is not, and should
not be, "an insurer to his client's adversary that his client will [be
successful]."'1 42 The attorney may reasonably submit a doubtful issue
of law when the outcome is uncertain or the law is unclear as a result
of changing public and judicial attitudes. 143 If, at the conclusion of the
litigation, the attorney's position proves to be erroneous, he should not
be held liable for malicious prosecution merely because he advanced a
new theory of law which the courts were not willing to accept.
Proof of malice is also an indispensable element of a malicious
prosecution claim. 144 Malice is difficult to define, however, because of
the varied meanings courts have given the term. 145 Malice in fact, or
actual malice, in the context of a malicious prosecution action, has
been defined as an evil or sinister purpose, or a depraved, wicked or
mischievous intention or motive. 146 It is not necessary, however, to
prove actual malice in the sense of hatred, hostility, or ill will in order
138. Maechtlen v. Clapp, 121 Kan. 777, 250 P. 303 (1926); Peck v. Chouteau, 91 Mo. 138, 3
S.W. 577 (1887); Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974).
139. Maechtlen v. Clapp, 121 Kan. 777, 250 P. 303 (1926); Peck v. Chouteau, 91 Mo. 138, 3
S.W. 577 (1887).
140. Tool Research & Eng'r Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291
(1975).
141. Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975); Tool Research &
Eng'r Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1975).
142. Tool Research & Eng'r Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675. 683, 120 Cal. Rptr.
291, 297 (1975).
143. See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-2.
144. Crescent City Live Stock Co. v. Butcher's Union Slaughter-House Co., 120 U.S. 141
(1887); Hanchey v. Brunson, 175 Ala. 236, 56 So. 971 (1911); Konas v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 158
Colo. 29, 404 P.2d 546 (1965); Keller v. Butler, 246 N.Y. 249, 158 N.E. 510 (1927).
145. See Fridman, Malice in the Law of Torts, 21 Modem L. Rev. 484 (1958).
146. Griswold v. Home, 19 Ariz. 56, 165 P. 318 (1917).
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to prevail. 147 Malice has been held to be present when the original civil
suit was actuated with an improper motive, 148 such as lack of belief in
the validity of the claim or of the possibility of success in the action. 14 9
Legal or implied malice' 5 0 may also be sufficient, in some jurisdictions,
to sustain a malicious prosecution action. Legal malice "may be
evidenced by a wanton or reckless refusal to make reasonable investi-
gation with regard to the propriety of a prosecution, or by the refusal
to terminate [an action] upon notice that it is wrongful."'15 1 Of course,
as with probable cause, termination of a malpractice action in favor of
the former defendant affords no evidence that the action was mal-
iciously instituted.' 5 2 It is not necessary that the attorney was himself
motivated by malice; it is sufficient that he knew of his client's
malicious motives when instituting the proceeding. '53 Moreover, proof
of malice need not be direct. The jury may infer malice from an
absence of probable cause, although the opposite inference may not be
drawn. 154
To succeed in a malicious prosecution action against an attorney, a
physician must also establish that the prior malpractice suit terminated
in his favor.15 5 Until this occurs, the former defendant has not
sustained any damages.15 6 The requirement of favorable termination
precludes a defendant from interposing a counterclaim for malicious
prosecution in the original malpractice proceeding. 15 7 Where a physi-
147. Prosser, supra note 103, at 855.
148. Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897).
149. Southwestern R.R. v. Mitchell, 80 Ga. 438, 5 S.E. 490 (1888).
150. Legal or implied malice has been defined as "a state of mind, which may be inferred
from the intentional doing of a wrongful act." Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630,
638 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1974).
151. Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630, 638 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
152. See Malloy v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R.R., 34 S.D. 330, 148 N.W. 598 (1914).
153. Munson v. Linnick, 255 Cal. App. 2d 589, 63 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1967); Burnap v. Marsh,
13 Ill. 536 (1852); Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1947); Peck v.
Chouteau, 91 Mo. 138, 3 S.W. 577 (1887).
154. Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 194 (1878); Adams v. Vhitfield, 290 So. 2d 49, 51
(Fla. 1974).
155. Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 845, 479 P.2d 379, 380, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 180
(1971) (en banc); see Schwartz v. Schwartz, 366 Ill. 247, 8 N.E.2d 668 (1937); Desmond v.
Fawcett, 226 Mass. 100, 115 N.E. 280 (1917).
156. MacEachern v. MacEachern, 127 Wash. 32, 216 P. 881 (1923).
157. Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 479 P.2d 379, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1971) (en banc),
Brand v. Hinchman, 68 Mich. 590, 36 N.W. 664 (1888); MacEachern v. MacEachern, 126
Wash. 32, 216 P. 881 (1923); Note, Counterclaim for Malicious Prosecution in the Action Alleged
to be Malicious, 58 Yale L.J. 490 (1949). In Herendeen v. Ley Realty Co., 75 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Sup.
Ct. 1947), the court permitted a counterclaim for malicious prosecution to be asserted In the
original proceeding. Subsequent New York cases have not followed this case. E.g., Embassy
Sewing Stores, Inc. v. Leumi Financial Corp., 39 App. Div. 2d 940, 333 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2d Dep't
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cian sought a declaratory judgment that the malpractice action was
being maliciously prosecuted, in the malpractice action itself, one court,
in defense of the favorable termination rule, noted that it was sup-
ported by "conceptual, practical and policy reasons."15 8 The rule
prevents the possibility of inconsistent judgments which might result if
the plaintiff prevailed in the main action, yet lost the malicious
prosecution action.15 9
Public policy, also, requires that the favorable termination rule be
retained to discourage additional claims for malicious prosecution,1 60 a
cause of action which the courts disfavor. Moreover, if counterclaims
for malicious prosecution were permitted to be asserted in the original
action, a plaintiff could suffer substantial prejudice by the introduction
of proof of lack of probable cause and malice in the original proceed-
ings. 16 1 Finally, if an attorney was joined as a defendant in the
malicious prosecution action before termination of the original proceed-
ing, the attorney would be placed in a potentially adverse position to
his client and separate counsel would have to be retained at additional
expense to the plaintiff to prosecute the original action.' 6 2
A favorable termination does not necessarily require an adjudication
on the merits.1 63 Termination of the prior malpractice proceeding
therefore may be established by proof that the action was abandoned
or dismissed. 164 Where it was "stipulated and agreed" that a case be
dismissed as to the defendants "without prejudice and without costs to
either party" a federal court concluded that the jury must decide,
under the circumstances, whether the withdrawal or abandonment
1972) (per curiam). See also Sonnichsen v. Streeter, 4 Conn. Cir. 659, 239 A.2d 63 (1967);
Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J. Super. 139, 83 A.2d 246 (1951), where counterclaims
for malicious prosecution were recognized.
158. Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 846, 479 P.2d 379, 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179,
181 (1971) (en banc).
159. Id. at 847, 479 P.2d at 382, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
160. Id. at 847-48,479 P.2d at 382, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 182. If a counterclaim was permitted, the
frequency of malicious prosecution would increase considerably, since less time, expense and
preparation is generally needed to file a counterclaim than to prosecute an independent action.
161. Id., 479 P.2d at 382, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 182. One commentator who supports the filing of
counterclaims during the pendency of the original action as a deterrent to the prosecution of
spurious claims suggests that adjudication of the counterclaim could await the disposition of the
original action to minimize the unfairness to the original plaintiff. Note, Malicious Prosecution:
An Effective Attack on Spuiious Medical Malpractice Claims?, 26 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 653, 684
(1976).
162. Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 848, 479 P.2d 379, 382, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 182
(1971) (en banc).
163. Hernon v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 96, 99 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
164. Baird v. Aluminum Seal Co., 250 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1957); Webb v. Youmans, 248 Cal.
App. 2d 851, 57 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1967).
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constituted a favorable termination. 165 However, a voluntary discon-
tinuance or a settlement agreed to by both parties generally acts as a
bar to an action for malicious prosecution. 166 By terminating the
action in such a manner, the physician estops himself from claiming
that the malpractice action was initiated without probable cause. 167
The physician must also prove actual damages in excess of the costs
recoverable in the original action in order to recover since no damage
will be presumed. 168 Once a physician establishes that he has sustained
some actual damage he may recover for all of his consequential
damages: 169 any lost income; 170  reasonable legal fees incurred in
defending the malpractice suit; 17 1 harm to reputation; 172 and mental
suffering. 173 In addition, punitive damages may be recovered where
there is proof of actual malice 174 or, in some jurisdictions, even where
there is proof of legal malice. 175 However, the mere absence of
probable cause 17 6 for instituting an action is insufficient to imply the
degree of legal malice generally necessary to support an award for
punitive damages. 17 7
Until quite recently 178 there have been very few malicious prosecu-
165. Hernon v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 96, 99 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
166. Baird v. Aluminum Seal Co., 250 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1957); Leonard v. George, 178 F.2d
312 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 965 (1950); Patete v. Baker, 14 Ill. App. 3d 385, 302
N.E.2d 416 (1973).
167. Leonard v. George, 178 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 965 (1950).
168. Lipscomb v. Shofner, 96 Tenn. 112, 33 S.W. 818 (1886); Prosser, supra note 103, at 855.
169. Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 847-48 & n.4, 479 P.2d 379, 382-83 & n.4, 92
Cal. Rptr. 179, 182-83 & n.4 (1971) (en banc).
170. Ray Wong v. Earle C. Anthony, Inc., 199 Cal. 15, 247 P. 894 (1926).
171. Stevens v. Chisholm, 179 Cal. 557, 178 P. 128 (1919); Connelly v. White, 122 Iowa 391,
98 N.W. 144 (1904); Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1068 (1968). But the physician will normally be
unable to recover for attorneys' fees incurred in bringing the malicious prosecution action
itself. See Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187 (1878); Benderack v. Grujicich, 30 N.M. 331, 233
P. 520 (1925).
172. Metzenbaum v. Metzenbaum, 121 Cal. App. 2d 64, 262 P.2d 596 (1953); Malone v.
Belcher, 216 Mass. 209, 103 N.E. 637 (1913). It has been argued that damage to reputation
resulting from a malicious prosecution action should be considered a special injury in those states
that follow the minority rule. See Note, Malicious Prosecution-Injury to Reputation as a Basis
for Recovery, 6 Willamette L.J. 173 (1970).
173. Stalker v. Drake, 91 Kan. 142, 136 P. 912 (1913); Cohn v. Saidel, 71 N.H. 558, 53 A.
800 (1902).
174. Alvarez v. Retail Credit Ass'n, 234 Ore. 255, 381 P.2d 499 (1963) (en banc); McIntosh v.
Wales, 21 Wyo. 397, 134 P. 274 (913).
175. Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1974). Legal malice may be inferred from
gross negligence indicating a wanton disregard for the rights of the litigant. Id. See notes 150-51
supra and accompanying text.
176. See notes 133-43 supra and accompanying text.
177. Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1974).
178. Since 1975 an unprecedented number of malicious prosecution actions have been
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tion actions instituted by physicians against attorneys who have unsuc-
cessfully litigated medical malpractice actions, and none of these cases,
except one, 179 has been successfully prosecuted. 180
The courts have been reluctant to find that an attorney has engaged
in malicious prosecution when a medical malpractice case has been
successfully defended. In Spencer v. Burglass,18 1 the Louisiana Court
of Appeals directly passed upon the question of an attorney's liability
for instituting a frivolous malpractice suit against a physician. The
physician alleged that in a medical malpractice action which termi-
nated in her favor the patient's attorney had failed to interview -and
consult with any medical witnesses prior to filing suit or trying the
case. Moreover, it was alleged that the hospital record indicated that
four doctors had examined the infant patient and found no bodily
damage. The physician claimed that the attorney owed her and the
public a duty to refrain from filing such groundless litigation. Although
the physician did not expressly plead malice, she claimed that an
action for malicious prosecution was stated because malice could be
inferred from the allegation that the patient's attorney filed suit with
knowledge that the allegations of malpractice were false or with a
reckless disregard of their truth. 182
The court, in affirming a dismissal of the physician's complaint,
concluded that her factual allegations did not support the claim that
the attorney knew that the patient's allegations were false or that he
acted with a reckless disregard of the truth when he filed the suit. On
the contrary, the physician's allegations created an inference that the
attorney simply did not know enough about the case when he insti-
tuted suit and this could not be construed as malice. The court
emphasized that if this type of conduct was considered to be malice,
"many a successful lawsuit would never have been or never would be
filed because oftentimes the case comes to the attorney just prior to
prescription date and the evidence is not discovered and developed
instituted by physicians against their former patients and the patients' attornes. Most of these
cases have not yet been tried. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Terry, Civil No. 75-565-CA-B (Fla. Cir. Ct.
1975); Rogers v. Hills, Civil No. W. 76 G. 268 L. (Ill. Cir. CL 1976); Balthazar & Schoenield v.
Dowling, Safanda & Reyes, Civil No. 76-1-799 (i. Civ. CL 1976); Schleinkofer v. Shambaugh,
Civil No. S-75-412 (nd. Cir. CL 1975); Friedman v. Dozorc, Civil No. 76-137492NZ (Mich. Cir.
CL 1976); Hoppenstein v. Zemek & Puskuldjian, Civil No. 19283-1976 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976);
Burkons v. Rogoff, Civil No. 953.503 (Ohio C.P. 1975).
179. Berlin v. Nathan, Civil No. 75 M2 542 (ill. Cir. CL June 1, 1976) (recovery on prima
facie tort and professional negligence causes of action). See notes 422-24, 482-84 infra and
accompanying text.
180. Adler, supra note 2.
181. 337 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1976).
182. See Carter v. Catfish Cabin, 316 So. 2d 517 (La. App. 1975).
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until after the suit is filed. ' 183 Although the allegation that the attorney
failed to interview any expert witness prior to filing suit might indicate
that the attorney was negligent in preparing the case, it did not imply
malice on the attorney's part. 184 The court found that "at worst...
defendant went to trial with a poor case and got his just desserts, to
wit, he lost.' 185 An attorney should be able to rely on circumstantial
evidence, reasonable inference and common sense without risking a
retaliatory countersuit for malicious prosecution. The court recognized
that the attorney was acting on behalf of his client, the father of the
infant plaintiff, who thought his child was damaged even though no
doctor agreed with him. The attorney was acting simply as the
instrument through which the patient invoked the judicial process and
without proof of specific malice in persuading the patient to initiate the
action, no cause of action for malicious prosecution was stated. The
majority of the court was obviously concerned with protecting the
state's avowed public policy of open access to the courts for redress of
grievances when it stated: "[C]onsideration must be given to the 'chilling
effect' such an action might have on the basic right of a citizen to seek
redress in court for what he considers to be a wrong.' I8 6
The dissenting opinion, however, refused to recognize the common
law tort of malicious prosecution since Louisiana was a ciVil law
state.18 7 Instead, the dissent treated the physician's action as one akin
to prima facie tort,' pursuant to a section of the Louisiana Civil
Code and Louisiana's constitutional guarantee that courts be open to
remedy injuries. '8 9
In cases such as this, the public policy favoring free access to the
courts will obviously be given enormous weight. It is difficult to
conceive of many cases where an action for malicious prosecution
would be stated, if one was not found in this case where an attorney
proceeded to trial without consulting any medical experts and there
was no evidence to support an inference of res ipsa loquitur.
A similar result recently occurred in Arizona' 90 where a physician,
183. 337 So. 2d 596, 599 (La. App. 1976).
184. The court suggested that the attorney's failure to adequately prepare the case might
provide a basis for a malpractice action by the attorney's client, but not the prior adverse
defendant. Id.
185. Id. at 600.
186. Id. at 601.
187. Id. at 602.
188. The dissent likened lack of probable cause in a malicious prosecution action to
instituting an action without arguable justification in an action in the nature of prima facie tort.
Id. at 603. See notes 430-36 infra and accompanying text.
189. See La. Const. art. 1, § 22; La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315 (West 1972).
190. Carroll v. Kalar, 112 Ariz. 595, 545 P.2d 411 (1976).
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after obtaining a dismissal of a malpractice claim on summary judg-
ment, brought suit for malicious prosecution against both the patient
and his attorney. A lower court rendered summary judgment for the
patient and his attorney on the ground that probable cause existed to
maintain the malpractice action. In affirming, the Supreme Court of
Arizona recognized that the failure to establish a lack of probable
cause for the malpractice claim constituted a defense to the malicious
prosecution action. 19 1 The attorney had sufficient reason to believe,
based on a deposition of another physician, that acts of malpractice
had indeed been committed. The court noted that in the absence of
some conflict concerning the facts, the decision as to whether probable
cause existed rested with the court as a matter of law.t 9 2 There was no
conflict in the facts merely because the affidavits of two attorneys
submitted in opposition to the summary judgment motion expressed an
opinion that the underlying facts of the malpractice case were in-
sufficient to support probable cause. This merely amounted to a
conflict in personal opinions as to the significance of facts, and did not
raise an issue of fact for the jury to resolve. Since the trial judge had to
determine whether probable cause was present, the opinions of other
attorneys were irrelevant and inadmissible. 193 The court concluded
that the attorney had conducted a reasonable investigation into the
circumstances surrounding the alleged malpractice and therefore his
decision to pursue the patient's case did not give rise to a cause of
action for malicious prosecution since "a reasonable man in [his] place
. . . could [have filed a] suit for malpractice." 194
The facts reported in a recently settled malicious prosecution suit in
California19 against a patient's attorney illustrate the kind of
conduct on the part of an attorney that could support a valid claim for
malicious prosecution. In this action, a pathologist was one of several
physicians named as defendants in a wrongful death action arising
from a surgical procedure. The pathologist's only connection with the
case was the performance of the autopsy. This fact, if unknown to
plaintiff's attorney when the action was first initiated, became known
to him early in the litigation when the pathologist's deposition was
taken. At the trial, several years later, the action against the
pathologist was discontinued after he testified.
A close analysis of these facts demonstrates the presence of all the
191. Id. at 596, 545 P.2d at 412.
192. The only function of the jury is to determine what the actual facts are if there is a
conflict. Id. at 598-99, 545 P.2d at 414-15.
193. Id. at 599, 545 P.2d at 415.
194. Id.
195. See Professional Liability Newsletter, Jan. 1976 at 1.
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essential elements of a malicious prosecution action. First, the dismis-
sal of the action against the physician during trial established that the
action was terminated in defendant's favor. Second, the facts indicated
that the attorney had knowledge that the action he had instituted
against the physician lacked probable cause. It was unreasonable for
the attorney to continue the action against the pathologist after discov-
ering he had no role in the surgical procedure. One can only assume
that the attorney did not discontinue the action against the physician
because he wanted his testimony as a witness at the time of the
trial-an insufficient reason for continuing the action. Third, malice
could have been inferred by the jury from an absence of probable
cause. If there was no evidence to establish the pathologist's malprac-
tice the jury could have found that the attorney's motive was improper
or unjustifiable.
With the steady expansion of liability in medical malpractice cases,
there are very few suits in which an attorney cannot successfully claim
that he had a tenable malpractice action against a physician and
thereby establish a defense to an action for malicious prosecution. For
example, in at least one jurisdiction it has been held that a patient
need not prove that the physician was negligent to recover, but may
rely on a theory of strict liability. 196 In some jurisdictions, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur has been extended in malpractice actions to permit
a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case on the basis of well-defined
circumstantial evidence without expert testimony and thereby to shift
the burden of proof to the defendant. 197 Furthermore, in some juris-
dictions, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been extended to hold
that each of the physicians involved in an operative procedure is
presumed to be negligent unless he rebuts this presumption.198 Some
jurisdictions have abandoned the locality rule with regard to expert
testimony and have replaced it with a national standard test, thereby
lessening the plaintiffs burden of proving that a physician failed to
meet the requisite standard of care. 199 The doctrine of informed
consent has also been expanded in many jurisdictions so that the
plaintiff, without relying on expert testimony, need only establish that
the physician failed to inform him of the material risks of an operative
procedure or treatment which a reasonable person would expect to
know before deciding to go forward with the treatment. 200
196. See Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974) (concurring opinion).
197. Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1 (1975).
198. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
199. See, e.g., Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 186, 349 A.2d 243
(1975); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967); Note, An Evaluation of
Changes in Medical Standard of Care, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 729 (1970).
200. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972);
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Given the traditional judicial attitude against expanding the mali-
cious prosecution action so as not to defeat the policy of open access to
the courts, it is doubtful that a physician, in most cases, can overcome
the burden of proving probable cause and malice. The traditional
malicious prosecution action could be an effective remedy only in those
few cases where it is obvious that the physician is a peripheral
defendant in the malpractice action. An attorney who continues an
action against a physician merely to obtain his expert testimony at the
time of trial in order to implicate the prime defendants could be
vulnerable to a malicious prosecution action. Although the attorney
may initially have reasonable grounds to believe that such a physician
was liable for malpractice, he has a duty2 0 ' to discontinue the action if
he learns through pre-trial discovery that the physician was not, in fact,
negligent or causally responsible for plaintiff's injury.
If the action for malicious prosecution was extended beyond its
present boundaries, attorneys who now represent physicians in malicious
prosecution actions against patients' attorneys might find themselves
liable for malicious prosecution if their actions ultimately proved
unsuccessful.20 2 Certainly in those jurisdictions where doctors and
their attorneys have publicly stated that they are instituting these
actions to deter the prosecution of frivolous medical malpractice suits,
it would be relatively easy to establish malice. Any significant expan-
sion of the tort of malicious prosecution would lead to interminable
and vexatious litigation that should be avoided.
B. Abuse of Process
Abuse of process in its broadest sense has been defined20 3 as the
misuse or perversion of regularly issued legal process, 204 after it has
Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552 (4th Dep't 1973); see Note,
Informed Consent-A Proposed Standard for Medical Disclosure, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 548 (1973).
201. An attorney has an ethical obligation to "treat with consideration all persons involved in
the legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm." ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility EC 7-10.
202. Hopke v. O'Byrne, 148 So. 2d 755 (Fla. App. 1963).
203. Several commentators have observed that the vital elements of the tort of abuse of
process are not clearly definable. 1 F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts § 4.9 (1956); Prosser,
supra note 103, at § 121; Bretz, Abuse of Process-A Misunderstood Concept, 20 Cleveland St.
L. Rev. 401 (1971); Gillam, Abuse of Process, 16 N.C.L. Rev. 276 (1938).
204. Process has traditionally been defined as "[t]he means of compelling a defendant to
appear in court, after suing out the original writ, in civil, and after indictment, in criminal, cases
... A writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law .. ."
Bouvier's Law Dictionary 2731 (3d rev. ed. F. Rawle 1914); see Meadows v. Bakersfield Savings
& Loan Ass'n, 250 Cal. App. 2d 749, 59 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1967). In a narrow sense process refers to
individual writs issued by the court during or after litigation. Stearns v. State ex rel. Biggers, 23
Okla. 462, 477, 100 P. 909, 914 (1909). Process has been broadly interpreted in some abuse of
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been issued, to achieve some collateral purpose not justified by the
nature of the process. 2 5 Courts and others have frequently confused
an abuse of process action with a malicious prosecution action.20 6
Although both torts originated from the action for trespass on the case
in the nature of conspiracy,20 7 and both possess the common element
of improper purpose in the use of legal process, upon careful analysis
they are readily distinguishable. Generally an action for malicious
prosecution 20 8 is available for causing process to issue maliciously and
without reasonable or probable cause. 209 However, in an abuse of
process action the original issuance of the legal process is justified, but
the process itself is subsequently used for a purpose for which it was
not designed. 210 One court succinctly described the distinction between
malicious use and malicious abuse of process: "[T]he malicious use is
the employment of process for its ostensible purpose, although without
reasonable or probable cause, whereas the malicious abuse is the
employment of a process in a manner not contemplated by law. ' '21 1
Lack of probable cause is therefore not an essential element of an
abuse of process action. 2 12
Another crucial distinction between the two actions is that unlike a
malicious prosecution action, in an abuse of process proceeding the
action in the initial proceeding does not have to terminate in favor of
the original defendant. 213 Accordingly, an action for abuse of process
may generally be asserted as a counterclaim in the original action, 214
process cases "to encompass the entire range of procedures incident to litigation." Younger v.
Solomon, 38 Cal. App. 3d 289, 296, 113 Cal. Rptr. 113, 117 (1974).
205. Restatement of Torts § 682 (1938); Prosser, supra note 103, at 856-57; 1 Am. Jur. 2d
Abuse of Process § 1 (1962).
206. See Italian Star Line, Inc. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 53
F.2d 359, 361 (2d Cir. 1931); Bretz, Abuse of Process-Misunderstood Concept, 20 Cleveland St.
L. Rev. 401 (1971).
207. See Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 401, 343
N.E.2d 278, 281, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 639-40 (1975); see also Saliem v. Glovsky, 132 Me. 402, 172
A. 4 (1934).
208. See pt. V A supra for a complete discussion of the elements of a malicious prosecution
action.
209. If the plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendant, but nevertheless institutes
the suit, the action that arises is one for malicious prosecution. Baird v. Aluminum Seal Co., 250
F.2d 595, 600 (3d Cir. 1957).
210. Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 387 F. Supp. 702, 712-13 (S.D. Miss. 1974);
Restatement of Torts § 682 (1938).
211. Ash v. Cohn, 119 N.J.L. 54, 58, 194 A. 174, 176 (1937).
212. Moore v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 368 Mich. 71, 75, 117 N.W.2d 105, 106 (1962).
213. Id., 117 N.W.2d at 106-07; Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780
(1947); Ash v. Cohn, 119 N.J.L. 54, 194 A. 174 (1937). Termination in favor of defendant is an
essential element of malicious prosecution. See notes 155-57 supra and accompanying text.
214. See generally Moore v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 368 Mich. 71, 117 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
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while one for malicious prosecution can only be asserted after the
original action has terminated. 215
The tort of abuse of process was first recognized in England in
Grainger v. Hill.2 16 The plaintiff in that case was a shipowner who
borrowed money from defendants secured by a mortgage on his vessel.
The defendants, in an attempt to secure the ship's register, sued
Grainger in assumpsit and had a writ of arrest issued. Grainger, who
was wounded and bedridden, was threatened with imprisonment
unless he delivered the register to the defendants. Grainger delivered
the register and then sued the defendants for procuring the writ of
arrest wrongfully, illegally and maliciously to injure or harass and
distress him and compel him to give up the ship's register. The court,
in affirming a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, held that the action
was not one for maliciously putting process in force but rather was an
action for maliciously abusing court process. The employment of
process to extort property was sufficient to state a cause of action and
it was immaterial whether the original suit had been terminated or
whether it was founded on probable cause. 217
In this country, the term abuse of process evolved as a catchall label
for a variety of dissimilar situations which had in common the impro-
per use of judicial machinery but the circumstances of the case did not
fit within the narrowly circumscribed action for malicious prosecu-
tion. 218 However, it has generally been recognized that the gist of the
action was the misuse of process, no matter how properly obtained, to
compel the party against whom it was used to do some collateral act
which he could not legally or regularly have been compelled to do.219
In order to recover for abuse of process, plaintiff must establish
three essential elements: defendant's misuse of a properly issued court
process in the course of a legal proceeding; defendant's ulterior motive
or purpose in misusing the process; and damage as a result of such
irregular act. 220
215. Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 469 P.2d 379, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179 (197 1) (en bane);
Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Pearce, 121 Ga. App. 835, 175 S.E.2d 910, 915 (1970).
216. 132 Eng. Rep. 769 (C.P. 1838).
217. See Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 401-02,
343 N.E.2d 278, 281-82, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 640-41 (1975).
218. Italian Star Line, Inc. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 53 F.2d
359, 361 (2d Cir. 1931).
219. Coy v. Advance Automatic Sales Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 313, 39 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1964),
overruled on other grounds, White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson, 68 Cal. 2d 336, 350-51 & n.8, 438
P.2d 345, 353-54 & n.8, 66 Cal. Rptr. 697, 705-06 & n.8 (1968); Moore v. Michigan Nat'l Bank,
368 Mich. 71, 117 N.W.2d 105 (1962); Restatement of Torts § 682, comment a (1938).
220. Italian Star Line, Inc. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 53 F.2d
359 (2d Cir. 1931); Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1947); Moffett v.
Commerce Trust Co., 283 S.W.2d 591 (Mo. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 996 (1956).
1977] 1035
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Although it is difficult to categorize all of the cases in which an
abuse of process action has been recognized, it has been applied
generally where court process was invoked to work some form of
blackmail or extortion, 2 2 1 as where a writ of attachment, 22 2 or civil
arrest 223 or criminal prosecution 2 24 was used as a threat or club to
compel payment of a debt or surrender of property not involved in the
proceeding.
Since the gravamen of the action is abuse of the process after it is
issued, it must appear that the actor did something in the "use of the
process outside of the purpose for which it was intended. 2 25 The mere
fact that the actor had an ulterior or vindictive motive in using court
process will not support an abuse of process action as long as the
process is used properly.226
A classical illustration of a successful abuse of process action oc-
curred in Spellens v. Spellens. 22 7 There a wife, in an action against her
husband to have their marriage declared valid, sought a determination
of their rights in certain personal property. During the pendency of this
suit the husband brought a second action to recover possession of the
personal property involved in the prior action. While the sheriff was
taking possession of the property pursuant to a validly issued writ of
attachment, the husband told his wife he would drop his claim if she
would discontinue the main action. The court held that while the
issuance of the writ was proper, the abuse of process consisted in using
it as a threat to coerce the wife to abandon the main action.228
221. Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 317 P.2d 613 (1957) (en banc); Prosser, supra note
103, at 857.
222. Jacoby v. Spector, 292 Mass. 366, 198 N.E. 157 (1935) (successive wage attachments to
induce plaintiff to enter into a contract through fear of loss of job); Reardon v. Sadd, 262 Mass.
345, 159 N.E. 751 (1928) (attachment of property to enforce a claim that is known to be
groundless); Zinn v. Rice, 154 Mass. 1, 27 N.E. 772 (1891) (attachment for greatly excessive
amount).
223. Shatz v. Paul, 7 II. App. 2d 223, 129 N.E. 2d 348 (1955) (writs of arrest issued to
compel plaintiff to borrow funds or to pledge personal credit toward payment of debts Incurred
through the discounting of invoices by the plaintiff as an officer of bankrupt corporations).
224. McClenny v. Inverarity, 80 Kan. 569, 103 P. 82 (1909) (warrant of arrest Issued to
collect a debt); White v. Apsley Rubber Co., 181 Mass. 339, 63 N.E. 885 (1902) (procuring
plaintiffs arrest on a criminal charge in order to compel him to abandon a claim of right to
occupy a house); Moore v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 368 Mich. 71, 117 N.W.2d 105 (1962) (improper
use of criminal process as a means of collecting a private debt).
225. Hauser v. Bartow, 273 N.Y. 370, 374, 7 N.E.2d 268, 269 (1937); accord, Dean v.
Kochendorfer, 237 N.Y. 384, 390, 143 N.E. 229, 231 (1924).
226. Fairfield v. Hamilton, 206 Cal. App. 2d 594, 24 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1962); Tellcfsen v. Key
Sys. Transit Lines, 198 Cal. App. 2d 611, 17 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1962).
227. 49 Cal. 2d 210, 317 P.2d 613 (1957) (en banc).
228. Id. at 230-35, 317 P.2d at 625-27.
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Mere vexation or harassment in prosecuting an action, however, is
insufficient to give rise to an abuse of process claim. 2 29 As one court
has noted:
[Tlhe mere institution of a civil action which has occasioned a party trouble, incon-
venience and expense of defending, will not support an action for abuse of process....
... The tort is not committed until the defendant uses or attempts to use the process
of the court, not to effect its proper function, but to accomplish through it some
collateral object. 230
This principle was reiterated in the recent case of Ewert v. Wieboldt
Stores, Inc.,2 3 1 where an abuse of process counterclaim and third-
party action was interposed against a plaintiff and his attorneys who
had previously instituted a negligence action for injuries suffered by
plaintiff in a fall while employed as a window washer. The defendant,
who had manufactured and sold the allegedly defective harness device
used by the plaintiff, alleged in its counterclaim and third-party
complaint that plaintiff and his attorneys knew or should have known
that the defendant corporation was not in existence nor had it trans-
acted business at any time prior to plaintiffs accident. The court, in
dismissing the abuse of process claim, concluded that there was no
allegation of improper use of process other than the mere institution of
a civil action, and there was no damage other than that necessarily
incident to filing a lawsuit. 23 2 The court held that the proper test to be
applied in an abuse of process action is "whether process has been used
to accomplish some end which is beyond the purview of the process, or
which compels" 233 a party to do some collateral thing which he could
not legally be compelled to do. 234 Other courts have applied a similar
test to dismiss abuse of process actions. 23 S
While traditionally this tort was available only where there was
229. Younger v. Solomon, 38 Cal. App. 3d 289, 297, 113 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 (1974).
230. Miller v. Stern, 262 App. Div. 5, 7-8, 27 N.Y.S.2d 374, 375-76 (1st Dep't 1941).
231. 38 Ill. App. 3d 42, 347 N.E.2d 242 (1976).
232. Id. at 44, 347 N.E.2d at 244.
233. Id., 347 N.E.2d at 243.
234. Id.
235. It has been held that where plaintiff was motivated by malice in issuing a garnishee
execution based on a properly obtained judgment, an action for abuse of process was unavailable
since there was no perversion of the process for a purpose outside of that for which it was
intended. Bohm v. Holzberg, 47 App. Div. 2d 764, 365 N.Y.S.2d 265 (2d Dep't 1975); see White
Lighting Co. v. Wolfson, 68 Cal. 2d 336, 350-51, nn. 7 & 8, 438 P.2d 345, 353-54, nn. 7 & 8, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 705-06, nn. 7 & 8. A party was held not to be liable for abuse of process when he served a
garnishment on a debtor's employer, for the purpose of collecting a supposed indebtedness, as
long as the demand was not used to coerce the debtor to do something foreign to the main
objective of the garnishment proceeding. Ammons v. Jet Credit Sales, Inc., 34 Ill. App. 2d 456,
181 N.E.2d 601 (1962). And where a party was alleged to have prosecuted a frivolous appeal, an
abuse of process action was held not to be stated since there was no allegation that defendant was
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clear evidence of some sort of extortion by use of the process, 236 the
tort has been broadened to include any act not within the scope of the
process, whether such a result could be obtained lawfully or oth-
erwise. 237 In addition, the term process, which has generally been
considered to include those processes that are instituted either inde-
pendently, such as the original commencement of a suit, or collater-
ally, such as an attachment, has been broadened, in some states, to
encompass the entire range of procedures incident to litigation. 238
A more expansive interpretation of abuse of process was recently
adopted by the New York Court of Appeals 239 in a case where
subpoenas had been issued by a teacher's association to 87 teachers to
compel their attendance as witnesses at a hearing. The attorney for the
teacher's association refused a request by the school district to stagger
the appearances of the teachers. As a result of this action, the school
district, in order to avert a shutdown, was compelled to hire a
substantial number of substitute teachers. The court, in holding that a
sufficient abuse of process action was stated, concluded that the
subpoenas were:
[Rlegularly issued process, defendants were motivated by an intent to harass and to
injure, and the refusal to comply with a reasonable request to stagger the appearances
was sufficient to support an inference that the process was being perverted to inflict
economic harm on the school district. 24
0
The court noted that the tort of abuse of process would be available
"[w]here process is manipulated to achieve some collateral advan-
tage, whether it be denominated extortion, blackmail or retribution
using such appeal for other than its proper purpose. Tellefsen v. Key Sys. Transit Lines, 198 Cal.
App. 2d 611, 17 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1962). But the court noted that a party may be fined by the court
or damages may be awarded to respondent if the appeal is found to be frivolous. Id. at 600, 17
Cal. Rptr. at 922. See 3 Witkin, California Procedure 2354-57 (1963).
236. See notes 221-24 supra and accompanying text.
237. Bretz, Abuse of Process-A Misunderstood Concept, 20 Cleveland St. L. Rev. 401, 403
(1971); 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 123 (1937).
238. Younger v. Solomon, 38 Cal. App. 3d 289, 113 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1974) (written
interrogatories constituted use of process); Tellefsen v. Key Sys. Transit Lines, 198 Cal. App. 2d
611, 17 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1962) (taking of an appeal under certain circumstances could give rise to
an abuse of process action); but see Meadows v. Bakersfield Say. & Loan Ass'n, 250 Cal. App. 2d
749, 59 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1967) (posting of notice of default and intention to sell under a deed of trust
was held not to be process emanating from the authority of the court); Jones v. Brockton Public
Mkts., Inc.,-Mass.-, 340 N.E.2d 484 (1975) (an injunction was held not to be process within
the meaning of abuse of process).
239. Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 343 N.E.2d
278, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975).
240. Id. at 404, 343 N.E.2d at 283, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 642-43.
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.... "241 The court broadened the scope of this tort considerably by
holding that the intentional infliction of economic injury without
"economic or social excuse" is a basis for an abuse of process action. 242
Despite the expansion of the scope of abuse of process, its impact is
still very limited especially in those states which require as an element
of the cause of action proof of special injury, such as arrest of the
person or seizure of plaintiff's property. 243 However, even in those
jurisdictions that apply this strict rule of damages, once the plaintiff
has proved that he was arrested or his property was seized, he may
then recover for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequence of the defendant's conduct,2 44 including damages for
mental distress, 245 loss of reputation, expenses for loss of time and
attorneys fees, and injury to business, property, or financial stand-
ing.24 6
An attorney may, of course, be held liable for abuse of process
where the acts performed in abusing the process were his own and
were not dependent upon any evidence or representations made by his
client. 247 If an attorney was cognizant of his client's improper motive,
such impropriety could be imputed to the attorney who would then be
personally liable for abuse of process. Moreover, as one case has held,
an attorney may be liable if he maliciously participates with others,
including his client, in an abuse of process or "he maliciously encour-
ages and induces another to act as his instrumentality in commit-
ting"248 an abuse of process. However, if the attorney was unaware of
his client's ulterior motive to use process as a device to obtain a
241. Id., 343 N.E.2d at 283, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
242. Id. at 405, 343 N.E.2d at 283-84, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
243. See, e.g., Siebrand v. Eyerly Aircraft Co., 185 F. Supp. 538, 540-41 (D. Ore. 1960)
(applying Illinois law); John Allan Co. v. Brandow, 59 li1. App. 2d 328, 335, 207 N.E.2d 343
(1965). Many of these states require similar proof of special injury in malicious prosecution
actions. Huggins v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 252 S.C. 353, 166 S.E.2d 297 (1969). See notes
108-10 supra.
244. Malone v. Belcher, 216 Mass. 209, 103 N.E. 637 (1913); see Italian Star Line, Inc. v.
United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 53 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1931).
245. Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 317 P.2d 613 (1957) (en banc); Murray v. Mace, 41
Neb. 60, 59 N.W. 387 (1894); Adelman v. Rosenbaum, 133 Pa. Super. 386, 3 A.2d 15 (1938). See
also Witte, Damages for Injury to Feelings in Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process, 15
Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 15, 25 (1966).
246. Saliem v. Glovsky, 132 Me. 402, 172 A. 4 (1934); Huggins v. Winn-Dixie Greenville,
Inc., 252 S.C. 353, 166 S.E.2d 297 (1969).
247. Dishaw v. Wadleigh, 15 App. Div. 205, 44 N.Y.S. 207 (3d Dep't 1897); see Ash v.
Cohn, 119 N.J.L. 54, 194 A. 174 (1937); Adelman v. Rosenbaum, 133 Pa. Super. 386, 3 A.2d 15
(1938).
248. Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 235, 28 N.W.2d 780, 792 (1947).
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collateral advantage and the action was meritorious on its face, the
attorney should have a good faith defense to an abuse of process
action.249
Although the scope of the abuse of process action has recently been
expanded, it will not, except under very special and limited circum-
stances, afford an effective remedy against attorneys who have insti-
tuted groundless medical malpractice actions. A case that was recently
reported settled presents the rare factual situation that would support
an abuse of process action by a physician against a patient or his
attorney. 250 A surgeon, who had been unable to collect a long overdue
bill for performing a myelogram, sued his patient to recover his fee. In
a transparent effort to counteract this suit, the patient instituted a
malpractice claim against the physician accusing him of negligently
failing to remove the pantopaque dye from her spinal cord following
the procedure. Convinced that he had pursued the proper course of
treatment, the surgeon counterclaimed for abuse of process, alleging
that the patient had instituted the malpractice action solely to avoid
paying the physician's bill for services rendered. The physician further
claimed that he sustained damage to his reputation and was required
to hire an attorney to defend the spurious malpractice action."s1
The facts of this case present all of the requisite elements of a
successful abuse of process action. The patient regularly issued process
as a threat to coerce the physician into discontinuing a valid claim
against her for money owed for services rendered. If an attorney
counseled such a course of conduct or was aware of his client's
improper motive, he too would be liable for abuse of process. This case
also contained all the elements of a malicious prosecution action, for
not only was process misused after it had been issued but process was
improperly issued without probable cause. However, if the physician
wished to assert a malicious prosecution action, he could not have
interposed it by way of counterclaim in the original action. 25 2
The recent case of Joseph v. Markovitz, 2 "3 is illustrative of a case
where an abuse of process action will not lie. Dr. Joseph instituted
actions for malicious prosecution, 25 4 abuse of process and intentional
249. See Adelman v. Rosenbaum, 133 Pa. Super. 386, 3 A.2d 15 (1938); Wilkerson v.
Randall, 254 Miss. 546, 180 So. 2d 303 (1965) (holding same for a surety).
250. For an account of the case see Levine, I Beat a Malpractice Blackmailer, Medical Econ.,
Feb. 23, 1976, at 65.
251. Shortly after the counterclaim had been instituted the patient discontinued her malprac-
tice claim and agreed to pay both the overdue bill and the physician's legal fees. Id.
252. See notes 155-57 supra and accompanying text.
253. 27 Ariz. App. 122, 551 P.2d 571 (1976).
254. The malicious prosecution action was dismissed on a motion for summary judgment
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infliction of mental distress 2s5 against his former partners who, in a
previous malpractice action against them, had filed a third party action
against Dr. Joseph for indemnification for any judgment exceeding
their insurance limits. 25 6 Dr. Joseph alleged that the third party
complaint was filed to prevent him from testifying against his former
partners in the malpractice action. The court, in dismissing the abuse
of process action, noted that some act beyond the initiation of a lawsuit
was necessary to support an abuse of process action. 257 If the defen-
dants had offered to dismiss the third party action in exchange for Dr.
Joseph's not testifying against them, the iniiiation of process might have
been considered to have been used for a collateral advantage. 258
However, the facts presented did not indicate that this was the
defenda.nts' purpose in instituting the third party action and, in any
event, no act or threat beyond the filing of the lawsuit itself was
alleged.
Generally, where a physician considers a malpractice action vexa-
tious, harassing and brought merely as a nuisance suit to coerce a
settlement, he will be unable to recover for abuse of process. Every
action is somewhat coercive and puts a party to some inconvenience
and expense in defending it. Moreover, institution of a weak or
tenuous claim should not, without more, give rise to an abuse of
process action. Public policy mandates that there be free access to the
courts for the redress of wrongs.25 9 If a malpractice action was
instituted with probable cause, the desire of an attorney or his patient
to settle the claim should not be considered a collateral purpose outside
the scope of litigation. Indeed, settlement of actions is a positive goal
of the courts in order to avoid unnecessary and lengthy litigation. If
the original action lacks merit and has been instituted solely to coerce a
settlement, the physician may, of course, have a valid malicious
prosecution action. An abuse of process claim, however, will not lie
unless the physician can prove that the patient or his attorney reached
beyond the natural consequences of the litigation to accomplish some
collateral purpose. Thus, if an unjustified malpractice action was
brought as a counterclaim to coerce the physician into discont>-.uing an
since the physicians in instituting the third party action relied upon the legal advice of their
attorney and therefore probable cause was established as a matter of law. Id. at 100, 551 P.2d at
574.
255. See notes 333-35 infra and accompanying text.
256. The original malpractice action terminated in favor of the defendant physicians. Id. at
100, 551 P.2d at 575.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 404, 343
N.E.2d 278, 283, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 643 (1975).
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action for money due for services rendered, an abuse of process action
should be available. 260
C. Defamation
A physician may have an action for libel or slander per se when false
words, whether oral or written, tend to prejudice the physician in his
profession. 261 Thus, it has been held that it is actionable per se to
falsely charge a physician with a want of professional ability and
integrity, 262 malpractice, 263 gross negligence in diagnosis, 264 or gross
misconduct, which implies that the physician is unfit to practice his
profession. 265 In Jankelson v. Cisel,266 for example, a dentist recov-
ered damages for slanderous publications made by a dissatisfied pa-
tient, who complained to other dentists and wrote numerous letters to
various dentists, dental societies and governmental agencies complain-
ing of the treatment she had received.
Although many statements concerning a physician made in the
context of a medical malpractice action could be considered defama-
tory, if untrue, a physician will ordinarily not have an effective remedy
against a patient who published such defamatory statements if they
were made within the confines of a judicial proceeding. The rationale
supporting this rule is based on the common law2 67 recognition of an
260. Courts should clearly define and distinguish a malicious prosecution action from an
abuse of process action. If these two torts are treated in an analogous manner, the impact on the
judicial system could be substantial. Since a physician in most jurisdictions would be able to
counterclaim in the original malpractice suit for abuse of process, the malpractice action could
become unduly complicated and prolonged. In addition the attention of the trier of the facts
would be diverted from the issue of malpractice to the motives of the plaintiff and his attorney for
initiating the action.
261. See Lathrop v. Sundberg, 55 Wash. 144, 104 P. 176 (1909). See Prosser, supra note 103,
at 757-59.
262. Krug v. Pitass, 162 N.Y. 154, 56 N.E. 526 (1900).
263. Foster v. Scripps, 39 Mich. 376 (1878); Quimby v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 38 Minn.
528, 38 N.W. 623 (1888); Mauk v. Brundage, 68 Ohio St. 89, 67 N.E. 152 (1903).
264. Ganvreau v. Superior Publishing Co., 62 Wis. 403, 22 N.W. 726 (1885).
265. Blende v. Hearst Publications Inc., 200 Wash. 426, 93 P.2d 733 (1939). But a charge of
ignorance or mistake on a single occasion may not be actionable per se since one mistake does not
amount to incompetence. If the charge, however, fairly imputes either habitual conduct, general
ignorance or lack of skill, which the public has a right to expect of a doctor, it may be actionable
without proof of special damages. Prosser, supra note 103, at 759; see November v. Time Inc., 13
N.Y.2d 175, 194 N.E.2d 126, 244 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1963) (lawyer accused of unprofessional
conduct).
266. 3 Wash. App. 139, 473 P.2d 202 (1970). The dentist's recovery for slander was
apparently based on the false statements the patient published to others outside of the malpractice
action she had instituted against the dentist. Id. at 140-41, 473 P.2d at 204.
267. Some states have codified the absolute privilege applicable to defamatory statements
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absolute privilege268 for defamatory statements published in the course
of judicial proceedings. 2 69 The privilege afforded to litigants270 to
express themselves freely during a judicial proceeding is based on the
recognized public policy of affording litigants free access to the courts
in order to secure and defend their rights. 27 1 The right of free speech
and the public need for free and full disclosure of facts in a judicial
proceeding outweigh the right of an individual to enjoy his reputation
free from defamatory attacks. 272
It is clear, in almost all jurisdictions, 273 that attorneys, 274 as well as
judges 275 and witnesses, 276 are absolutely privileged to publish de-
famatory matter concerning another if the statements are made during
the course of a judicial proceeding. 277 The attorney's privilege is
coextensive with that of his client27 8 and is invoked " 'to protect
attorneys in their primary function-the representation of a client
.... '279 In order to preserve the free and unfettered administration of
justice, attorneys must be given great latitude during the course of
judicial proceedings in drawing pleadings and affidavits, examining
witnesses, and commenting upon testimony and demeanor without
published in the course of judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 47(2) (West 1954); Ga.
Code Ann. § 105-711 (1968).
268. An absolute privilege applies without regard to actor's motive or purpose, or the
reasonableness of his conduct. Prosser, supra note 103, at 776-77.
269. Restatement of Torts, Introductory Note §§ 585-92 (1938).
270. Id. § 587.
271. Abbottv. Tacoma Bank of Commerce, 175 U.S. 409, 411 (1899); Lerette v. Dean Witter
Organization Inc., 60 Cal. App. 3d 575, 578, 131 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595 (1976); Bradley v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 30 Cal. App. 3d 818, 824, 106 Cal. Rptr. 718, 721 (1973).
272. Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 Colum. L. Rev. 463
(1909).
273. The rule of absolute privilege does not apply in Louisiana. Oakes v. Alexander, 135 So.
2d 513 (La. App. 1961). There the privilege is qualified and for the privilege to attach the
statement must be material and be made with probable cause and without malice. Lescale v.
Joseph Schwartz Co., 116 La. 293, 40 So. 708 (1905). See notes 301-02 infra-
274. Restatement of Torts § 586 (1938).
275. Id. § 585.
276. Id. § 588.
277. Theiss v. Scherer, 396 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1968); Ginsburg v. Black, 192 F.2d 823 (7th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952); Romero v. Prince, 85 N.M. 474, 513 P.2d 717
(1973); Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P.2d 1127 (1938) (en banc); Restatement of Torts § 586
(1938); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974); Note, 35 N.C.L. Rev.
541 (1957).
278. Robinson v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 242 Iowa 1120, 49 N.W.2d 521 (1951);
Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N.Y. 440, 121 N.E. 341 (1918).
279. Smith v. Hatch, 271 Cal. App. 2d 39, 50, 76 Cal. Rptr. 350, 357 (1969), quoting
Friedman v. Knecht, 248 Cal. App. 2d 455, 462, 56 Cal. Rptr. 540, 545 (1967).
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fear of being subjected to a lawsuit for libel or slander if their
statements later prove to be defamatory. 280
Once the absolute privilege is recognized, 28 1 no inquiry is permitted
into the attorney's motivation or purpose in publishing the false
statements. The privilege thus will attach even when the defamatory
statements are published with actual malice and with knowledge of
their falsity. 282 Further, the privilege attaches to every step of the
judicial proceeding, 283 from pre-trial activities28 4 to final disposition of
the action. 285 It extends not only to oral testimony given during the
trial, 286 but to pleadings, 287 affidavits, 288  depositions, 289 statements
made in briefs, 290 and comments made by an attorney during argu-
ment, opening or summation. 291 In fact, the privilege has recently
been held to cover communications of lawyers made prior to the
280. Abbott v. Tacoma Bank of Commerce, 175 U.S. 409, 411 (1899); Veeder, Absolute
Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 Colum. L. Rev. 463, 482-83 (1909).
281. Thornton v. Rhoden, 53 Cal. Rptr. 226, 230 (1966), subsequent opinion on rehearing,
245 Cal. App. 2d 80, 53 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1966); Restatement of Torts § 586, comment a at 229-30
(1938). Contra, Oakes v. Alexander, 135 So. 2d 513, 516 (La. App. 1961) (qualified privilege
recognized).
282. Smith v. Hatch, 271 Cal. App. 2d 39, 76 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1969); Friedman v. Knecht,
248 Cal. App. 2d 455, 56 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1967); Thornton v. Rhoden, 245 Cal. App. 2d 80, 53
Cal. Rptr. 706 (1966); State v. Tillett, 111 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1959).
283. The judicial proceedings to which the privilege applies have not been explicitly defined.
However, judicial proceedings have been held to include any hearing before a court or tribunal
which performs a judicial function, ex parte or otherwise. See 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander §
232 (1970). Many jurisdictions have extended the privilege to administrative proceedings where
the administrative officer or board is exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function. See Dixie
Broadcasting Corp. v. Rivers, 209 Ga. 98, 70 S.E.2d 734 (1952); Engelmohr v. Bache, 66 Wash.
2d 103, 401 P.2d 346, cert. dismissed, 382 U.S. 950 (1965).
284. Petty v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 365 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1966)
(negotiations for settlement); Spoehr v. Mittelstadt, 34 Wis. 2d 653, 150 N.W.2d 502 (1967)
(pre-trial conference).
285. Brown v. Shimabukuro, 118 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (motion for rehearing); Jones v.
Trice, 210 Tenn. 535, 360 S.W.2d 48 (1962) (motion for new trial). See Restatement of Torts §
586 (1938).
286. Horton v. Tingle, 113 Ga. App. 512, 149 S.E.2d 18541966); Wells v. Carter, 164 Tenn.
400, 50 S.W.2d 228 (1932).
287. DiBlasio v. Kolodner, 233 Md. 512, 197 A.2d 245 (1964); Meriwether v. Publishers:
George Knapp & Co., 211 Mo. 199, 109 S.W. 750 (1908); Greenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 427 Pa.
511, 235 A.2d 576 (1967); Restatement of Torts § 587 (1938).
288. Glasson v. Bowen, 84 Colo. 57, 267 P. 1066 (1928) (en banc); Schmitt v. Mann, 291 Ky.
80, 163 S.W.2d 281 (1942); Keeley v. Great N. Ry., 156 Wis. 181, 145 N.W. 664 (1914).
289. Thornton v. Rhoden, 245 Cal. App. 2d 80, 53 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1966).
290. Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 295 P.2d 405 (1956) (en banc); Lesperance v. North
Am. Aviation, Inc., 217 Cal. App. 2d 336, 31 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1963); Soter v. Christoforacos, 53
Ill. App. 2d 133, 202 N.E.2d 846 (1964).
291. Wall v. Blalock, 245 N.C. 232, 95 S.E.2d 450 (1956).
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commencement of the lawsuit itself, where "[aill signs pointed to
incipient litigation and to the necessity for protective action. 2 92
The only limitation imposed upon this absolute privilege in the
United States2 93 is that the statements must be relevant or pertinent to
some issue in the case.2 94 Relevancy in this context has been broadly
interpreted, and is not limited to statements that fall within the
technical rules of evidence. 2 95 Most jurisdictions have adopted a good
faith standard, 29 6 requiring only that the defamatory statements be
either reasonably connected or related to the judicial proceeding29 7 or
pertinent to it.29 8 All doubts should be resolved in favor of relevancy,
pertinency and materiality. 2 99 The defense of privilege will therefore
fail only if a statement is so palpably irrelevant to the subject matter of
the controversy that no reasonable person could doubt its immate-
riality. 3 00
In view of the absolute privilege afforded to an attorney for state-
ments, both written and oral, published during a judicial proceeding,
it is unlikely that a physician could ever recover for libel or slander
even where an action was unjustifiably instituted and the charge of
malpractice was false unless the allegation was completely irrelevant to
the litigation. The only case to directly discuss the issue of a physi-
cian's claim for defamation arising out of a previous malpractice
292. Johnston v. Cartwright, 355 F.2d 32, 37 (8th Cir. 1966); Lerette v. Dean Witter
Organization, Inc., 60 Cal. App. 3d 573, 578-79, 131 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595 (1976). See Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 586, comment c at 169 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974).
293. The English rule is that defamatory statements made in the course of judicial proceed-
ings are absolutely privileged regardless of whether or not they are relevant to any issue involved
in the case. Sebree v. Thompson, 126 Ky. 223, 103 S.W. 374 (1907); Munster v. Lamb, [1883] 11
Q.B.D. 588.
294. Mdatthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 67 N.W.2d 413 (1954); LaPorta v. Leonard, 88
N.J.L. 663, 97 A. 251 (1916); Seltzer v. Fields, 20 App. Div. 2d 60, 244 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1st Dep't
1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 624, 198 N.E.2d 368, 249 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1964).
295. Taliaferro v. Sims, 187 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1951); Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 67
N.W.2d 413 (1954); Seltzer v. Fields, 20 App. Div. 2d 60, 244 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1st Dep't 1963),
aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 624, 198 N.E.2d 368, 249 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1964).
296. Prosser, supra note 103, at 779.
297. Ginsburg v. Black, 192 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952);
Rader v. Thrasher, 22 Cal. App. 3d 883, 99 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1972); Thornton v. Rhoden, 245 Cal.
App. 2d 80, 53 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1966).
298. Bleecker v. Drury, 149 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1945); Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 67
N.W.2d 413 (1954); Feldman v. Bernham, 6 App. Div. 2d 498, 179 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dep't
1958) (per curiam), affd, 7 N.Y.2d 772, 163 N.E.2d 145, 194 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1959). See Ginsburg
v. Black, 192 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952); Robinson v. Home Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 242 Iowa 1120, 49 N.W.2d 521 (1951).
299. Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 67 N.W.2d 413 (1954); Greenberg v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 427 Pa. 511, 235 A.2d 576 (1967).
300. Scott v. Statesville Plywood & Veneer Co., 240 N.C. 73, 81 S.E.2d 146 (1954).
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action, Foster v. McLain,3 10 occurred in Louisiana which only recog-
nizes a qualified privilege for defamatory statements made during a
judicial proceeding. 30 2
The Foster litigation arose from three related medical malpractice
actions that were instituted against Dr. Foster for allegedly leaving a
foreign substance, described in the pleadings as a sponge, in Mrs.
McLain's abdomen during an operation. Mrs. McLain informed her
attorneys that the surgeon had told her that a piece of cotton the size
of her little finger had been removed from the area of surgery. These
attorneys referred the matter to a second attorney with a referral letter
which related their conversations with Mrs. McLain and stated that
some cotton or sponge had been removed. The trial attorneys then filed
a petition based upon the referral letter, Mrs. McLain's statements,
and the fact that a second operation was actually performed to remove
an object from the area of incision. The prosecution of the medical
malpractice action as well as the alleged basis for the action was
widely publicized in the local newspapers. 30 3
Upon dismissal of the malpractice actions, Dr. Foster instituted an
action for libel, based upon the allegedly false and maliciously filed
allegations in the previous malpractice actions, against the trial attor-
ney who prepared the pleadings, the patient-client, and the referring
attorneys. 30 4 Upon appeal, the appellate court reversed a judgment
against the attorneys on the ground that they could not have known
that the allegations made in the petition were untrue. 305 The court
concluded that Dr. Foster had not met his burden of proof, since there
was no evidence to establish that the allegations were motivated by
malicious intent or ill will toward him. Moreover, there was no
301. 251 So. 2d 179 (La. App. 1971).
302. Oakes v. Alexander, 135 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 1961). For this qualified privilege to
attach to defamatory statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding, Louisiana requires
that the statements must be material to the case, made with probable cause to believe them true
and made without actual malice. Waldo v. Morrison, 220 La. 1006, 58 So. 2d 210 (1952). This
test is the equivalent of the elements applied in a malicious prosecution action in other
jurisdictions except for the requirement of favorable termination. See pt. V A supra and
accompanying text. Actual malice in this context means that the false statements were motivated
by personal spite or ill will, or were made with a reckless disregard for the truth, Bienvenu v.
Angelle, 254 La. 182, 223 So. 2d 140 (1969).
303. 251 So. 2d at 181.
304. Id. The action and third party action brought by the trial attorneys against the referring
attorneys were dismissed on appeal since their sole involvement in the malpractice action was a
letter to the trial attorneys relating that the client had told them that a piece of cotton or a suture
had been left in her body. They did not participate in investigating, drafting or filing the libelous
allegation.
305. Id. at 181-82.
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evidence to indicate that the allegations were made with a reckless
disregard for the truth. 316
It was clear that Mrs. McLain had a second operation and that
something was removed from the original surgical incision. Whether a
cotton suture which had been used to close the surgical incision was
removed, as the doctor claimed, or a piece of cotton inadvertently left
in the incision, could only be determined by a thorough pre-trial
investigation, and presented a question of fact to be determined by a
jury on the merits. Thus, the allegation that a sponge, not a piece of
cotton or cotton suture, had been left in plaintiffs abdomen was at
most an honest mistake of fact which was relevant to the medical
malpractice action. 30 7
In most jurisdictions, where an absolute privilege is extended to
statements made during judicial proceedings, the attorney is free to
allege that the physician was incompetent or committed acts of mal-
practice if such statements are relevant to the proceedings. An attor-
ney, however, can lose the protection of the absolute privilege if he
repeats the defamatory statement made during a judicial proceeding to
newspapers outside the purview of the proceeding. 308 One court has
aptly noted "an attorney who wishes to litigate his case in the press
will do so at his own risk." 30 9
Where an action for libel or slander is unavailable because of the
absolute privilege, a physician may still be able to interpose an action
for malicious prosecution if the malpractice action was instituted
without probable cause, malice is proved and the action terminated in
the physician's favor. As one court has stated:
The remedy for one who has been harassed by a malicious and groundless suit, where
there is any remedy, is not an action for defamation, but for bringing and prosecuting
the suit maliciously, and without probable cause. 311
But, in at least one jurisdiction, a physician may not recover for
306. The court seemed to be confining malice to actual malice, although it extended it
somewhat by applying a standard of reckless disregard. Id. at 182.
307. Although the court does not specifically refer to the inference of res ipsa loquitur, this nle
would generally apply where a foreign object is left in a person's body after an operative
procedure. See Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N.C. 178, 13 S.E.2d 242 (1941). Therefore, the attorney
would have probable cause to institute such an action even without expert testimony to support
the allegation of malpractice and could delay investigating fully the patient's claim until after
filing the complaint. See Note, 26 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 653, 676-77 (1976).
308. Robinson v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 242 Iowa 1120, 49 N.W.2d S21 (1951);
Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1962); Jacobs v. Herlands, 51 Misc. 2d 907, 17
N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 823, 19 N.Y.S.2d 770 (2d Dep't 1940).
309. Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 99, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (1962).
310. Wilson v. Sullivan, 81 Ga. 238, 7 S.E. 274 (1888).
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damages to his reputation in the guise of a malicious prosecution
action. In Dixie Broadcasting Corp. v. Rivers, 31' plaintiff instituted an
action to recover damages on the ground that defendants maliciously
and without probable cause initiated proceedings against plaintiff
before the Federal Communications Commission to revoke plaintiff's
permit to construct a radio station..It was alleged that defendants
made false charges against plaintiff in the prior proceeding without
probable cause, and that plaintiffs personal reputation and radio
business had been injured as a result. 3 12 Plaintiff did not specifically
characterize the nature of his cause of action, in all likelihood to avoid
the absolute defense of privilege available to false statements made
during a judicial proceeding.
The court treated the action as one for malicious prosecution, but
would not permit recovery for those elements of damage which were
attributable to the libelous statements made during the course of the
proceedings before the Commission. The court recognized an absolute
privilege for publishers of libelous statements made during a judicial
proceeding.313 This privilege completely protects defendants from any
liability for damage in a libel suit, and that which the law prohibits
directly it should not permit indirectly.3 14 Thus, the court concluded
that a plaintiff who cannot recover damages for injury to reputation
arising from libelous allegations in a judicial proceeding cannot pro-
ceed indirectly to recover the very same damages by denoting the
action as one for malicious prosecution. The defense of absolute
privilege would therefore bar recovery for damages to reputation
arising from libelous allegations in a judicial proceeding even though
the plaintiff alleged almost all of the essential elements of a malicious
prosecution action.315
In view of the absolute privilege afforded to false statements made
during judicial proceedings, an action for defamation is clearly unavail-
able to a physician. The paramount public policy affording patients
and their attorneys freedom of access to the courts without fear that
they will be sued for false statements made during judicial proceedings
outweighs the physician's interest in protecting his reputation.
311. 209 Ga. 98, 70 S.E.2d 734 (1952).
312. Georgia follows the minority rule and requires a showing of special injury, such as (1)
arrest of the person, (2) seizure of property, or (3) other special damage, as an element of a
malicious prosecution action. Jacksonville Paper Co. v. Owen, 193 Ga. 23, 17 S.E.2d 76 (1941).
In Dixie no special injury was proved and the malicious prosecution action was dismissed. 209
Ga. at 108, 70 S.E.2d at 741-42.
313. This privilege is recognized by statute in Georgia. Ga. Code Ann. § 105-711 (1968). See
note 283 supra.
314. 209 Ga. at 107, 70 S.E.2d at 741.
315. Id. Plaintiff failed to establish special injury. See note 312 supra.
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D. Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress
In recent years many jurisdictions have recognized an independent
action for intentional infliction of mental distress. 316 Courts had tradi-
tionally been reluctant to expand recovery for emotional distress as a
separate tort because of the fear of flooding the courts with fraudulent
and fictitious claims and the difficulty in measuring damages for
mental distress. 317 For these reasons, the tort of intentional infliction of
mental distress has generally been limited to those situations where the
defendant's acts were so outrageous that they tended to guarantee the
genuineness of plaintiff's claim of serious mental distress. 318
The Second Restatement of Torts specifically recognized that "[o]ne
who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress . . . is subject to liability for such
emotional distress"319 and any bodily harm that resulted from the emo-
tional distress. 320 However, the Restatement limited the tort of inten-
tional infliction of mental distress to those cases where the defendant's
conduct has been so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree
as to exceed all reasonable bounds of decency. 321 In order for defen-
dant's conduct to give rise to liability, it must therefore be regarded as
atrocious and "outrageous" by the average member of the commu-
nity. 322
In addition, the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff must be
severe. 323 A minor annoyance or affront to plaintiff's dignity is too
unimportant to support such an action, since "trivial emotional distress
is a part of the price of living [in society]." 324 The cause of action for
intentional infliction of mental distress should therefore be recognized
only when the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable person
of ordinary sensibilities could be expected to endure it.325
316. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965). See, e.g., Savage v. Boles, 77 Ariz. 355, 272
P.2d 349 (1954); Wilson v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 25 S.W.2d 428 (1930); State Rubbish Collectors
Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952); Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57.
317. See Prosser, supra note 103, at 50-51.
318. See Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L.
Rev. 1033 (1936); Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 40 (1956).
319. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965).
320. Some states that recognize the tort restrict its application to cases in which plaintiff
suffered physical consequences. See Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62 (D.C.
Cir. 1939); Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954).
321. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment d at 72-73 (1965).
322. Id. at 73.
323. Id., comment j at 77.
324. Id.
325. Knierim v. Izzo, 22 111. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961); Swanson v. Swanson, 121 III.
App. 2d 182, 257 N.E.2d 194 (1970).
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The types of situations in which this tort has been recognized are
quite varied, but they all have in common the element of extreme,
outrageous conduct.3 26 It has been used most successfully to counteract
the extremely harassing and high pressure tactics of collection agen-
cies, 327 creditors, 328 insurance carriers and adjusters329 and landlords
attempting to evict tenants. 330
Although the limits of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress have not yet been fully determined, 331 it is doubtful that the
conduct of an attorney in instituting an unjustified medical malpractice
suit would be considered the type of outrageous conduct that has
previously been recognized as actionable. Even though a malpractice
action was motivated by a malicious intent to cause mental distress, it
is highly unlikely that the courts would view the attorney's conduct in
prosecuting the malpractice action as extreme and outrageous conduct
that exceeds the bounds of decency, if probable cause was present for
instituting the action. If probable cause was absent, malice could be
inferred and the physician could then recover damages for the mental
distress he sustained in a traditional action for malicious prosecu-
tion. 33 2 It would therefore be unnecessary under the circumstances to
recognize a separate action for such damage.
In Joseph v. Markovitz, 333 a physician's action for intentional inflic-
tion of mental distress 334 against his former partners, who had insti-
tuted a third party action against him in a prior malpractice action,
was dismissed on a motion for summary judgment. The suit had its
origin in a malpractice action against two members of a medical
326. See, e.g., Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954) (police tricked plaintiff into
confinement by telling her that her child had been injured and was in the hospital); Hallo v.
Lurie, 15 App. Div. 2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (2d Dep't 1961) (man who had jilted a woman
wrote her taunting letters); Flamm v. Van Nierop, 56 Misc. 2d 1059, 291 N.Y.S.2d 189 (Sup. Ct.
1968) (defendant constantly harassed plaintiff by such conduct as dashing out at him in public
places).
327. Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954). See also Berger, The Bill
Collector and the Law-A Special Tort, at Least for a While, 17 DePaul L. Rev. 327 (1968).
But a reasonable effort to collect a bill, even though it may cause serious mental distress, is not
actionable. Berrier v. Beneficial Fin., Inc., 234 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Ind. 1964).
328. Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932); La Salle Extension
Univ. v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934).
329. Frishett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 Mich. App. 688, 143 N.W.2d 612 (1966).
330. See Kaufman v. Abramson, 363 F.2d 865 (4th Cir. 1966).
331. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment c at 72 (1965).
332. See note 173 supra.
333. 27 Ariz. App. 122, 551 P.2d 571 (1976).
334. Plaintiff's causes of action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process were also
dismissed since probable cause was shown to exist and there was no act or threat beyond the
filing of the lawsuit itself. See notes 253-58 supra and accompanying text.
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partnership which had been dissolved prior to the filing of the mal-
practice action. A third party complaint was filed by the physicians
against Dr. Joseph, their former partner, asserting a right of indemni-
fication under a partnership agreement for any judgment exceeding the
limits of their insurance policy. Dr. Joseph alleged that the filing of the
third party complaint against him by his former partners, with the
acquiescence of his own insurance company, and the fact that the
insurance company paid the attorneys' fees in the third party action,
constituted extreme and outrageous conduct. Although the jurisdiction
had previously recognized an action for intentional infliction of mental
distress, 335 this court concluded that the filing of the third party
complaint here was not the kind of extreme and outrageous conduct
that would support an action for intentional infliction of mental
distress.
Clearly, the mere institution of an unjustified law suit will not
amount to the outrageous conduct necessary for the tort of intentional
infliction of mental distress. Furthermore, it is difficult to conceive of a
set of circumstances where an attorney's conduct would be considered
so outrageous that a separate action for mental distress would arise
without the physician also stating a valid cause of action for malicious
prosecution in which he could recover damages for the mental distress
he sustained. 33 6 The malicious prosecution action should therefore be
the only cause of action permitted to vindicate the rights of a wrong-
fully sued physician. The stringent proof requirements in a malicious
prosecution action 337 better serve the policy of free access to the courts,
and the definition of outrageous conduct should not be broadened to
reach those cases where an attorney has allegedly instituted an un-
justified malpractice action.
VI. MORE INNOVATIVE THEORIES
OF RECOVERY
A. Prima Facie Tort
It is obvious from the foregoing analysis of the traditional tort
theories that, in most cases, a physician will not have an available
remedy against an attorney who institutes an unjustified medical
malpractice action. The physician generally cannot establish the pre-
scribed elements of these narrowly circumscribed torts. Several juris-
dictions, in the past, have recognized a distinct action for prima facie
335. Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954).
336. See note 173 supra.
337. See pt. V A supra.
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tort 338 when traditional tort remedies were inadequate to provide a
remedy to an injured party. This doctrine may, in the future, provide
an innovative alternative to the traditional tort categories by creating a
remedy for the prosecution of unjustified medical malpractice actions
where none existed.
Prima facie tort has been broadly defined as "the infliction of
intentional harm, resulting in damage, without excuse or justification,
by an act or a series of acts which would otherwise be lawful. '339 The
prima facie tort doctrine was first enunciated in England in 1889 when
Lord Bowen in his now famous dictum stated that: "intentionally to do
that which is calculated in the ordinary course of events to damage,
and which does, in fact, damage another in that other person's
property or trade, is actionable if done iithout just cause or ex-
cuse." 340 In this country, the principle of prima facie tort was first
recognized by Mr. Justice Holmes when he wrote that: "prima facie,
the intentional infliction of temporal damage is a cause of action,
which, as a matter of substantive law, whatever may be the form of
pleading, requires a justification if the defendant is to escape. '34 1
As a result of Justice Holmes' influence, a number of states soon
thereafter recognized a distinct cause of action for prima facie tort 342
where intentional harm had been inflicted "by an act or series of acts
which might otherwise be lawful and which do not fall within the
categories of traditional tort actions. '343
338. For a general discussion of the prima facie tort doctrine see Brown, The Rise and
Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort Principle, 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 563 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as Brown]; Forkosch, An Analysis of the "Prima Facie Tort" Cause of Action, 42 Cornell
L.Q. 465 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Forkosch]; Hale, Prima Facie Torts, Combination, and
Non-Feasance, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 503 (1946); Halpern, International Torts and the Restatement,
7 Buff. L. Rev. 7 (1957); Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1894); James,
Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process, 8 Buff. L. Rev. 315 (1959); Seavey,
Bad Motive Plus Harm Equals a Tort, 26 St. John's L. Rev. 279 (1952); Smith, Torts Without
Particular Names, 69 U. Pa. L. Rev. 91 (1921); Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 52 Colum.
L. Rev. 503 (1952); Note, A Remedy for All Injuries?, 25 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 90 (1959); Note,
Abstaining from Wilful Injury-The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 10 Syracuse L. Rev. 53 (1958).
339. Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 769, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808, 811 (1st Dep't 1955).
340. Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow, & Co., [1899] 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613.
341. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904).
342. Massachusetts accepted the doctrine at an early date. See Bogni v. Perroti, 224 Mass.
152, 112 N.E. 853 (1916); Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871). New York appears to have
recognized the doctrine in 1923 in Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 89, 140 N.E. 203, 205
(1923), although it did not come into full use until 1934. Al Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., 265
N.Y. 1, 191 N.E. 713 (1934). See also Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 52 Colum. L. Rev.
503, 504 (1952); Note, Abstaining from Wilful Injury-The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 10
Syracuse L. Rev. 53, 54-55 (1958).
343. Knapp Engraving Co. v. Keystone Photo Engraving Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 170, 172,
148 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (1st Dep't 1956).
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This doctrine of prima facie tort, if liberally applied, could provide
greater flexibility in the law of torts by recognizing novel claims for
damages arising as a result of changing social and economic needs
which had little common law precedent. 344 The common law of torts
"does not consist of absolute, fixed, and inflexible rules, but rather of
broad... principles [of] justice, reason, and common sense. '345 As the
social needs of the community change, the common law must respond
to these changes. 346 If it becomes clear therefore that plaintiff's
interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's con-
duct, the mere fact that the claim is novel should not bar a remedy. 34 7
As one commentator has noted:
The prima facie tort principle ... has proved useful in assisting the development of
needed reforms in the law of tort,.particularly in receiving and resolving the myriad of
claims which have arisen from new relationships and power groupings formed, and
continuously reformed, in the business world. It serves a high purpose in providing
within its compass a residuary action for timely recognition of novel claims. . . .
However, in most jurisdictions the action for prima facie tort has
tended to crystallize, like other tort actions, into a rather narrowly
restricted specific remedy, requiring proof of malice and special dam-
ages. 349
Although rarely labeled "prima facie tort" there also appears in the
law the parallel maxim ubi jus ibi remedium-for every right there is a
remedy. 3s0 The constitutions of a majority of American states ex-
pressly recognize this principle by guaranteeing to every person a legal
remedy for all injuries and wrongs done to persons, property or
reputation. 351
Both the judicially created action of prima facie tort and the
344. Some authorities reject the view that all wilful harm is actionable unless defendant
justifies his conduct and maintain that every plaintiff must bring his case under some traditionally
accepted tort category. Salmond, Law of Torts, 15-16 (10th ed. 1945).
345. Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 405, 37 N.W.2d 543, 547 (1949).
346. Id. at 406-07, 37 N.W.2d at 547.
347. Prosser, supra note 103, at 3-4; Smith, Torts Without Particular Names, 69 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 91 (1921).
348. Brown, supra note 338, at 573.
349. Brown, supra note 338; Forkosch, supra note 338, at 480. See Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d
1191, 1202 (1967).
350. Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 1191, 1196 & n.10 (1967).
351. Typical of such state constitutional provisions is Ill. Const art. 1, § 12 which states:
"Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he
receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely,
completely, and promptly." See also Ala. Const. art. 1, § 13; Conn. Const. art. 1, § 10; Kan.
Const. Bill of Rights, § 18; Ky. Const Bill of Rights, § 14; Mo. Const. art. 1, § 14; Neb. Const.
art 1, § 13; Ore. Const. art 1, § 10; R.I. Const. art. 1, § 5; Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 17.
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constitutional guarantee of a remedy for every wrong may provide
novel remedies to the physician who successfully defends a groundless
medical malpractice action. Both of these approaches must be carefully
analyzed to determine if they can be used as an effective remedy by
physicians to curtail the prosecution of unjustified medical malpractice
claims.
In the past, prima facie tort has been invoked to provide a remedy
for all types of intentional wrongdoings which were difficult to
categorize, although it was applied most frequently in cases of labor
disputes and interference with employment and other contractual
relations.35 2 The doctrine of prima facie tort has achieved its greatest
degree of sophistication and utilization in New York State, where it
has been expanded to provide a remedy for a wide variety of otherwise
uncategorized misconduct. 3 53 The New York courts, however, have
severely restricted the effect of this tort by applying formidable re-
quirements of both pleading and proof.3 54
The basic elements of the prima facie tort cause of action that
emerge from the case law include an intent to injure on the part of the
defendant, a lack of justification in so acting, and proof of special
damages. 35 5 A prima facie tort, in the restricted sense of the term,
arises only where plaintiff can prove that the defendant acted mali-
ciously by showing an actual intent to harm as distinguished from an
intent merely to commit the act. 35 6
Some courts have further circumscribed this tort action by requiring
plaintiff to prove that the defendant's sole motive was to injure the
352. Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 505 (1952); Note,
Abstaining From Wilful Injury-The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 10 Syracuse L. Rev. 53, 55
(1958).
353. For a discussion of the doctrine as it evolved in New York, see Forkosch, supra note
338, at 475-79; Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine in New York-Another Writ?, 42 St. John's
L. Rev. 530 (1968).
354. A recent New York case appears to have overruled long standing precedent by
eliminating some of the formalism in pleading and proving a prima facie tort action. See Board of
Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 343 N.E.2d 278, 380
N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975); notes 377-78 infra and accompanying text.
355. 74 Am. Jur. 2d Torts § 38, at 651-52 (1974).
356. Passaic Print Works v. Ely & Walker Dry-Goods Co., 105 F. 163 (8th Cir. 1900), cert.
denied, 181 U.S. 617 (1901); Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909); Advance
Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946); Ruza v. Ruza, 286
App. Div. 767, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1st Dep't 1955). The requirement of proof of intent to do harm
has been criticized as being unnecessarily restrictive. The better view, which has been advanced
by some commentators, is to inquire as to whether there was an intention to commit the
disfavored act. See Brown, supra note 338, at 569-70; Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 52
Colum. L. Rev. 503, 506-07 (1952).
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plaintiff.35 7 This rule is based on Justice Holmes' dictum that in order
for intentional harm, inflicted without justification, to be prima facie
actionable, it must have been motivated solely by "disinterested
malevolence. '35 8 Thus, if a defendant's motivation to injure the plain-
tiff was combined with his own self-interest in pursuing a profit, the
necessary malice would be negated and plaintiffs prima facie tort
action would be dismissed. 35 9 The sole intent requirement, 360  if
restrictively applied, limits the physician's use of the prima facie tort
doctrine even if proof was available to establish an intent to harm the
physician since the patient's self-interest in achieving a monetary
recovery could negate the essential element of malice.
Most courts concerned with the possible proliferation of prima facie
tort actions also require, as an essential element, an allegation of special
damages3 6 1 -deprivation of pecuniary benefit. 36 2 While some courts
have acknowledged that an allegation of injury to professional reputa-
357. Reinforce, Inc. v. Birney, 308 N.Y. 164, 169-70, 124 N.E.2d 104, 106-07 (1954);
Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 90, 140 N.E. 202, 206 (1923).
358. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U.S. 3S0, 358 (1921).
359. Benton v. Kennedy-Van Saun Mfg. & Eng'r Corp., 2 App. Div. 2d 27, 152 N.Y.S.2d
955 (1st Dep't 1956); Girard Trust Co. v. Melville Shoe Corp., 275 App. Div. 117, 88 N.Y.S.2d
121 (1st Dep't), aft'd, 300 N.Y. 496, 88 N.E.2d 724 (1949).
360. The "sole" intent requirement has been criticized by some commentators as "choking to
death" the prima facie tort doctrine. Forkosch, supra note 338, at 479. Several states apply a test
in which they distinguish between the primary and secondary intent of the defendant. If the
primary or predominant intent of the defendant is to cause harm liability attaches. Connors v.
Connolly, 86 Conn. 641, 86 A. 600 (1913); Boggs v. Duncan-Schell Furniture Co., 163 Iowa 106,
143 N.W. 482 (1913); Robitaille v. Morse, 283 Mass. 27, 186 N.E. 78 (1933).
361. Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946);
Coopers & Lybrand v. Levitt, 52 App. Div. 2d 493, 384 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1st Dep't 1976); Brandt v.
Winchell, 286 App. Div. 249, 141 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1st Dep't 1955), afl'd, 3 N.Y.2d 628, 144
N.E.2d 160, 170 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1958). A few courts have permitted recovery without a showing
of special damage, but these decisions have not been generally followed. See, e.g., Grattan v.
Societa Per Azzioni Cotonificio Cantoni, 137 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd, 285 App. Div.
1042, 140 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1st Dep't 1955) (special damages unnecessary).
362. An allegation of a decline in business has been held to be a mere conclusion which can be
cured only by stating specifically and with particularity the items of loss claimed, including names
of customers. Rager v. McCloskey, 305 N.Y. 75, 81, 111 N.E.2d 214, 217-18 (1953). Where
plaintiff's demand for damages was alleged in a round sum, it was held that an allegation of
general, not special, damages was asserted. Leather Dev. Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 15
App. Div. 2d 761, 224 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1st Dep't 1962), afi"d mem., 12 N.Y.2d 909, 188 N.E.2d
270, 237 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1963). An allegation that plaintiff was subjected to ridicule and
impairment of his reputation and damaged in the sum of $100,000 was not a proper allegation of
special damages. Friedlander v. National Broadcasting Co., 39 Misc. 2d 612, 241 N.Y.S.2d 477
(Sup. Ct. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 20 App. Div. 2d 701, 246 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1st Dep't 1964)
(mem.).
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tion 3 63 and harassment caused by the institution of successive ground-
less suits364 would be sufficient to sustain a prima facie tort action,
other courts have held that an allegation of damage to professional
standing and reputation, without more, would result in a dismissal of
the complaint for failure to allege special damages with sufficient
particularity. 365 If a physician could only allege that his standing or
reputation in the community had been damaged or that he had been
harassed and distressed as a result of the prosecution of the malprac-
tice suit, he would fail to state a cause of action in some jurisdic-
tions. 366 The physician must, at the very least, allege loss of business
income attributable to the groundless action.
In addition to proving intent to harm and special damages, plaintiff
must also prove that the defendant's acts were committed without
economic or social justification. 367 The defendant's conduct would be
considered justified if the privilege of the defendant to act in a way
that causes injury to another outweighs the plaintiff's right to be free
from injury.3 68 Public policy considerations are most relevant 369 in
determining whether the defendant's conduct was justified in light of
the harm done to the plaintiff.370 As the New York Court of Appeals
stated:
[W]henever the gist of an alleged cause of action . . .is that an otherwise lawful act
has become unlawful because the actor's motives were malevolent, the court is called
upon to analyze and weigh the conflicting interests of the parties and of the public in
order to determine which shall prevail. 37 1
363. French v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 88 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1950); Stein v.
Schmitz, 21 N.J. Misc. 218, 32 A.2d 844 (Super. Ct. 1943); Mangum Elec. Co. v. Border, 101
Okla. 64, 222 P. 1002 (1923).
364. Munson Line, Inc. v. Green, 6 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
365. See Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co., 19 N.Y.2d 453, 227 N.E.2d 572, 280
N.Y.S.2d 641 (1967).
366. E.g., J.J. Theatres, Inc. v. V.R.O.K. Co., 96 N.Y S.2d 271, 273 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
367. See Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401
(1946).
368. Note, Abstaining from Wilful Injury-The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 10 Syracuse L.
Rev. 53, 59-60 (1958).
369. House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir. 1962);
Prosser, supra note 103, at 15-16; Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 503,
509-12 (1952).
370. Public policy considerations motivated one court to dismiss a counterclaim offering the
technical elements of prima facie tort. The court reasoned that the counterclaim would complicate
an already complex litigation with separate burdens of proof and measures of damages. Knapp
Engraving Co. v. Keystone Photo Engraving Corp., I App. Div. 2d 170, 148 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1st
Dep't 1956).
371. Brandt v. Winchell, 3 N.Y.2d 628, 634-35, 148 N.E.2d 160, 164, 170 N.Y.S.2d 828,
833-34 (1958).
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Where a patient has, in fact, suffered a bad medical result, the
physician will have the overwhelming burden of proving lack of
justification since there may be probable cause for the institution of a
medical malpractice suit. 372 Public policy favoring free access to the
courts will in all likelihood tip the balance against the physician even if
there was doubtful merit to the patient's claim or overwhelming proof
of the attorney's malevolent intent.
Another serious obstacle to utilizing prima facie tort as a potential
weapon against unjustified medical malpractice suits is the generally
accepted principle that conduct actionable under one of the traditional
tort categories is not actionable under the prima facie tort theory. 37 3
Where this rule is strictly applied, a physician who alleges the elements
of a recognized traditional tort such as malicious prosecution 374 or
defamation 375 may not be permitted to rely on prima facie tort.37 6
The New York Court of Appeals has recently retreated from this
restrictive position in view of the liberalized pleading requirements in
that state.377 The court held that at the pleading stage plaintiff may
allege alternate causes of action for a traditional tort (abuse of process)
and prima facie tort. Once the traditional tort was established, how-
ever, the allegation with respect to prima facie tort would be rendered
academic since double recovery would not be permitted. 378
The prima fade tort theory could provide an effective remedy for
the wrongful institution of an unjustified malpractice litigation in those
jurisdictions that adhere to the minority rule requiring proof of special
372. Proof of lack of justification is akin, in this context, to lack of probable cause. If a
patient and his attorney had probable cause to institute the malpractice action, the attorney's acts
should be considered justified. See Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596, 602 (La. App. 1976)
(dissenting opinion).
373. Knapp Engraving Co. v. Keystone Photo Engraving Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 170, 172,
148 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (lst Dep't 1956); Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 769, 146 N.Y.S.2d
808, 811 (1st Dep't 1955).
374. Metromedia, Inc. v. Mandel, 21 App. Div. 2d 219, 249 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1st Dep't), aftd,
15 N.Y.2d 616, 203 N.E.2d 914, 255 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1964).
375. Knapp Engraving Co. v. Keystone Photo Engraving Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 170, 148
N.Y.S.2d 635 (1st Dep't 1956); Green v. Time, Inc., 147 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 1 App.
Div. 2d 665, 146 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1st Dep't 1955), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 732, 143 N.E.2d 517, 163
N.Y.S.2d 970 (1957). See Alpert v. Gordon, 15 App. Div. 2d 673, 224 N.Y.S.2d 119 (2d Dep't
1962). Contra, Strollo v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 20 N.J. Misc. 217, 26 A.2d 559 (Super.
CL 1942).
376. Knapp Engraving Co. v. Keystone Photo Engraving Corp., I App. Div. 2d 170, 148
N.Y.S.2d 635 (1st Dep't 1956); Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1st Dep't
1955).
377. Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 406, 343
N.E.2d 278, 284-85, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 645 (1975). See N.Y. CPLR § 3013 (McKinney 1974).
378. 38 N.Y.2d at 406, 343 N.E.2d at 284-85, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
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injury379 in malicious prosecution actions. Several cases have exam-
ined the interrelationship between the traditional tort action of mali-
cious prosecution and prima facie tort. In some cases, plaintiff's action
for prima facie tort was sustained even though an action based upon
malicious prosecution would have failed because plaintiff could not
establish one of the traditional elements-special injury.3 0 For exam-
ple, in Munson Line, Inc. v. Green,38 it was alleged that the defen-
dants instituted successive groundless lawsuits maliciously and without
probable cause solely to harass the plaintiff. All of the suits terminated
in plaintiff's favor.38 2 Plaintiff could not recover under malicious
prosecution since all of the jurisdictions that had an interest in the
litigation required proof of special injury.383 Although a cursory read-
ing of the complaint might have given the impression that the action
was solely for malicious prosecution, 38 4 the court held that a valid
claim in the nature of prima facie tort was stated since the defendant's
acts taken together established an intentional series of wrongs that
created a wrongful interference with another's business. 38 5 In J.J.
Theatres, Inc. v. V.R.O.K. Co.,386 the court adopted a similar posi-
tion. In that case tenants of a theatre charged that the owner of the
property had instituted baseless lawsuits to harass the tenants into
abandoning their lease. The court concluded that the complaint alleged
a sufficient action for unlawful interference with plaintiffs' business,
since "[e]ven lawful acts if done maliciously and with intent to injure
can be the subject of a cause of action.' 38 7
These courts, by the adroit use of the prima facie tort doctrine, have
permitted a plaintiff to prove that a defendant who maliciously insti-
tuted prior civil proceedings was liable for the damage he caused,
although plaintiff could not meet one of the stringent proof require-
ments of malicious prosecution. Such an expansive application of the
379. Special injury in the context of a civil malicious prosecution action is generally
considered an interference with plaintiff's person or property or some injury other than the
normal incident of defending similar civil actions. See notes 108-14 supra and accompanying text.
Special damage as used in prima facie tort refers to a pecuniary loss. See notes 361-62 supra.
380. See, e.g., Gillis v. Georgas, 225 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Sup. Ct. 1962); J.J. Theatres, Inc. v.
V.R.O.K. Co., 96 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
381. 6 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), appeal dismissed, 165 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1942).
382. Id. at 16.
383. Maryland, the District of Columbia and New York followed the minority rule which
required proof of special injury in malicious prosecution actions. Id.
384. The court indicated that if plaintiff's cause of action was "nothing more than a glorified
cause of action for malicious prosecution," it would not have sustained it. Id. at 18.
385. Id. at 17.
386. 96 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
387. Id. at 273.
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prima facie tort doctrine would circumvent one of the harsher re-
quirements of malicious prosecution actions still followed in a minority
of jurisdictions.
There is an apparent conflict of authority as to whether the prima
facie tort doctrine can be utilized to avoid another of the essential
requirements of malicious prosecution actions-termination of the
original suit in the defendant's favor. 388
In Gillis v. Georgas,389 the court rejected the requirement of
favorable-termination where plaintiff alleged that the defendant
maliciously circulated or gave false information or testimony which led
to plaintiffs conviction of a crime. Although the complaint failed to
allege termination of the prior action in plaintiff's favor, the court held
that such acts provided the basis for a prima facie tort action390 since
there was an intentional doing of acts which were calculated, in the
ordinary course of events, to damage the plaintiff. The acts were
actionable because they were done without just cause or excuse. 39'
Several courts have dismissed counterclaims in the nature of prima
facie tort which were interposed in the original maliciously instituted
action 392 as being prematurely instituted and contrary to public policy.
There is some authority, however, to support the view that a coun-
terclaim charging that plaintiff conducted groundless litigation should
be sustained. 393
Those cases that do not permit a counterclaim for prima facie tort
are better reasoned. A counterclaim of this nature would confuse an
already complex malpractice case394 and divert the attention of the
388. See notes 155-57 supra and accompanying text.
389. 225 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
390. Id. at 166. Where a person, however, maliciously provokes public officials to act and the
defendants' statements, although motivated by malice, prove to be true, there is no action stated
for prima facie tort. Since the public interest is advanced by the exposure of those guilty of
offenses against the public, such a person is entitled to immunity from civil suit. In one case the
damage sustained by the plaintiff was held to be due to the actions of the public officials after an
investigation and good cause shown. See Brandt v. Wincheil, 3 N.Y.2d 628, 635, 170 N.Y.S.2d
828, 834, 148 N.E.2d 160, 164 (1958).
391. The complaint for prima facie tort was nevertheless dismissed since it failed to plead
special damages and concise statements of the material facts which had to be proved at trial. 225
N.Y.S.2d at 166.
392. See Luckett v. Cohen, 169 F. Supp. 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Knapp Engraving Co. v.
Keystone Photo Engraving Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 170, 148 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1st Dep't 1956);
Friedman v. Roseth Corp., 190 Misc. 742, 74 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1947), modified on other
grounds sub nom. Friedman v. Odora Co., 273 App. Div. 755, 75 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1st Dep't),
aff'd, 297 N.Y. 495, 74 N.E.2d 192 (1947).
393. Nathan v. Berlin, Civil No. 75-M2-542 (11. Civ. Ct., June 1, 1976); Herbert Prods., Inc.
v. Oxy-Dry Sprayer Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 71, 145 N.Y.S.2d 168 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
394. From the physician's point of view, if a counterclaim could be instituted in the original
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jury to collateral issues-the motives of the patient and attorney in
initiating the malpractice action. 3 95 On the other hand, a physician
would suffer only the inconvenience of a relatively short delay and
little additional expense if he had to proceed in a separate action after
the malpractice suit terminated in his favor.3 96
The doctrine of prima facie tort has been used by some courts to
avoid the defense of absolute privilege afforded defamatory statements
made in the course of judicial proceedings. 397 In Schauder v. Weiss, 3 98
the plaintiff's complaint, in essence, pleaded a conspiracy among a
detective, an indemnity company, and plaintiff's husband to institute a
fraudulent divorce action on the basis of a false report made by the
detective which showed that plaintiff had committed adultery. Al-
though the complaint did not support a cause of action for libel or
slander 399 because of the defense of privilege, the broader doctrine of
prima facie tort was also pleaded. The court held that the defense of
privilege could not be interposed in the prima facie tort action.40
0
Finally, most courts have held that prima facie tort may not be used
to avoid the application of the statute of limitations of one of the
traditional tort actions. 40 1 In a few jurisdictions, however, the prima
facie theory has been utilized to avoid the harsh effect of the extremely
short statutes of limitations applicable to intentional tort actions.40 2 In
malpractice action there would be a savings in both litigation time and expenses. Moreover, all of
the relevant issues including the patient's and attorney's motives in instituting the malpractice
action could be explored in the original proceedings.
395. Knapp Engraving Co. v. Keystone Photo Engraving Corp., I App. Div. 2d 170,
172-73, 148 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637-38 (1st Dep't 1956).
396. Id. at 173, 148 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
397. See notes 267-300 supra and accompanying text.
398. 88 N.Y.S.2d 317 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd, 276 App. Div. 967, 94 N.Y.S.2d 748 (2d Dep't
1950).
399. Id. at 322. The court held that the allegations also failed to state a sufficient cause of
action for malicious prosecution since there was no allegation of special injury in the nature of an
interference with plaintiffs personal property. In addition it failed to state an action for abuse of
process since the process employed was not diverted to a use for which it was not intended. Id.
400. A contrary prior holding which was not referred to in the Schauder decision held that the
absolute privilege accorded defamatory statements in libel tnd slander actions should be applied
in an action for injurious falsehood based upon non-defamatory statements. Lucci v. Engel, 73
N.Y.S.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1947). See also Al Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., 265 N.Y. 1, 191 N.E.
713 (1934), where a cause of action for injurious falsehood was recognized.
401. E.g., Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co., 19 N.Y.(I 453, 227 N.E.2d 572, 280
N.Y.S.2d 641 (1967); see Forkosch, supra note 338, at 475-76.
402. In many states, the statute of limitations period for intentional torts such as defamation
and malicious prosecution is as short as one year. See, e.g., N.Y. CPLR § 215(3) (McKlnney
1972). In malicious prosecution actions, however, the statute of limitations is rarely a problem
since the cause of action does not accrue until the original action hai terminated. See Jones v.
Independent Fence Co., 12 Misc. 2d 413, 173 N.Y.S.2d 684 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
PHYSICIANS COUNTERATTACK
one case, where plaintiff alleged that the defendants falsely and
maliciously charged that he was stealing electricity for the purpose of
inducing plaintiff's employer to dismiss him, the court held that
plaintiff stated a timely cause of action for malicious interference with
employment, even though any action for slander was barred by a one
year statute of limitations. 40 3 The court reasoned that although slander
was the means used by the defendants to accomplish their wrongful
design, their malicious intent rather than their slander was the gist of
the cause of action. 404
In New York where the doctrine of prima facie tort has traditionally
had its most widespread utilization, the restrictions of intent, justifica-
tion and special damage limited the impact of the tort almost exclu-
sively to the business field where there had been an interference with
some form of contractual relation.40 5 However, a recent New York
case40 6 has eliminated much of the formalism and restrictions that
previously surrounded the prima facie tort action. This development
may encourage additional actions based upon prima facie tort against
attorneys who institute unjustified malpractice litigation.
In Board of Education v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Associa-
tion, Inc.,407 plaintiff alleged that the defendant wrongfully and
maliciously subpoenaed 87 teachers to appear simultaneously at a
hearing with full knowledge that they could not all testify at the same
time. The defendant's attorney thereafter refused to stagger the teach-
ers' appearances. The school district sought damages for the amount
expended in hiring substitute teachers and for punitive damages. The
court recognized that these allegations supported both abuse of
process408 and prima facie tort actions. The court held that the defen-
dant's conduct in utilizing legal procedure to harass and to oppress the
plaintiff who suffered damages should be recognizable at law. It
appeared to redefine prima facie tort in an expansive way- "Conse-
quently whenever there is an intentional infliction of economic dam-
age, without excuse or justification, we will eschew formalism and
recognize the existence of a cause of action.140 9
The prima facie tort doctrine, as it has developed through judicial
403. Strollo v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 20 N.J. Misc. 217, 26 A.2d 559 (Super. CL
1942).
404. Id. at 223, 26 A.2d at 562.
405. Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 770, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808, 811 (Ist Dep't 1955).
406. Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 343 N.E.2d
278, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975).
407. 38 N.Y.2d 397, 343 N.E.2d 278, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975).
408. See notes 239-42 supra for a discussion of the abuse of process action.
409. 38 N.Y.2d at 406, 343 N.E.2d at 284, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
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evolution, could provide a wrongfully sued physician with the needed
flexibility to avoid some of the rigid proof requirements of the tradi-
tional tort actions. Prima facie tort could be considered as a residual or
"last-chance" cause of action covering those situations where inten-
tional harm is done without justification but which do not necessarily
fall within the traditional tort categories. However, in those jurisdic-
tions where the prima facie tort doctrine has become as crystallized
as the more traditional torts-with its own set of rigid proof
requirements-the doctrine will not provide a new remedy to wrong-
fully sued physicians. In any event, as a practical matter it is doubtful
in most cases that an action for prima facie tort would be stated if a
traditional malicious prosecution action was not also available. If a
physician could establish lack of justification, he could also prove lack
of probable cause in instituting the prior malpractice action. An
expansive interpretation of prima facie tort, however, could permit a
physician to avoid at least the most restrictive requirement of mali-
cious prosecution-proof of special injury.
An alternative approach is an action in the nature of prima facie
tort, based on a state constitutional provision that provides a remedy
for every wrong.410 Although the constitutional provisions guaran-
teeing a remedy for every wrong vary from state to state, they have
generally not been interpreted to create a new remedy where none
existed prior to the passage of the constitutional provision. 411 A
number of courts regard these constitutional guarantees merely as an
expression of universal philosophy and not as a mandate for a certain
remedy. 412 In most cases, the failure to state sufficient facts to consti-
tute any cause of action cannot be cured by alleging that plaintiff is
entitled to a remedy under the relevant constitutional provision. 413
Even those courts which interpret these provisions expansively often
limit their applicability by narrowly defining the word "injury" to
mean only conduct violative of established law.4 14 Such a limited
definition effectively precludes use of this constitutionally based prima
facie tort doctrine as a means of extending the bounds of the tradi-
410. See note 351 supra.
411. 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 385 (1964).
412. Sullivan v. Midlothian Park Dist., 51 Ill. 2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659 (1972); Welch v.
Davis, 342 Ill. App. 69, 95 N.E.2d 108 (1950), rev'd on other grounds, 410 Il1. 130, 101 N.E.2d
547 (1951).
413. E.g., Belmar Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n, 34 Ill. 2d
544, 216 N.E.2d 788 (1966); Bauscher v. City of Freeport, 103 Ill. App. 2d 372, 243 N.E.2d 650
(1968).
414. Benson v. Housing Authority, 145 Conn. 196, 140 A.2d 320 (1958); Stewart v. Standard
Publishing Co., 102 Mont. 43, 55 P.2d 694 (1936); Barnes v. Kyle, 202 Tenn. 529, 306 S.W.2d 1
(1957).
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tional torts to create new causes of action. These provisions have thus
been more useful in preventing the dilution of recognized rights and
remedies than in spearheading the drive for new causes of action. 4 15
In Illinois, 416 however, such a constitutional provision has been
invoked to give relief to a physician who claimed he had been unjusti-
fiably sued for malpractice. In Illinois, the constitutional guarantee
providing a remedy for every wrong has been used to recognize new
causes of action for invasion of privacy,4 17 alienation of affections, 418
and contribution to a minor's support'lg-all of which had not previ-
ously been recognized in that state.420
A recent jury verdict421 in the case of Nathan v. Berlin42 2 is the first
reported decision where a physician has successfully sued an attorney
for instituting a groundless medical malpractice case. The physician's
claim was premised on a purported remedy for all injuries guaranteed
by the Illinois constitution.
This precedent-setting case began when a radiologist was sued for
malpractice for allegedly misreading hospital X-rays and failing to
discover a fracture in plaintiff's right hand. Apparently the treatment
plaintiff actually received was the same as that given for a fracture.
The physician shortly after being sued for malpractice filed a com-
plaint against the patient, her attorney-husband, 423 and the two attor-
neys representing them. The first count of the physician's complaint
alleged that the defendants owed the physician the duty to refrain from
willfully and wantonly bringing suit against him without reasonable
cause to believe that he had committed malpractice. The physician
claimed that the defendants filed the original malpractice suit despite
an opinion they had received from an orthopedic surgeon that the
415. See, e.g., Neely v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc., 192 Kan. 716, 391 P.2d
155 (1964).
416. Ill. Const. art. 1, § 12 (1970); see note 351 supra.
417. Erick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952).
418. Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947).
419. Parker v. Parker, 335 Ill. App. 293, 81 N.E.2d 745 (1948).
420. Other states relying on nearly identical constitutional provisions as the Illinois provision
have refused to recognize some of these very same causes of action. Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn.
156, 56 A.2d 768 (1947); Nash v. Baker, 552 P.2d 1335 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974).
421. The jury award was $2,000 for compensatory damages and $6,000 for punitive damages.
N.Y. Times, June 3, 1976, at 20, col. 1.
422. Civil No. 75-M2-542 (IIl. Civ. CL, June 1, 1976). This decision has received much
notoriety, see N.Y. Times, June 3, 1976, at 20, col. 1.
423. The physician alleged a violation of a barratry statute against the patient's attorney-
husband. This count was dismissed prior to trial. Barratry is defined as: "The offense of
frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits .... " Black's Law Dictionary 190 (4th ed.
1968).
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physician had not committed malpractice. The doctor alleged further
that the Illinois constitution guaranteed him a remedy for this wrong.
The damages claimed by the physician were injury to his business
profession, mental anguish, devotion of time to the defense of the
malpractice suit and increased insurance premiums as a result of the
litigation. The physician further alleged that the attorneys were negli-
gent in filing a lawsuit without reasonable evidence to support the
allegations of medical malpractice. 424
The doctor's action and the malpractice suit were consolidated for
trial. On the morning of trial, the malpractice action against Dr. Berlin
was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice and Dr. Berlin proceeded to
trial on his claims. The evidence introduced at trial disclosed that the
patient's attorneys relied solely on the statements of their client in
instituting the malpractice action. They made no effort to contact the
treating physician or subsequent physicians who examined the patient.
Two attorneys testified, as expert witnesses, that defendant's attorneys
did not act as reasonably prudent attorneys since they even failed to
conduct an initial investigation of their client's charges of malpractice.
At the time he filed his complaint, the physician obviously could not
allege two of the crucial elements of a malicious prosecution action;
termination of the prior medical malpractice action in his favor and
special injury. In effect, Dr. Berlin recovered on a new cause of action
based upon a constitutional guarantee of a remedy for every wrong.
A review of the prior applications of this constitutional guarantee in
Illinois indicates that the physician's victory may be short lived in the
appellate courts. The Illinois courts have held that article I, section 12
of the Illinois constitution is an expression of a philosophy that some
remedy be provided for every wrong, but does not require that any
specific form of remedy be provided. 425 If plaintiff's pleading was
dismissed for failure to sufficiently state a cause of action, plaintiff
would not have been denied a constitutional right under the theory
that there must be a remedy for every wrong. 426 The Illinois courts
have thus held in these instances that if no cause of action exists, or if
a defective complaint was dismissed, constitutional rights are not
424. See note 482 infra and accompanying text.
425. See Sullivan v. Midlothian Park Dist., 51111. 2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659 (1972) (interpret-
ing predecessor to Ill. Const. art. 1, § 12); Mier v. Stanley, 28 Il. App. 3d 373, 329 N.E.2d
1 (1975) (immunity from suit granted officers of corporate employers by the Workmen's
Compensation Act for work-related injuries was not unconstitutional since plaintiff had an
available remedy-workmen's compensation benefits).
426. City of Decatur v. Kushmer, 7 Ill. App. 3d 567, 288 N.E.2d 65 (1972) (abuse of process
action dismissed as being insufficient); Holiday Magic, Inc. v. Scott, 4 Ill. App. 3d 962, 282
N.E.2d 452 (1972) (abuse of process complaint dismissed).
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infringed. 427 Based on these judicial decisions, it would seem that the
constitutional guarantee of a remedy for every wrong may not be used
to create a cause of action where plaintiff has a remedy in the form of
an action for malicious prosecution or a petition for recovery of
expenses and attorney's fees.4 28 The fact that a malicious prosecution
action could not be instituted prior to the termination of the malprac-
tice suit in defendant's favor or that plaintiff could not plead one of the
other essential elements of such an action (special injury) could hardly
be construed as a denial of a constitutional right to a remedy. If this
were so, a party could avoid the bar of the statute of limitations by
alleging he had a constitutionally created cause of action pursuant to
the state constitution.
In Spencer v. Burgass,4 29 a case involving a suit by a physician
against an attorney arising from the filing of an allegedly frivolous
malpractice suit, a majority of the Louisiana Court of Appeals held
that the physician's complaint failed to state a cause of action for
malicious prosecution under general tort and negligence concepts.430
The dissenting opinion, however, noted that Louisiana-a civil code
state--did not recognize a malicious prosecution action.43 1 The dissent
stated that the plaintiff's complaint was founded on a section of the
Louisiana Civil Code that obliges one to repair damage caused by his
fault.4 3 2 In view of the public policy recognizing that courts be open to
remedy an injury, 433 the dissent held that there could be no liability for
instituting an action unless this is no arguable justification for having
done so. 434 In this context, instituting an action without probable
cause435 would be equivalent to bringing a suit without arguable jus-
tification.
427. See County of Champaign v. Anthony, 33 Ill. App. 3d 466, 337 N.E.2d 87 (1975), aff'd,
64 Ill. 2d 532, 356 N.E.2d 561 (1976); Zamouski v. Gerrard, 1 Ill. App. 3d 890, 275 N.E.2d 429
(1971).
428. Section 41 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act provides that where allegations and denials
are made without reasonable cause and are found to be untrue, the party pleading them shall pay
the reasonable expenses actually incurred by the other party by reason of the untrue pleading,
together with reasonable attorneys' fees to be summarily taxed by the court at trial. Ill. Ann. Stat.
ch. 110, § 4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); see notes 556-58 infra and accompanying text.
429. 337 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1976).
430. See notes 181-86 supra and accompanying text.
431. 337 So. 2d at 602. See notes 185-87 supra and accompanying text.
432. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315 (West 1972).
433. La. Const. art. 1, § 22.
434. 337 So. 2d at 602.
435. The dissent seemed to indicate that malice was not a necessary element of this action
except to the extent that merely having brought or tried a wholly unfounded suit would indicate
malice. Id. This appears to be the equivalent of implying malice from a lack of probable cause in
a malicious prosecution action.
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This action which the dissent recognized, although not clearly
defined, appears to be analogous to an action for prima facie tort
arising from a constitutional guarantee of a remedy for every wrong.
The dissent concluded that the petition stated a valid cause of action
against the attorney because he breached his general legal duty when
he continued to prosecute the malpractice action without any evidence
whatsoever. 436
This case is instructive in analyzing the meaning that courts
should give to justification when confronted with a prima facie tort
action. If justification is to be given the same meaning as probable
cause, the same result would generally occur when a physician sues an
attorney for instituting an unjustified malpractice action regardless of
the theory he pleads. The only real benefit that accrues to the physi-
cian if he pleads a prima facie tort action is that he may be able to
bypass some of the more traditional requirements of malicious prosecu-
tion such as special injury and termination in his favor. However, this
would only be so where the prima facie tort action is broadly inter-
preted by the courts to provide a remedy even if a traditional tort
remedy is available.
B. Professional Negligence
Although physicians and other professionals have been increasingly
exposed to professional malpractice actions, the liability of attorneys
for their malpractice has until recently remained relatively cir-
cumscribed. 437 In order to discourage malpractice suits against attor-
neys, the early American cases imposed a stringent requirement on
legal malpractice actions: the necessity of privity.438 This requirement
436. The dissent recognized that the physician would not have stated a cause of action if the
attorney merely filed the suit prior to consulting with any medical witnesses since the statute of
limitations was about to expire and the attorney had to file the claim to preserve his client's
rights. However, the dissent believed that a valid cause of action was stated since almost three
years passed between the filing and trial of the action during which time the attorney obtained no
evidence to support his client's claim. 337 So. 2d at 603.
437. For a discussion of the historical evolution of attorneys' liability for professional
negligence, see Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 755 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Wade]. For a fuller review of the elements of a legal malpractice action, see
Blaustein, Liability of Attorney to Client in New York for Negligence, 19 Brooklyn L. Rev. 233
(1953); Coggin, Attorney Negligence . . . A Suit Within A Suit, 60 W. Va. L. Rev. 225 (1958);
Gardner, Attorneys' Malpractice, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 264 (1957); Gillen, Legal Malpractice, 12
Washburn L.J. 281 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Gillen]; Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 Colum. L.
Rev. 1292 (1963); Note, Liability of an Attorney in the Conduct of Litigation, 12 Syracuse L.
Rev. 494 (1961); Note, The Bases of the Attorney's Liability to His Client for Malpractice, 37 Va.
L. Rev. 429 (1951).
438. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879). But cf. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236,
135 N.E. 275 (1922) (public weigher).
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limited the attorney's liability for negligence solely to his own client
with whom he was in privity of contract. The courts also diluted the
ordinary standard of reasonable care and skill by applying a subjective
standard requiring that the lawyer represent his client only to the best
of his knowledge. 439 While courts have expanded the scope of the
attorney's liability to his own client, their traditional reluctance to
abrogate the privity rule remains an overwhelming hurdle for a
physician who seeks to sue his adversary's attorney for instituting a
medical malpractice action without reasonable evidence to support the
claim.
The clear trend of recent decisions has been toward the establish-
ment of a higher standard of responsibility for attorneys by eroding the
strict proof requirements of the earlier cases. 440 Although there are
several definitions that have been used to express the degree of care
that an attorney owes to his client, it is now generally accepted that an
objective standard will be applied. 44 1 Accordingly, the creation of an
attorney-client relationship442 imposes a duty upon an attorney to
represent his client with "such skill, prudence and diligence as lawyers
of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the
performance of the tasks which they undertake." 44 3 This duty has been
held to encompass both an obligation to know the law and an
obligation to diligently research the law and make an informed judg-
439. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879). See Gllen, supra note 437, at 287-91
440. For a discussion of the expansion of attorneys' liability for malpractice, see Cum-an,
Professional Negligence-Some General Comments, 12 Vand. L. Rev. S35 (1959); Gillen, supra
note 437; but see Haughey, Lawyers' Malpractice: A Comparative Appraisal, 48 Notre Dame
Law. 888, 903-07 (1973), for the view that an attorney's liability should remain limited to
preserve the adversarial system.
441. In Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 519, 80 S.E.2d 144, 14S-46 (1954), the standard of
care was expressed as follows: "[o]rdinarily when an attorney engages in the practice of the law
and contracts to prosecute an action in behalf of his client, he impliedly represents that (1) he
possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill, and ability necessary to the practice of his
profession and which others similarly situated ordinarily possess; (2) he will exert his best
judgment in the prosecution of the litigation entrusted to him; and (3) he will exercise reasonable
and ordinary care and diligence in the use of his skill in the application of his knowledge to his
client's cause." Some courts, however, still consider subjective factors. See Palmer v. Nissen, 256
F. Supp. 497, 501 (D. Me. 1966) (an attorney should exercise his own best judgment to the best
of his personal ability).
442. Since an attorney generally undertakes to perform duties pursuant to a contract with his
client, the attorney's failure to exercise the requisite skill and care is a breach of an express or
implied term of that contract and therefore legal malpractice constitutes both a tort and a breach
of contract Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98
Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971); Gillen, supra note 437, at 286.
443. Wright v. Villiams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 809, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (1975), quoting
Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 523, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 593 (1966).
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ment. 444 The standard of care generally applied is measured by the
conduct of members of the profession in the same or similar locality
under similar circumstances. 445 An attorney, however, is not an in-
surer of the correctness of his work446 or the results which will be
attained and is therefore not responsible for mere errors of judg-
ment.4 4 7 A lawyer, moreover, is generally not liable for mistaken
advice when well-informed lawyers in the community would entertain
a reasonable doubt as to the proper resolution of the legal question
involved. 4 48
It is especially difficult to assess an attorney's conduct in prosecuting
a litigation. Decisions involving the introduction of testimony and
evidence made during a trial involve trial strategies that are not
susceptible of precise evaluation. 449 As one court has noted:
In a litigation a lawyer is well warranted in taking chances .... The conduct of a
lawsuit involves questions of judgment and discretion, as to which even the most
distinguished members of the profession may differ. They often present subtle and
doubtful questions of law. If in such cases a lawyer errs on a question not elementary
or conclusively settled by authority, that error is one of judgment for which he is not
liable. 4
0
An attorney may therefore choose among various alternative strategies,
444. Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1975).
445. Some courts have recently recognized that a lawyer who holds himself out as a specialist
within the legal profession should be held to a higher than average standard of care. See, e.g., Id.
at 809, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 199, Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1292, 1302-04
(1963).
446. See Tool Research & Eng'r Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 683, 120 Cal. Rptr.
291, 297 (1975) ("the attorney is not an insurer to his client's adversary that his client will win In
litigation").
447. Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954). In the context of legal
malpractice as distinguished from medical malpractice the determination as to whether an
undesirable legal result was caused by the lawyer's bad judgment or by actionable negligence Is
still treated in some jurisdictions as a question of law. See Wallach & Kelley, Attorney
Malpractice in California: A Shaky Citadel, 10 Santa Clara Law. 257, 264 (1970). Some courts,
however, have recently changed this rule, so that the issue of whether the attorney used bad
judgment or was negligent is treated as an issue of fact for the jury. See, e.g., Ishmael v.
Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
448. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961) (en banc), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). (The rule against perpetuities poses such complex and difficult
problems for the draftsman that even careful and competent attorneys fall prey to its traps.) But
in Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975) (overruled on other
grounds, In re Marriage of Brown, 313 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976) (en
banc)), the court found that an attorney had a duty to undertake reasonable research even when a
question of law was unsettled.
449. Wade, supra note 437, at 756; Note, Attorney's Malpractice, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1292,
1301 (1963).
450. Byrnes v. Palmer, 18 App. Div. 1, 4, 45 N.Y.S. 479, 481-82 (2d Dep't 1897), aff'd, 160
N.Y. 699, 55 N.E. 1093 (1899).
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one of which may be to refrain from pressing a point that is legally
unclear because the potential benefit to the client may not outweigh the
detriment in terms of expenditure of time and resources. 4 5 1 But as one
federal court has noted, "[t]here is nothing strategic or tactical about
ignorance .... ,,452
The expansion of the attorney's liability for negligence4 S3 has led in
part to the significant increase in the number of legal malpractice
claims instituted in the last several years. 45 4 Thus, physicians have
increasingly attempted to counterattack against attorneys who they
believe have instituted unjustified medical malpractice suits by relying
on a theory that has in the past been used so successfully against the
physicians themselves. However, despite the relative ease with which
a disappointed client may now proceed against his negligent attorney,
a third party not in privity with an attorney does not generally possess
the same advantages.
Historically, an attorney could not be held liable to one other than
his client in an action arising out of his professional duty in the absence
of fraud or collusion. 45 5 The courts have generally advanced two
arguments in support of the privity requirement. The courts reason
that if liability would be permitted to a third party without regard to
privity, the parties to the contract would be deprived of control of their
own agreement. 45 6 In addition, if the courts imposed a duty on the
attorney to the general public a potentially unlimited burden would be
placed on attorneys. 45 7
451. Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
452. Pineda v. Craven, 424 F.2d 369, 372 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 932
(1973).
453. Some states have simplified a dient's burden of establishing causation by eliminating the
traditional suit within a suit requirement, i.e., the client has to prove that he would have won the
first suit against the original defendant in order to win the second one. Note, Legal Malpractice,
Erosion of the Traditional Suit Within a Suit Requirement, 7 U. Toledo L. Rev. 328, 339-40
(1975). There has also been a liberalization of the application of the statute of limitations by
holding that the period of limitation does not begin to run until the attorney's failure to perform
the requisite function becomes irremediable. Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74
Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969) (en banc). See also Woodruff v. Tomlin, 511 F.2d 1019 (6th Cir. 1975).
454. In a recent report it was estimated that in the last five years the number of suits against
lawyers have doubled. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1977, at 1, col. 6; id. at 44, col. 6; see also Blaine,
Professional Liability Claims: An Increasing Concern for Lawyers, 59 Ill. Bar J. 302 (1970).
455. In Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 200 (1879) the Supreme Court stated the
general rule that "the obligation of the attorney is to his client and not to a third party, and unless
there is something in the circumstances of [the] case to take it out of the general rule, it seems
clear that the proposition. . . must be sustained." Several recent decisions have reiterated this
traditional rule. E.g., McGlone v. Lacey, 288 F. Supp. 662 (D.S.D. 1968); McDonald v. Stewart,
289 Minn. 35, 182 N.W.2d 437 (1970).
456. Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1184 (1972).
457. Id.
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With the "citadel of privity" collapsing in other areas of the law4 58 it
was inevitable that some inroads would be made in the area of legal
malpractice. 45 9 The first significant erosion occurred in California in
Biakanja v. Irving.460 There, a notary public who had drafted a will
for his "client" was held liable-despite the absence of privity-to the
intended sole beneficiary of the will for negligently failing to have the
will properly attested. 4 6 1 Three years later, the California Supreme
Court, in Lucas v. Harm,4 6 2 extended the Biakanja holding to an
attorney who negligently drafted a provision of his client's will so as to
render it void. The court noted that the attorney could be held liable to
the intended beneficiaries of the will either on the basis of a third party
beneficiary contract 4 63 or on the grounds of negligence. 4 64 The court
reasoned that damage to the intended beneficiaries was clearly foresee-
able if the will was found to be invalid as a result of the attorney's
negligence. The court replaced the rigid privity requirement with a
flexible balancing test.4 65 Among those factors which would be consid-
ered in determining whether as a matter of policy a party not in privity
458. In other areas of the law, especially products liability, the strict requirement of privity of
contract has been abrogated as being anomalous to modem concepts of tort law which should
be based on issues of foreseeability. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,
377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (en banc); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 662, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461
(1973); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); Baxter v. Ford
Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932). See also Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven &
Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) (discussion of privity requirement for negligent
misrepresentations made by accountants).
459. See Averill, Attorney's Liability to Third Persons for Negligent Malpractice, 2 Land &
Water L. Rev. 379 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Averill]; Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1181 (1971).
460. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (en banc).
461. The court noted that the notary's conduct in addition to being negligent was "highly
improper" since he had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, and such conduct should be
discouraged. Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
462. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961) (en banc), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
987 (1972).
463. The court observed that lack of privity would not prevent the intended beneficiaries
from recovering as third-party beneficiaries of the contract between the testator and the attorney
since the primary purpose in drafting the will was to transfer the estate to them in the future.
This intent could be effectuated only by giving the beneficiaries a cause of action in the event the
attorney breached the agreement. Id. at 590, 364 P.2d at 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
464. However, the attorney's failure to properly apply the complex rule against perpetuities
was held not to be negligent. Id. at 592-93, 364 P.2d at 690, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
465. This test was first enunciated in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958)
(en banc). There, however, the court also included as a factor the moral blame attached to the
conduct. This factor was apparently dropped by the California Supreme Court in the Lucas
decision, 56 Cal. 2d at 15, 364 P.2d at 687, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 823. See also Averill, supra note 459,
at 395.
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could recover for an attorney's professional negligence were the follow-
ing: "the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between
defendant's conduct and the injury, and the policy of preventing future
harm. '46 6 The court rejected the argument that an undue burden
would be imposed upon the legal profession by holding an attorney
liable to the beneficiaries of a negligently drawn will, particularly in
view of the fact that a contrary conclusion would cause the innocent
beneficiaries to bear the loss. 4 6 7
The California courts, in subsequent decisions, 468 emphasized that
the privity requirement had not been abolished in all actions instituted
by a third party against a negligent attorney. It has therefore been held
that the scope of the duty owed to a beneficiary must still be deter-
mined by reference to the attorney-client relationship, even though a
duty to third persons is imposed. 469 As one court has stated: "[Plublic
policy requires that the attorney exercise his position of trust and su-
perior knowledge ... so as not to affect adversely persons whose rights
and interests are certain and foreseeable. '470 While an attorney may
therefore be held liable to named beneficiaries for negligently drafting
a will, he will not be held liable to a larger class of undesignated
potential beneficiaries, since an attorney has no duty to determine the
true but unexpressed intentions of the testator or to draft an unam-
biguous will. 47'
The courts that have abolished the privity requirement have done so
primarily in two situations which by their very nature lend themselves
to injuries to third persons in the event of negligence: will drafting4 72
466. S6 Cal. 2d at 421, 364 P.2d at 687, I Cal. Rptr. at 823.
467. Id. at 721, 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
468. Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969); Wright v.
Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1975).
469. Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
470. Id. at 229, 449 P.2d at 165, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
471. Ventura County Humane Soc'y for the Prevention Of Cruelty to Children & Animals,
Inc. v. Holloway, 40 Cal. App. 3d 897, 115 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1974).
472. See Licata v. Spector, 26 Conn. Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (C.P. 1966); Woodfork v.
Sanders, 248 So. 2d 419 (La. App.), writ denied, 252 So. 2d 455 (1971). Few jurisdictions have,
however, as yet embraced the California rule abrogating the necessity of privity even in the
limited situation of will drafting where a duty to the intended benefidary is clear. See Averill,
supra note 459, at 397. New York, in fact, has specifically rejected the reasoning of the California
cases, holding that an attorney is not liable for negligence to a third party with whom he has no
privity of contract-in the absence of fraud or collusion. Victor v. Goldman, 74 Msc. 2d 685, 344
N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1973), aff'd mem. 351 N.Y.S.2d 956 (2d Dep't 1974); Mlaneri v. Amodeo,
38 Misc. 2d 190, 238 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. CL 1963).
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and examination of titles.4 7 3 However, the class of foreseeable plain-
tiffs has expanded very little beyond these cases.4 7 4
The conclusion is inescapable from an analysis of the applicable case
law that a third party, in order to successfully proceed in an action for
legal malpractice, must be a direct and intended beneficiary of the
attorney's services. The mere fact that the third party may be foresee-
able is insufficient to give rise to a legal duty on the part of an attorney
to such a third person. It follows that an attorney should not be held
liable for professional negligence to a third party who is in an adversa-
rial relationship. Accordingly, an action instituted by a physician
against a patient's attorney for professional negligence in instituting an
unjustified medical malpractice suit should clearly fall outside the
limited abrogation of the privity rule enunciated in Lucas v. Hamm.4 71
473. Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. St. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897) (attorney knew that a third party
was relying on his title search).
474. In Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App. 3d 769, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1971), an attorney
employed by a collection agency to bring an action for the collection of a debt owed to an
individual client of the agency was held liable to the individual creditor despite the absence of
privity of contract when the lawyer's negligent failure to diligently prosecute the action caused the
individual creditor to lose his recovery on a valid claim.
The California courts have also passed upon an attorney's duty toward a third person in a
criminal proceeding. In one case, a court dismissed a suit brought against defense counsel who,
while defending a client charged with murder, called plaintiff as a witness. It was alleged that the
attorney knew or should have known that the witness involved would have incriminated herself
on the stand. Plaintiff was later charged with a crime. DeLuca v. Whatley, 42 Cal. App. 3d 574,
117 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1974). The court, in holding that the attorney could not be held liable to the
defense witness on a third-party beneficiary theory, concluded that "when an attorney defends a
person accused of a crime he has but one intended beneficiary-his client." Id. at 576, 117 Cal.
Rptr. at 64 (emphasis supplied).
In Metzker v. Slocum, 537 P.2d 74 (Ore. 1975) (en banc), the court did not abolish the privity
requirement, but hinted that it might do so in a proper case. Nevertheless, the court dismissed an
action for legal malpractice brought by a minor child who alleged that an attorney who had been
retained by a husband and wife ten years previously had negligently failed to perfect her adoption
for his clients. The child claimed that because the adoption had not taken place she could not
secure an award for support upon the separation of her putative parents. The court concluded
that the foreseeability of such harm (that the failure to perfect the adoption would mean that a
court could not in a later divorce action force any legal obligation for support upon the father),
the certainty that the plaintiff would have secured support but for the attorney's negligence and
the closeness of the connection between the attorney's conduct and the injury suffered were too
tenuous. In order to state a cause of action for legal malpractice a "more certain, direct and
foreseeable connection" between the lawyer's negligence and the third party's injury must exist.
Id. at 76.
In Haldane v. Freedman, 204 Cal. App. 2d 475, 22 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1962), attorneys who
represented a woman in a divorce proceeding were not liable to the woman's minor children for
negligently depleting their mother's estate. The court in applying the balancing test enunciated in
previous cases concluded that the attorneys had committed no actionable wrong to the children
simply because they represented the mother in a divorce action.
475. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961). Such a suit should also be barred
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Several courts have recently considered whether a former defendant,
who was allegedly unjustifiably sued, stated a valid cause of action for
professional negligence against plaintiff's counsel. In Norton v.
Hines,47 6 a defendant, who had obtained a dismissal of an earlier
action, sued the attorneys who had represented the previous plaintiff for
negligence. 477 He contended that the attorney owed him a duty as a
foreseeable third person 478 to exercise reasonable care in advising his
client to commence a suit against him. This duty was allegedly
breached since the attorney knew or should have known that the client
lacked probable cause to sue. The court rejected this argument stating
that an "adverse party is not an intended beneficiary of the adverse
counsel's client. '479 If a cause of action existed against the attorney for
wrongfully instituting a civil action, it had to be pleaded as an action
for malicious prosecution, 48 0 and plaintiff could not avoid the stringent
proof requirements of a malicious prosecution action by pleading
negligence. The court found no reason to extend the law in view of the
recognized public policy limiting causes of action for instituting unjus-
tified litigation to malicious prosecution actions. A party should not be
permitted to subvert the public policy favoring free access to the courts
by relying on a cause of action for simple negligence which requires a
less demanding standard of proof than an action for malicious prosecu-
tion. 481
In Nathan v. Berlin,482 a physician who successfully defended a
malpractice action recovered a verdict against the attorneys who
prosecuted the action on two theories: prima facie tort (constitutional
on public policy grounds. Any other rule would expose attorneys to unlimited liability in every
case in which a suit was unsuccessfully litigated and would discourage meritorious litigation. See
Haughey, Lawyers' Malpractice: A Comparative Appraisal, 48 Notre Dame Law. 888, 903-06
(1973).
476. 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975).
477. On oral argument it was conceded that the attorneys were not sued for malicious
prosecution because plaintiff's attorney did not believe they acted maliciously. A cause of action
was, however, alleged against the attorney's client for malicious prosecution. Id. at 919 n.2, 123
Cal. Rptr. at 239 n.2.
478. Since the strict requirement of privity had been eased in certain situations in California,
plaintiff argued that modern tort concepts required that foreseeability of injury to a third party
should be determinative in defining duty and not privity of contract. Id. at 920, 123 Cal. Rptr. at
239.
479. Id. at 921, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
480. Id.
481. The court stated that the third person could state a cause of action for malicious
prosecution if the attorney prosecuted a claim which a reasonable lawyer would not regard as
tenable or proceeded with the action by unreasonably neglecting to investigate the law. Id. at
924, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
482. Civil No. 72-M2-542 (Ill. Cir. Ct., June 1, 1976).
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guarantee of a remedy for every wrong)483 and professional negligence.
One count of the physician's complaint alleged that the patient's
attorneys failed to act as reasonable and prudent attorneys in filing a
lawsuit against the physician without reasonable evidence to support
their medical malpractice claim. It is doubtful, however, that the
appellate courts will sustain the physician's cause of action for profes-
sional negligence.
The physician here was apparently attempting to avoid the stringent
proof requirements of a malicious prosecuting action. 484 Sound public
policy recognizing free access to courts must not be subverted by
permitting a plaintiff to sue for negligence when he cannot recover on
a malicious prosecution theory. An adverse party should not be
considered an intended beneficiary of the adverse counsel's client. The
burden on the physician resulting from the short delay incurred in
waiting until the prior action was terminated in his favor is far less
than the strain that would be placed on our system of justice if litigants
were permitted to bypass the traditional remedies that were created to
protect the well recognized public policy of free access to the courts. 4 5
Lawyers should not be discouraged from vigorously prosecuting
meritorious actions by the threat of malpractice litigation. If an
attorney were faced with a malpractice action by his adversary every
time he was unsuccessful, the impact on the adversary system would
be disastrous. The lawyer, as distinguished from other professionals, is
in a unique position because of the basic adversary nature of the legal
profession and overriding public policy requires that the lawyer be
immune from a negligence action instituted by a successful adverse
litigant who feels that a medical malpractice action was unjustifiably
prosecuted. Public policy considerations require that such a litigant's
exclusive remedy be based on a malicious prosecution theory.
C. Private Action for Breach of an Attorney's Oath
or Ethical Code by Filing a False Claim
A formal statement of the rules governing the conduct of members of
the legal profession is contained in the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility adopted by the American Bar Association. 486 The Code makes
483. See notes 422-24 supra and accompanying text for discussion of the prima fade tort
aspects of this case.
484. The physician initiated his countersuit before the original malpractice action had
terminated in his favor and therefore he would not have been able to prove one of the essential
elements of malicious prosecution. Apparently he also could not prove special injury. See Caspers
v. Chicago Real Estate Bd., 58 Il. App. 2d 113, 206 N.E.2d 787 (1965); see notes 108-10 155-67
supra and accompanying text.
485. See Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975).
486. This code replaces the Canons of Professional Ethics which were originally promulgated
1074 [Vol. 45
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no attempt to define the penalties that should be imposed for a
violation of a Disciplinary Rule. 487 It merely notes that the penalty
imposed should be determined by the nature of the attorney's conduct
and the attendant circumstances.4 88
The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically provides that a
lawyer shall not:
File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on
behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve
merely to harass or maliciously injure another.' 89
In addition, the Code states that a lawyer in representing his client
shall not "[k]nowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted
under existing law. .... 490
Some physicians have argued that a violation of these Disciplinary
Rules or Ethical Considerations should give rise to a civil tort action
for breach of a statutory duty. Moreover, it is contended that a breach
of an oath (not to maintain a suit which appears to be unjust) sworn to
in some states by attorneys upon admission to the bar should support a
tort action. The courts, however, have rejected any attempt to trans-
form the breach of an attorney's ethical duty into a private remedy.
In Spencer v. Burglass,491 a physician brought an action against a
patient's attorney for filing a frivolous medical malpractice suit. In
addition to a cause of action in the nature of malicious prosecution,492
the plaintiff alleged that the attorney breached a duty to plaintiff
based upon the oath493 taken by the attorney upon his admission to the
practice of law as well as the Canons of Professional Ethics. 494 The
by the American Bar Association in 1908. It has been formally adopted in all states and the
District of Columbia with a variety of omissions and alterations in any particular jurisdiction. See
Kaufman, Problems in Professional Responsibility 29 (1975).
487. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimal level of conduct below which no attorney can
fall without being subject to disciplinary action. The Ethical Considerations are aspirational and
constitute a body of principles which provide guidance in many specific situations. ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility Preliminary Statement.
488. The disciplinary measures taken are discretionary and an attorney may be disbarred,
suspended or censured depending on the character of the offense. Note, 43 Cornell L.Q. 488, 495
(1958).
489. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(1). See also id. DR 2-109; id. DR
6-101(A)(2); id. EC 7-4; id. EC 7-10.
490. Id. at DR 7-102(A)(2).
491. 337 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1976).
492. For a full discussion of the other aspects of this case see notes 181-86 supra and
accompanying text
493. The oath cited provideck "You will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which
shall appear to you to be unjust, nor any defense except such as you believe to be honestly
debatable under the law of the land." 337 So. 2d at 600.
494. Canon 30 provided: "The lawyer must decline to conduct a civil cause or to make a
defense when convinced that it is intended merely to harass or to injure the opposite party or to
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court dismissed the action after exploring the ethical complexities
which govern the lawyer's conduct in relation to his client, the court
and the public. The court found that other ethical considerations 495 -
besides the attorney's duty to avoid unjustified suits-governed when,
at the time of trial, the attorney discovered that he had no evidence to
sustain the malpractice action. The attorney's freedom to withdraw
from the case was tempered by the interests of his client, subjective
considerations of honor and self respect, and an evaluation of his
client's subjective motives in pursuing the litigation. 496 The court
concluded that the attorney did not abnegate his duty to the physician
because the Canons of Ethics merely permitted, but did not require, an
attorney to withdraw from a lawsuit when he discovers that his client
has no case. Moreover, the court held that public policy required that
all persons shall have free access to the courts to redress wrongs and,
as long as an attorney acts in good faith upon reasonable grounds in
commencing a civil proceeding, he should not be subject to a counter-
suit if the action proves unsuccessful. 497
In Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Elgin Coal, Inc., 498 the
plaintiff, in addition to pleading causes of action for malicious prosecu-
tion 499 and abuse of process, alleged that the plaintiff's attorneys in the
prior litigation had violated their oath and public duty by filing an
action stating facts which they knew to be false.500 The court in
holding that plaintiff failed to state cause of action stated: "[A] private
action for civil damages for alleged breach of an attorney's oath by the
filing of a false claim would not lie. The remedy for such a breach is a
public one and not a private one." 501
work oppression or wrong . . . His appearance in Court shall be deemed equivalent to an
assertion on his honor that in his opinion his client's case is one proper for judicial determina-
tion." Id.
495. Canon 42 provided that an attorney may withdraw from employment only for good
cause. "The lawyer shall not throw up the unfinished task to the detriment of his client except for
reasons of honor or self-respect.... (Wihen a lawyer discovers that his client has no case and the
client is determined to continue it; or even if the lawyer finds himself incapable of conducting the
case effectively," the lawyer may be justified in withdrawing from the case. Id. at 601.
496. Id.
497. Id. Logically, even where a statute codifies certain ethical guidelines for attorneys in
their capacity as officers of the court, a breach of these directives should not provide the basis for
a civil suit against the attorney. See Tingle v. Arnold, Cate & Allen, 129 Ga. App. 134, 137, 199
S.E.2d 260, 263 (1973).
498. 358 F. Supp. 17 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), aff'd without opinion, 477 F.2d 598 (6th Cir. 1973).
499. The court dismissed the malicious prosecution action because the prior proceeding had
been settled and therefore had not terminated in plaintiff's favor. Id. at 21.
500. Although the plaintiff did not cite the statutory authority relied upon, the court
concluded that the statutory duty was apparently a statutory section dealing with the procedure
for admission to the practice of law and the oath required therein. Id. at 22.
501. Id.
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Although local disciplinary agencies should vigorously condemn and
penalize attorneys who violate the disciplinary rules by instituting
unjustified malpractice suits, a private cause of action for damages
arising from such a violation should not be recognized by the courts.
V11. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
Several states have recently enacted reform legislation to discourage
the prosecution of unjustified medical malpractice actions. 50 2 Although
these legislative responses are on the whole salutary, they fail to
effectively resolve the problem of unjustified malpractice suits.
California and Ohio have enacted statutes that require a patient to
serve a notice of intent to commence a malpractice action upon a
potential defendant 90 (California) or 180 (Ohio) days prior to filing a
claim, but within the time afforded by the applicable statute of
502. Law of Sept. 23, 1975, act 513, §§ 8(1), (2), [1975] Ala. Acts; Alaska Stat. § 09.55.535
(Cum. Supp. 1976); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-561, -567 to -569 (Supp. 1976); Law of Bar. 28,
1976, act 638, §§ 1-15, [1976] Ark. Acts; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6146 (West Supp. 1976); Cal.
Civ. Pro. Code § 1295 (West Supp. 1976); Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, §§ 6803-14, 6864-65 (Cum.
Supp. 1976); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 95.11(4)(b), 768.133 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Law of June 9, 1976, act
219, §§ 2, 13, [1976] Hawaii Sess. Laws; Idaho Code §§ 6-1001 to -10013 (Supp. 1976); Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 110, §§ 58.2, .3-.8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977) (declared unconstitutional, Wright v.
Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 M. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976)). Ind. Ann. Stat. §§
16-9.5-9-1 to -10 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1976); Iowa Code Ann. § 147.138 (Cur. Pamphlet 1976);
Law of April 15, 1976, ch. 248, § 1, ch. 249, §§ 1-9, [1976] Kan. Sess. Laws; La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 40:1299.47 (West Supp. 1977); Md. Ann. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc., §§ 3-2A05-06 (Cum. Supp.
1976); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231, § 60B (Cum. Supp. 1975); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann., §§
600.5040-.5059 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Mo. Stat. Ann. §§ 538.015-050 (Vernon, Cum. Supp. 1976);
Law of April 6, 1976, L.B. 434, §§ 40-47, [1976] Neb. Stat.; Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 41A.010-.090
(Supp. 1975); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 519A-A:2 (1974); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 1:21-6(0 (Supp. 1976);
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 58-33-1 to -28 (Interim Supp. 1976); N.Y. Judiciary Law §§ 148-a, 213(9),
474-a (McKinney Supp. 1976); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2711.21-.24 (Page Supp. 1975) (declared
unconstitutional, Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, - Ohio Op. 2d -, 355 N.E.2d 903
(C.P. 1976)); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, §§ 1301.308, .605 (Supp. 1976); Law of Sept. 1, 1976, § 1,
[1976] R.I. Gen. Laws; S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. §§ 21-25A-1 to -38 (Supp. 1976); Tenn. Code
Ann. §§ 23.3401 to .3421 (Cum. Supp. 1976); VL Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 7001-08 (Cur. Supp.
1976); Va. Code Ann. §§ 8-911 to -922 (Supp. 1975); Law of Feb. 21, 1976, ch. 56, §§ 1-15,
[1976] Wash. Laws; Wis. Stat Ann. § 298.04 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
Many other legislative changes have also been promulgated in response to the malpractice
crisis. Many of these procedural changes were enacted to limit recoveries and include: shorten-
ing statutes of limitations; eliminating the ad damnum from the complaint; permitting collateral
source evidence to be admitted at trial; providing peer review immunity, not allowing evidence of
advance payment at trial; allowing periodic payments of awards; establishing patient's compensa-
tion funds; and limiting amounts recoverable. Some states have also made substantive changes
in their tort law. These states have altered traditional res ipsa loquitur doctrines, clarified their
laws as to informed consent, provided that a promise to cure must be in writing, and enacted
good samaritan laws. These legislative enactments are beyond the scope of this Article. See Beck,
Medical Malpractice Developments, 6 Ins., Negligence & Compensation Law Brief 6-7 (1976);
Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975
Duke L.J. 1417; N.Y.U., Annual Survey of American Law 249-54 (1976).
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limitations. s0 3 This notice must describe the legal basis of the patient's
claim and the type of loss sustained. 0 4 The attorney's failure to serve a
notice will not invalidate the proceeding but may subject him to
disciplinary action s05
The primary purpose of such notice of claim legislation is to allow
for a "cooling-off' period prior to the formal institution of a malprac-
tice action.50 6 It was hoped that during this period the patient's claim
would be settled or that the patient, upon reflection, would be dis-
suaded from instituting any action.507 If insurance carriers promptly
investigate claims and attempt to settle them during this early stage of
the proceedings, many meritorious actions may not have to be insti-
tuted, but the groundless actions that could not be settled because
they lacked merit would still be prosecuted. There is certainly no
evidence that fewer groundless malpractice actions have been insti-
tuted against municipal hospitals and doctors in those states where
claimants must file a notice of claim against a municipalitys prior to
instituting suit. In all likelihood, this legislation will merely postpone
the formal institution of suit for a short period of time, and do little to
discourage patients and their attorneys from instituting unjustified
malpractice actions.
In order to resolve the malpractice crisis, a majority of states50 9 have
503. E.g., Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 364 (West Supp. 1976); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.11
(Page Supp. 1975).
504. Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 364(b) (Vest Supp. 1976).
505. Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 365 (West Supp. 1976).
506. ABA, Interim Report of the Commission on Medical Professional Liability 51-52 (1976).
507. Id.
508. See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Munic. Law § 50-e (McKinney 1965).
509. In some states the panels are only used where there is a prior agreement to arbitrate.
Law of Sept. 23, 1975, act 513, §§ 8(1)-(2), [1975] Ala. Acts; Alaska Stat. § 09-55-535 (Cum.
Supp. 1976); Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 1295 (West Supp. 1976); Ohio Rev. Code Ann..§§ 2711.22-.24
(Page Supp. 1975) (declared unconstitutional, Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, - Ohio
Op. 2d -, 355 N.E.2d 903 (C.P. 1976)); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, §§ 1301.308-.605 (Supp. 1976);
S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. §§ 21-25A-1 to -38 (Supp. 1976); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 7001-08
(Cum. Supp. 1976); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 655.013 (Supp. 1976-77). In some states, the claimant and
respondent may voluntarily submit their dispute to an arbitration panel. Law of May 28, 1975,
act 638, § 4, [1975] Ark. Acts; Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, §§ 6803-14 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Law of
April 15, 1976, ch. 249, [1976] Kan. Sess. Laws; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 600.5040-59, -65
(Supp. 1976); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 519A-1a'2 (1974); Va. Code Ann. §§ 8-911 to -22, (Cum.
Supp. 1976). In some states the panel is a mandatory part of malpractice litigation. Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 12-567 (Supp. 1976); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 768.133-34 (Supp. 1976); Law of June 9,
1976, act 219, §§ 2-11 to -20, [1970] Hawaii Sess. Laws; Idaho Code §§ 6-1001 to -02 (Supp.
1976); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, §§ 58.2, -.3-.8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977) (declared unconstitutional,
Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 fI1. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976)); Ind. Ann. Stat.
§§ 16-9.5-9-1 to -10 (Burns Supp. 1976); La. Rev. Stat. § 40:1299.47 (West Supp. 1977); Md. Ct.
& Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-2A01-09 (Supp. 1976); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 231, § 60B (Supp.
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created some type of pre-trial screening or arbitration panels. Although
the legislation creating these panels varies considerably among the
states, generally a claimant will submit his case prior to trial to a
panel composed of some combination of judges, lawyers, doctors and
laymen who make a preliminary determination as to whether malprac-
tice has occurred. If the panel finds that there is no substantial
evidence of malpractice, the patient generally may reject the decision
of the panel and proceed to try the case before a jury. 510 In some
states, the panel's findings as to liability may be admissible at the
trial.511 There are, however, no real sanctions imposed upon either the
patient or his attorney for proceeding to trial despite the panel's
tentative finding that the malpractice claim was groundless.
The panel system may indirectly have the effect of discouraging
some groundless medical malpractice actions. In the first instance, this
procedure forces an attorney to prepare and evaluate his case fully at
an early stage of the proceedings. At this juncture, if the attorney
cannot secure a medical expert or persuade the panel of the merits of
the patient's claim, he could easily discontinue the action with a
significant savings in time and future litigation expenses. However,
1976); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 516.105, 538.015-.050 (Vernon Supp. 1976); Law of April 6, 1976, ch.
434, §§ 40-47, [1976] Neb. Laws; Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 41A.010-.090 (Supp. 1975); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§§ 58-33-15 to -28 (Interim Supp. 1976); N.Y. Judiciary Law, §§ 148-(a)(4), (6), (8), 213(9)
(McKinney Supp. 1976); Law of Sept. 1, 1976, § 1, [1976] R.I. Gen. Laws; Tenn. Code Ann. §
23-3401-21 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 298.04 (Supp. 1976). See Gibbs, Malpractice
Screening Panels and Arbitration in Medical Liability Disputes, 1 J. Legal Medicine, May-June
1973, at 30; Holder, Joint Screening Panels, 215 J.A.M.A. 1715 (1971).
510. This provision upholds their constitutionality since it preserves the right to a jury
trial. While U.S. Const. amend. VII does not apply to state courts since it has not been selectively
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, most states provide for a right to a jury trial in their
own state constitutions. Adams & Bell, Alternatives to Litigation II, in HEW Report, supra note
2, Appendix 318. The constitutionality of some panels and arbitration statutes has recently been
tested by the courts. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W.
3463 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1977), rev'g 43 Fla. Supp. 107 (Cir. CL 1975) (mandatory panel held
constitutional); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976)
(mandatory panel held unconstitutional); Comisky v. Arlen, 55 App. Div. 2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d
122 (2d Dep't 1976) (panel held constitutional); Halpern v. Gozan, 85 Misc. 2d 753, 381 N.Y.S.2d
744 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (mandatory panel held constitutional); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical
Center, - Ohio Op. 2d -, 355 N.E.2d 903 (C.P. 1976) (mandatory arbitration held unconstitu-
tional).
511. The following states allow the findings of the panels to be admitted into evidence if a
trial follows: Alaska Stat. § 09.55.536(e) (Supp. 1976); Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 6812 (Cum.
Supp. 1976); Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 16-9.5-9-9 (Burns Supp. 1976); La. Rev. Stat. § 40.1299.47(I)
(West Supp. 1977); Md. Ct. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-2A06(d) (Supp. 1976); Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 231, § 60B (Supp. 1976); N.Y. judiciary Law § 148-a(8) (McKinney Supp. 1976); Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 40, § 1301.510 (Supp. 1976); Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-3409 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Va. Code
Ann. § 8-918 (Supp. 1976); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 298.04 (Supp. 1976).
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unless legislatures impose some sanctions, such as payment of rea-
sonable attorneys' fees to the physician who successfully defends an
unjustified malpractice action, the panel system will not significantly
reduce the prosecution of groundless suits.
The American Medical Association, in an effort to discourage unjus-
tified malpractice suits, has drafted a model counterclaim act that
would apparently enable physicians to counterclaim for malicious
prosecution against a patient and his attorney in the malpractice action
itself. This proposal reads:
In any action for damages for personal injury or death, whether based on tort or
contract law, or otherwise, a counterclaim for damages for abuse of process in filing
such action may be filed and litigated in the same action provided that the counterclaim
is based upon substantial allegations of material facts.
It would appear that the term, "abuse of process," contained in the
draft proposal actually refers to malicious prosecution. There would
certainly be no need for such a statute if "abuse of process" was used in
the technical sense since a counterclaim has traditionally been per-
mitted in such actions.5 12 This proposed reform has been adopted in
Tennessee, where it explicitly includes malicious prosecution ac-
tions.5 13
The proponents of this act argue that it would force patients and
their attorneys to consider their own liability before proceeding with an
action against a physician. Moreover, it is claimed that such a change
would minimize litigation time and expenses since the questions of
malpractice and malicious prosecution would be adjudicated at the
same time and before the same fact finder.
Although this counterclaim proposal may appear to save judicial
time and energy, in practice it would undermine the policy of open
access to the courts for the redress of grievances. If a counterclaim was
permitted with ease in the original action litigants with legitimate
claims could be discouraged by the fear of retaliatory actions. Fur-
thermore, such counterclaims would tend to confuse the issues of a
highly complex litigation. The patient who already has a substantial
burden of proving malpractice would be put on the defensive by
having to prove that he instituted the malpractice action with probable
cause and without malice. This would shift the focus of the jury's
512. See notes 213-14 supra and accompanying text.
513. Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-3415(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976). The Tennessee counterclaim provi-
sion specifically provides that a counterclaim will be permitted for "malicious prosecution (on the
ground that the principal action was instituted with improper intent and without probable cause)
or malicious abuse of process (on the ground that there was an improper use with improper Intent
of the process) in the same action . ... " Id.
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inquiry from the main issue of whether malpractice was actually
committed to collateral issues.
It has also been proposed that verification of pleadings be made
mandatory in medical malpractice cases.514 Pursuant to such a provi-
sion, an attorney as a prerequisite to filing a malpractice action, would
have to verify under oath that he had reviewed the facts of the case,
consulted with an appropriate specialist who is licensed to practice in
the state and had concluded, on the basis of such a review, that there
was substantial and reasonable cause for filing the action. Such a
statute would do very little to resolve the physician's dilemma. In
those states where pleadings must be verified,515 there is no empirical
evidence to indicate that such a procedure has caused any decrease in
the number of unjustified actions. On the contrary, in New York,
where pleadings must be verified, in some courts, in order to secure a
general trial preference, the number of malpractice cases filed has
continued to increase.5 16
In any event, a verification statute would not deter any appreciable
number of malpractice suits since it is no longer as difficult as it once
was to secure the opinion of a medical expert. In addition, the
verification legislation, as proposed, would appear to impose no
specific penalties upon an attorney who incorrectly or wrongfully
verifies a pleading. Although an attorney who falsely verifies may be
subject to a charge of perjury,517 this severe criminal penalty has
rarely been imposed.5 18
While the number of unjustified malpractice actions may not be
directly affected as a result of verification provisions, a lawyer's
violation of a verification statute could provide the basis for a success-
ful malicious prosecution action. The failure to consult with a medical
expert or reasonably to investigate and review the facts of a malprac-
tice action, when considered in conjunction with the attorney's conduct
in wrongfully or falsely verifying the pleadings, could provide the
essential elements of malice and lack of probable cause in a malicious
prosecution action.
514. See A.B. 2939, 1976 Calif. Leg. which died in Committee on November 30, 1976.
515. E.g., 22 N.Y. CRR § 660.9(c) (Supp. 1974) (New York and Bronx Counties Sup. CL). A
bar association committee has recommended that malpractice complaints be verified by both
plaintiff and his counsel. Assoc. of the Bar of the City of New York, Report on Medical
Malpractice Insurance Crisis § Q (1976).
516. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
517. E.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 210.00-.10 (McKinney 1975).
518. See Siegel, Practice Commentary, N.Y. CPLR § 3020 (McKinney 1974). The at-
torney who falsely verifies would, of course, be subject to disciplinary proceedings. The ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(4) states: "A lawyer shall not ... [e]ngage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation."
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Many physicians believe and strenuously argue that the contingent fee
arrangement encourages the prosecution of unjustified malpractice
litigation. 51 9 In response to such arguments, many states520 have re-
cently enacted legislation to limit the attorneys' fees in medical mal-
practice actions. While it is too early to evaluate the effect of these
changes on the frequency of litigation, meritorious or otherwise, a few
general observations can be made. Since many of these legislative
changes limit the amount of the lawyer's fee only where the recovery is
substantial,5 21 they should have little, if any, effect on the prosecution
of smaller nuisance claims. Moreover, such legislation may have the
adverse effect of discouraging the prosecution of meritorious malprac-
tice suits especially where the patients' monetary recovery appears to be
limited.
The most revolutionary reform which has yet to be seriously consid-
ered by any state as a deterrent to unjustified malpractice actions is a
total revision of the traditional American approach to attorneys'
fees. 522
519. HEW Report, supra note 2, at 32. There is, however, significant evidence to indicate
that, in reality, the contingent fee protects the physician from groundless suits. Id. at 153; Harley
& Rheingold, New Survey of Malpractice Litigation, 175 N.Y.L.J., April 28, 1976, at 1, col. 2.
For the arguments for and against the contingent fee system see F. MacKinnon, Contingent Fees
for Legal Services 4-5 (1964); Hughes, The Contingent Fee Contract in Massachusetts, 43 Boston
U.L. Rev. 1 (1963); Radin, Contingent Fees in California, 28 Calif. L. Rev. 587 (1940). See also
Grunskay v. Simenauskas, 107 Conn. 380, 140 A. 724 (1928).
520. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-568 (Supp. 1976); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6146 (West Supp.
1976); Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 6865 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Law of June 9, 1976, ch. 219, § 2-2,
(1976] Hawaii Sess. Laws; Ind. Ann. Stat. § 16-9.5-5. l(a) (Burns Supp. 1976); Iowa Code Ann. §
147.138 (Cum. Pamphlet 1976); Law of April 15, 1976, ch. 248, [1976] Kan. Sess. Laws; Md. Cts.
& Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-2A07 (Supp. 1976); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5040-59 (Supp.
1976); Law of April 6, 1976, ch. 434, § 34, [1976] Neb. Stat.; N.J. Stat. Apn. Rule 1:21-6(0
(Supp. 1976); N.Y. Judiciary Law § 474-a (McKinney Supp. 1976); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
2711.21-.24 (Page 1975) (declared unconstitutional, Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, -
Ohio Op. 2d -, 355 N.E.2d 903 (C.P. 1976)); Ore. Rev. Siat. § 12.110 (1975); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit.
40, § 1301.604 (Supp. 1976); Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-3419 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Law of Feb. 21,
1976, ch. 56, § 12, [1976] Wash. Laws; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 655.013 (Supp. 1976-77).
521. The California statute provides a representative example of such statutes. It provides:
"(a) An attorney shall not contract for or collect a contingency fee ... in excess of the following
limits:
(1) Forty percent of the first fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) recovered.
(2) Thirty-three and one-third percent of the next fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) recovered.
(3) Twenty-five percent of the next one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) recovered.
(4) Ten percent of any amount on which the recovery exceeds two hundred thousand dollars
($200,000)." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6146 (West Supp. 1976); see also N.Y. Judiciary Law,
§ 474-a (McKinney Supp. 1976).
522. In the 1974 New York State Assembly session a bill was introduced which provided that
"a defendant in an action for malpractice, if judgment is entered in his favor, is entitled to costs,
disbursements and additional sums as the court deems reasonable for counsel fees and other
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In the United States, 523 attorneys' fees are not ordinarily recoverable
as costs52 4 in the absence of a specific statute or enforceable contract
providing for such fees.525 Each party must therefore generally bear
the cost of his own attorneys' fees as part of the privilege of using the
courts. Under the American rule, s 26 the successful party, who must
bear the costs of his own attorneys' fees, is never made totally whole.5 27
Those who support the American rule, however, argue that:
[O]ne should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and that
the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights
if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents' counsel. . . .Also the
time, expense, and difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the question of what
constitutes reasonable attorney's fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial
administration.5 28
Those who support a substantial change in the traditional approach to
awarding attorneys' fees claim that if the unsuccessful litigant and his
attorney were responsible for the reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by
a physician who successfully defended a malpractice action, unjusti-
fiable litigation would be deterred if not eliminated altogether. Al-
expenses necessarily incurred with respect to such action." A.B. 10187, 1974 N.Y. Leg. See
Note, Rx for New York's Medical Malpractice Crisis, 11 Colum. J.L. & Social Problems
467, 481 (1975).
523. In England, courts are authorized by statute to award reasonable counsel fees to a
successful litigant. See Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717
(1967). See generally C. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages § 60, at 234-36 (1935);
1 S. Speiser, Attorneys' Fees, § 12.7 (1973); Goodhart, Costs, 38 Yale L.J. 849 (1929).
524. For a discussion of taxable costs as a sanction to deter frivolous suits see Mayer & Stix,
The Prevailing Party Should Recover Counsel Fees, 8 Akron L. Rev. 426 (1975); Comment,
Deterring Unjustifiable Litigation by Imposing Substantial Costs, 44 111. L. Rev. 507 (1949);
Note, Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 78 (1953).
525. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); F.D. Rich Co.
v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974); Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing
Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967); Kinter v. Harr, 146 Mont. 461, 480 P.2d 487 (1965); Utica Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Plante, 106 N.H. 525, 214 A.2d 74 (1965).
526. The American rule denying recovery for attorneys' fees has been criticized by many
commentators. See Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 Calif
L. Rev. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 Iowa L. Rev.
75 (1963); McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorneys' Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal
Services, 40 Fordham L. Rev. 761 (1972).
527. F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974); Rodulfa v. United
States, 295 F. Supp. 28 (D.D.C. 1969). Advocates of the English rule claim that the allowance of
the successful party's legal expense would discourage the institution of unfounded litigation.
Goodhart, Costs, 38 Yale L.J. 849, 862 (1929).
528. Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (citations
omitted). See also Agostini v. State, 255 App. Div. 264, 5 N.Y.S.2d 732 (3d Dep't 1938) where
the court stated, "To permit a successful party to bring an action against his unsuccessful
opponent to recover the legal expenses of prosecuting a former action would lead to endless
litigation. . . ." Id. at 267, 5 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
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though such an approach could provide the most direct deterrent to
unjustified suits, it could also affect the foundations of our judicial
system. As mentioned previously, access to the courts to redress
grievances has been one of the cornerstones of justice in the United
States. A proposal requiring the payment of counsel fees by the
unsuccessful attorney or litigant in all cases would have a detrimental
effect on the prosecution of all actions. Many actions are lost not
because they are unjustified but because of the circumstances sur-
rounding the trial. To impose a penalty upon a lawyer every time he
loses a malpractice action would have a chilling effect on the attorney's
obligation to pursue the interests of a client who has a meritorious
claim containing complex and novel issues. Any proposal which so
directly affects free access to the courts should be rejected.
There is, however, some constructive legislation 529 providing for an
award of attorneys' fees under certain limited circumstances which
could provide some relief for physicians who believe they have been
unjustifiably sued. These types of statutes could effectively deter the
prosecution of unjustified actions without contravening the well-
recognized public policy of free access to the courts.
VIII. ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARDED IN LIMITED SITUATIONS
A. Attorneys' Fees as Costs
Several limited exceptions to the general American rule5 30 denying
recovery of attorneys' fees as costs have developed. 531 Usually these
exceptions arise as "part of the historic equity jurisdiction" of the
courts. 532 The federal courts, thus, may assess counsel fees as part of
taxable costs "for dominating reasons of justice." 533
529. There is some authority in support of an award of costs and attorneys' fees as damages
against a plaintiff who has prosecuted a suit that was vexatious, groundless or fraudulent. 1 S.
Speiser, Attorney's Fees § 13.3 (1973). See notes 556-58 supra and accompanying text.
530. See notes 523-27 supra and accompanying text.
531. These exceptions generally occur where a statute authorizes such attorneys' fees; where
there is an enforceable contract obligation; where a common fund has been created; where
obstinate behavior occurs; and where the successful litigant has acted as a private attorney
general and a statute authorizes such fees. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240 (1975); F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974); Flelschman
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967); Cleveland v. Second Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 149 F.2d 466 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 775 (1945); Tenants & Owners In
Opposition to Redevelopment v. HUD, 406 F. Supp. 1060 (N.D. Cal. 1975); 6 J. Moore, Federal
Practices 1 954.77[2], at 1704-05 (2d ed. 1976).
532. Sprague v. Ticonic Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939); accord, Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369
U.S. 527, 530 (1962). See Annot., 31 A.L.R. Fed. 833 (1977).
533. Sprague v. Ticonic Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939).
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The federal courts,5 34 pursuant to their equity power, have recog-
nized that attorneys' fees may be awarded in the court's discretion "to
a successful party when his opponent has acted in bad faith, vexa-
tiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. '5 3s The award of attorneys'
fees pursuant to this rule has been used most sparingly 36 by the courts
in extraordinary cases.S37
This exception to the general rule may be easily stated, but it is
difficult to define the type of conduct on the part of a party or an
attorney that will amount to bad faith.5 38 Bad faith in this context has
been interpreted to connote fraud,5 39 an actual or willful wrong-
doing5 40 or a continued and persistent course of harassment 4 I A
distinction, however, must be drawn between intermittent, burden-
some or dilatory conduct by a party and unreasonably wanton or
willfully oppressive conduct that is sufficient to support a finding of
bad faith.5 42 It is only when a party's conduct goes beyond "generally
accepted vigor and persistence commonly employed in our adversary
534. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d), which states in pertinent part: "Except when express
provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs. .. ." Under this
rule, federal courts have a wide discretion in the apportionment and taxation of costs. Jones v.
Schellenberget, 225 F.2d 784, 794 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. dismissed, 350 U.S. 789 (19S6).
535. F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974); see, e.g., Vaughan v.
Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962); Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575 (1946),
Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974); McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109 (1st
Cir. 1971); Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951); 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice S4.77[2], at 1709 (2d ed. 1976).
536. Note, Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 78,
83 (1953).
537. "[O]nly in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice can the exercise of the
power by the district court be justified." 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice 54.7711], at 1709-11 (2d
ed. 1976). See also Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951).
538. It appears that bad faith would be more than the implied malice or in some instances the
actual malice necessary to support a malicious prosecution action. See notes 144-54 supra and
accompanying text.
539. E.g., Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946) ("No doubt, if
the court finds after a proper hearing that fraud has been practiced upon it, or that the very
temple of justice has been defiled, the entire cost of the proceedings could justly be assessed
against the guilty parties.'); Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 484
F.2d 905, 909 (7th Cir. 1973) ('In this circuit, attorney fees are only awarded... in exceptional
cases 'to prevent gross injustice and where fraud and wrong-doings are clearly proved.' ").
540. E.g., Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. W'is.
1970); Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383 (1). Md. 1963).
541. E.g., Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606 (5th Cir. 1974) ("When a party's conduct
has been vexatious, groundless or in bad faith!); Tenants & Owners in Opposition to Redevel-
opment v. HUD, 406 F. Supp. 961, 964 (N.D. Cal. 1975) ("continued, unreasonably obstinate,
wanton or wilfully oppressive conduct").
542. Tenants & Owners in Opposition to Redevelopment v. HUD, 406 F. Supp. 961, 964
(N.D. Cal. 1975).
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system" that sanctions should be imposed.5 43 Moreover, the moving
party has the burden of clearly proving his adversary's fraud or
wrongdoing. 544
If bad faith is equated with fraud or wilful conduct, it is obvious
that an award of attorneys' fees can only be imposed in very few
cases. 5 45 It is doubtful that a physician who has been unjustifiably
sued for malpractice can meet the stringent requirement of proof of
bad faith which would amount to a fraud on the federal courts. S46
Some state statutes547 also specifically provide for the taxing of
reasonable attorneys' fees where false allegations s48 were made without
reasonable cause,5 49 and in bad faith.550 These statutes were enacted
to prevent litigants from being subjected to harassment by the prosecu-
tion of actions which by their nature were vexatious or brought
without legal foundation.55 1 It has been held that such statutes should
only be invoked in those cases which fall strictly within their terms.5 S 2
In order to recover attorneys' fees under most of these statutes a
party generally has the burden of proving that the allegations in the
pleadings were made without reasonable cause 553 and in bad faith.
55 4
543. Id.
544. Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 351 F.2d 557, 560 (7th Cir. 1965); Armour & Co.
v. Wilson & Co., 274 F.2d 143, 148 (7th Cir. 1960).
545. Note, Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 78,
83 (1953).
546. Even if the physician could meet this proof requirement, however, it is questionable
whether this exception to the general rule of costs is applicable in a federal suit based on
diversity, if the forum state would not recognize an award of attorneys' fees. 6 J. Moore, Federal
Practice 954.77[2], at 1712-13 (2d ed. 1976); C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2669, at 154-55 (1973).
547. E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110, § 41 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); Md. R. Civ. Prac. 604, §
b; N.D. Cent. Code Ann. R. App. P. 38 (1974); see F.W. Berens Sales Co. v. McKinney, 310
A.2d 601 (D.C. App. 1973). Ga. Code Ann. § 20-1404 (1965) allows recovery to plaintiff if the
defendant has been stubbornly litigious. There is some question as to whether a defendant may
use this section if the plaintiff was stubbornly litigious. Busbee v. Sellers, 71 Ga. App. 26, 29
S.E.2d 110 (1944). See also Levine, Section 41 of the Civil Practice Act-the Sleeper Awakes, 54
Ill. Bar. J. 388 (1966).
548. Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110, § 41 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); see Murczek v. Powers Label
Co., 31 111. App. 3d 939, 335 N.E.2d 172 (1975).
549. Md. R. Civ. Prac. 604, § b(2); see F. W. Berens Sales Co. v. McKinney, 310 A.2d 601
(D.C. App. 1973); Horween v. Dubner, 68 Il. App. 2d 309, 216 N.E.2d 288 (1966).
550. Md. R. Civ. Prac. 604 § b(1); 1901 Wyoming Ave. Cooperative Ass'n v. Lee, 345 A.2d
456 (D.C. App. 1975); cf. Feist v. Luzerne County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 347 A.2d 772
(1975). Illinois has recently eliminated its requirement of a showing of bad faith. Ill. Ann. Stat.
ch. 110, § 41 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976).
551. See, e.g., F. W. Berens Sales Co. v. McKinney, 310 A.2d 601, 603 (D.C. App. 1973);
Ready v. Ready, 33 I1. App. 2d 145, 161-62, 178 N.E.2d 650, 656 (1961).
552. Murczek v. Powers Label Co., 31 fI. App. 3d 943, 935, 335 N.E.2d 172, 176 (1975).
553. Md. R. Civ. Prac. 604 § b(2); Murczek v. Powers Label Co., 31 Il. App. 3d 939, 335
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Bad faith is obviously a vague standard and is difficult to define. It
is evidently more than a mistake of judgment and appears to require a
conscious wrongdoing. It also appears to be more than the mere
absence of probable cause. The District of Columbia, for example,
requires that a grievous wrongdoing must have been committed before
awarding attorneys' fees."55
Illinois, in response to the medical malpractice problem, 556 has
recently revised its statute by eliminating the bad faith requirement
altogether. 557 To recover attorneys' fees a party must merely prove
that the allegations in the pleading were untrue and were made
without reasonable cause.558 The fact that a court resolves a factual
issue adversely to the pleader does not necessarily establish that an
allegation was made without reasonable cause.55 9 In Illinois, therefore
it would be much easier to prove a right to attorneys' fees, than
to successfully prove a cause of action for malicious prosecution.
The advantages of a statute such as the Illinois statute is obvious.
A physician who claims to have been unjustifiably sued for malpractice
need only prove that the plaintiff-patient or his attorney lacked rea-
sonable or probable cause to institute the action in order to recover
the attorneys' fees he incurred in successfully defending the action.
Actual or implied malice or bad faith need not be proven. Moreover,
the physician need not institute a second proceeding to recover attor-
neys' fees, but may do so as part of the original suit, with an appreciable
saving in time and costs. 560 Even though a party may prove all the
N.E.2d 172 (1975). Where plaintiff makes a false pleading knowing that it is false, one case has
held that all of defendant's expenses and fees that result from plaintiff's pleadings in disregard of
the known facts were recoverable. Kosthade v. Telford, 13 Ill. App. 3d 961, 301 N.E.2d 321
(1973).
554. Md. R. Civ. Prac. 604 § b(1); F.W. Berens Sales Co. v. McKinney, 310 A.2d 601 (D.C.
App. 1973). Illinois no longer requires proof of bad faith. Upon a finding that an allegation was
made without reasonable cause and that it was untrue recovery of attorneys' fees can be had. See
Jenner & Martin, Commentary, Ill. Ann. Stat, ch. 110, § 41 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976).
555. F.W. Berens Sales Co. v. McKinney, 310 A.2d 601, 603 (D.C. App. 1973).
556. Jenner & Martin, Commentary, ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 41 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1976).
557. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 41 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976).
558. Id. See also Grandys v. Spring Soft Water Conditioning Co., 101 Il. App. 2d 225, 242
N.E.2d 454 (1968).
559. Theodorou v. Community Builders, Inc., 6 UIl. App. 3d 277, 280, 285 N.E.2d 474, 476
(1972). See Horoween v. Dunbar, 68 Ill. App. 2d 309, 319-20, 216 N.E.2d 288, 293 (1965)
("Plaintiffs had to present sufficient evidence that the allegation in defendants' pleadings were not
only untrue, but that defendants, at the time they made the allegations, knew they were untrue.").
560. A hearing will be held at trial at which time the court may summarily tax expenses
incurred by reason of the untrue pleadings. Krass v. Froio, 24 Ill. App. 3d 924, 322 N.E.Zd 67
(1975). See also Adams v. Silfen, 342 Ill. App. 415, 96 N.E.2d 628 (1951).
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requisites of a malicious prosecution action and recover all the ex-
penses incurred in defending the maliciously instituted suit, he still
may not recover the legal expenses he incurred in the malicious
prosecution action itself.5 6 ' A statute5 62 providing for attorneys' fees
would, at least, afford a limited remedy to a physician 63 who
believes he has been unjustifiably sued.5 64 A more realistic use of an
award of attorneys' fees where there is proof of a lack of reasonable
cause in prosecuting an action would certainly deter unjustified litiga-
tion without unduly restricting the institution of meritorious malprac-
tice actions.
B. Security for Costs
Another procedure which may deter unjustified suits has been
promulgated in California.565 Under this statute, at any time before
final judgment, a defendant may move, upon notice and hearing, for
an order requiring the plaintiff to provide security for costs. The
defendant must allege in his moving papers that the plaintiff "is a
vexatious litigant and that there is not a reasonable probability that he
will prevail in the litigation against the moving defendant. '566 When
such a motion is filed, the court must stay the proceedings pending
determination of the motion. The amount of security, if any, to be
provided by the plaintiff is within the court's discretion. 567
Security for costs legislation would benefit the physician since it
requires the plaintiff and his attorney to determine at the time of the
defendant's motion, which would generally be at the initial stages of
the litigation, whether to continue a claim which the court has
determined lacks merit. The deterrent effect of this statute on nuisance
claims could be substantial. It would seem that the requirement that
there is no "reasonable probability that he will prevail," should be
561. See Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187 (1878).
562. Any power of a trial court to impose attorneys' fees to deter bad faith litigation should be
created by the legislature with appropriate safeguards and guidelines. Young v. Redman, 55 Cal.
App. 3d 827, 838-39, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86, 93-94 (1976).
563. The plaintiff should, of course, be permitted to recover his reasonable attorneys' fees If
the defendant interposed frivolous defenses.
564. In all of these cases, the costs of the attorneys' fees were apparently assessed against the
party not the attorney. There is some authority indicating that costs may be assessed against an
attorney who asserts a frivolous position in a litigation. Acevedo v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 538 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1976) (double costs were assessed against an attorney since it
was unlikely that the petitioner would be able to satisfy the costs and the petitioner was found not
to be responsible for the unreasonable prolongation of the litigation).
565. Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 391.1 (West Supp. 1976).
566. Id.
567. Id. § 391.3 (West 1973). If Security is not furnished, the action shall be dismissed. Id. §
391.4.
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considered to be at least the equivalent of lack of probable cause. 568 It
is questionable, however, whether the issue of probable cause in
initiating the action should be determined at this early stage of the
proceedings.
Moreover, if the security was minimal, it would not act as a
deterrent to bringing an unjustified action. Yet if the security was too
substantial, it could discourage meritorious malpractice claims since
there is no requirement that plaintiff's financial ability5 69 to furnish
adequate security be considered. 570
It would appear that statutes requiring an award of attorneys' fees at
the conclusion of the malpractice action, rather than requiring security
at the initiation of the suit, better accomplish the goal of deterring
unjustified suits without discouraging meritorious ones.
IX. CONCLUSION
Although some unidentifiable percentage of medical malpractice
suits are unjustifiably instituted, there is insufficient evidence to indi-
cate or infer that a substantial number of medical malpractice claims
are groundless. The well-recognized public policy of providing free
access to the courts without fear that a subsequent action will be
instituted as a penalty for using the courts in the event the litigant is
unsuccessful must be preserved. On balance, the public's interest in
open access to the courts and the attorneys' need freely to institute and
litigate malpractice claims to implement this policy outweighs the
physicians' interest in freedom from defending unjustified malpractice
suits. There do not appear to be sufficient policy grounds for reversing
the courts' traditional reluctance to expand the available remedies
against those who have allegedly instituted unjustified litigation. The
traditional remedies of malicious prosecution and abuse of process
safeguard the attorney's and his client's rights to prosecute meritorious
568. Id. § 391.1 (West Supp. 1976). See Muller v. Tanner, 2 Cal. App. 3d 445, 82 Cal. Rptr.
738 (1970).
569. A bill was introduced in 1975 in the New York Senate proposing a similar security for
costs procedure. S. 660 § 1, 1975 N.Y. Leg. The bill would have required, however, that the
defendant, in addition to showing that there was no "reasonable possibility" that plaintiff had a
cause of action, prove that the plaintiff would not suffer undue economic hardship in giving such
security. This proposal was not passed. See Note, Rx for New York's Medical Malpractice Crisis,
11 Colum. J.L. & Social Problems 467, 481-82 (1975).
570. The plaintiff, not his attorney, is generally liable for security for costs. A provision that
an attorney pay his client's security for costs would violate the spirit of ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 5-103(B) which restricts the attorney's right to advance the expenses of
litigation to his client See 8 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, New York Civil Practice
8501.05 (1976). Wisconsin, however, follows the practice of holding the plaintiff's attorney liable
for security for costs. See Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 814.27, 814.28, 814.34 (1977).
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claims and provide an adequate remedy to the physician who feels that
he has been unjustifiably sued.
It is essential that those states still that adhere to the minority
position, requiring proof of special injury in malicious prosecution
actions, abrogate this restrictive rule.5 7' A defendant who has incurred
legal fees as a result of defending an unjustified action, which has been
instituted without probable cause and with malice, should be able to
recover such fees without proof of any additional special injury. In
those jurisdictions which continue to adhere to the restrictive rule
requiring special injury, courts could recognize a physician's claim for
defending an unjustified medical malpractice suit by relying on the
theory of prima facie tort. However, the prima facie tort concept
should not be invoked to overcome the other stringent proof require-
ments of a malicious prosecution action. If a prima facie tort action is
alleged, plaintiffs' burden of proving that the original malpractice
action was instituted without justification should be the equivalent of
proof of lack of probable cause.572 Proof of malice should be an
essential element of plaintiffs' case regardless of the theory plaintiff
utilizes, provided malice is broadly defined to include implied malice,
i.e., malice may be inferred from the absence of just cause or excuse
for doing an act which causes damage or from a lack of probable
cause. Moreover, the remedy of prima facie tort should not be em-
ployed to circumvent the generally required element in malicious
prosecution actions of termination of the prior suit in defendants'
favor. If a physician or other professional is permitted to assert a
counterclaim for malicious prosecution or prima facie tort in the
original action, the primary focus in the original action will be shifted
from the often complicated issues of malpractice to the motives of the
attorney and his client in instituting the action. The delay and addi-
tional expense which the defendant physician would incur in having to
wait until the successful termination of the original malpractice action
is slight compared to the adverse psychological effect and additional
confusion that could be caused by permitting a counterclaim in the
original action.
There are, however, certain reforms573 that could deter, to some
extent, the prosecution of unjustifiable medical malpractice claims.
Many states have adopted a system of impartial medical malpractice
571. See notes 108-15 supra and accompanying text.
572. See note 435 supra and accompanying text.
573. For a discussion of some solutions to the problem of unjustified medical malpractice
suits, see Rheingold, The Remedies of the Wrongfully Sued Professional, 1975 Nat'l Medicolegal
Symposium 52, 55-56; Willis, Assault with a Deadly Lawsuit A Wrong in Search of a Remedy,
Case & Comment, Nov.-Dec. 1976, at 19.
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panels to review malpractice claims prior to trial. S74 The panel system
could be structured in conjunction with an award of attorneys' fees to
discourage the trial of unjustified malpractice suits. Where the panel
unanimously5 7S finds that a patient does not present a valid malprac-
tice claim, the patient and his attorney still have a right to pursue the
action in the courts. However, in view of the unanimous panel finding
that the doctor was not negligent, a patient and his attorney, who
continue to prosecute the action, should pay the reasonable attorneys'
fees of the physician who successfully defends the action. Such a
finding is sufficient to put the patient's attorney on notice that the
claim has little, if any merit. A patient and his attorney who then
proceed to trial are obviously gambling that a jury will be sympathetic
to the claim. This procedure would discourage the prosecution of many
groundless malpractice actions. On the other hand, the reverse of this
procedure could be used to encourage settlements as well as limit the
expenses of unnecessary litigation. If the medical malpractice panel
unanimously finds that the physician was negligent, it is obvious that
the action should be settled at that point without incurring any
additional costs in preparing or trying the case. Neither party's attor-
ney should be permitted to act unreasonably with regard to settling the
action. If the physician's attorneys offer an unreasonably small sum in
settlement and the patient at the time of trial recovers a sum in excess
of the amount offered, the plaintiff should be permitted to recover the
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in trying the case. On the other
hand, if the sum recovered at trial is less than the amount offered by
the physician's attorneys in settlement, it can be inferred that the
plaintiff was unreasonable in his demand and was therefore the cause
of additional litigation. In that case, the patient and his attorney (at
least to the extent of his contingent fee) should be responsible for the
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by the defendant. Such a procedure
would serve the dual purpose of discouraging the trial of many
malpractice suits and of fosteAng more realistic settlement offers and
demands.
Moreover, the legal profession itself must recognize and become
more responsive to the physicians' problems. Physicians, as well as
other professionals, have a right to be free from defending groundless
professional liability suits. Local bar associations or grievance com-
mittees should carefully investigate claims brought by physicians
574. See notes 509-10 supra and accompanying text.
575. If there has been a split finding by the panel there is some indication that the plaintiff
may have a valid claim of malpractice and he should be permitted to pursue the suit. An
inference arises that the patients' claim was instituted with probable cause and attorneys' fees
should not be awarded merely because the plaintiff proceeds to trial to vindicate his rights.
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against lawyers who they contend have prosecuted unjustified profes-
sional liability suits. Appropriate disciplinary measures should be
imposed upon those lawyers who abuse the courts by prosecuting
groundless litigation.
A more constructive use of an award of attorneys' fees in medical
malpractice cases576 could have the positive effect of discouraging the
prosecution of unjustified litigation, without having a chilling effect on
meritorious litigation. Statutes providing for an award of attorneys'
fees, where the allegations of a pleading are untrue and asserted
without probable cause, would provide some relief for a physician who
believes he has been unjustifiably sued. Such statutes would bypass
some of the traditional proof requirements of malicious prosecution
actions such as malice, special injury, and the necessity of instituting a
second action for malicious prosecution after the termination of the
original proceeding. The physician's recovery would, however, be
limited to his direct economic loss in defending the unjustified action.
He would not be able under such a statute to recover all of his other
consequential damages such as loss of business, loss of reputation,
mental distress or punitive damages.
If a lawyer is going to be sued by another lawyer every time a
professional successfully defends a malpractice action, litigation would
truly become interminable and the strain on the American legal system
would be overwhelming. The public policy of open access to the courts
for the redress of grievances would only be realized by those litigants
who have "sure" claims. On balance, therefore, except for the award-
ing of attorneys' fees in certain well-defined situations, the successful
professional who feels that he has been unjustifiably sued by a patient
and his attorney should be permitted to recover only if he can prove
the essential elements of a traditional malicious prosecution or abuse of
process action.
576. An argument can be made that the traditional American rule awarding counsel fees
should be abandoned only in medical malpractice cases because of the professional's unique
interest in maintaining his professional reputation. See Rheingold, The Remedies of the Wrong-
fully Sued Professional, 1975 Natl Medicolegal Symposium-52, 56.
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